



# ***JPRS Report***

## **Near East & South Asia**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A**  
Approved for public release;  
Distribution Unlimited

19980713 047

# Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-89-057

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### **'Reunification' of Turkish Territories Discussed**

46050033a Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 5 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] We reported recently that representatives from both the government and the people made speeches at the 23-26 June sitting of the Armenian Supreme Soviet.

We learn from an exclusive report that has reached AZTAG that [journalist] Zori Balayan and other individuals also spoke at the meeting. In his speech Balayan raised the issue of the pan-Turanist threat. Citing the case of Nakhijevan, Balayan demanded that the Soviet Union recognize what was done to the Armenians in Nakhijevan as a genocide.

Balayan also raised the issue of restoring Armenia's pre-1914 borders and proposed that the reunification of the [Turkish provinces of] Kars and Ardahan [with Armenia].

Balayan's speech was followed by a debate and the evaluation of the issues he raised. Members of the Karabakh Committee also took part in the debate.

### **Catholicos Welcomes ArSSR Recognition of 28 May**

46050033c Paris GAMK in Armenian 5 Jul 89 p 1

[Bull by Vazken I, Catholicos of All Armenians, issued in Echmiadzin on 14 June 1989]

[Excerpts] Vazken, servant of Jesus Christ, Chief Bishop and Catholicos of all Armenians through the compassion of God and the will of the nation, and Supreme Patriarch of the Esteemed Pannational Araratian See at the Holy Apostolic Mother Church of Echmiadzin:

Greetings of Christian love and blessings to His Holiness Karekin II, the Pontifical Catholicos of the Holy See of Cilicia; His Holiness Archbishop Yeghishe, the Patriarch of Holy Jerusalem; His Holiness Archbishop Shnorhik, the Patriarch of Constantinople; all archbishops, bishops, archimandrites, priests and deacons; diocesan assemblies and diocesan and parish councils; church employees; and all beloved Armenian believers:

By providential ordinance and a favorable change of times, the awaited hour has come for our people and government to take possession of the history of the last 100 years which is a heroic saga of a liberation struggle "for faith and for homeland."

Peoples assert their national identity and determine the correct path toward the future by claiming ownership of their history.

That is why We, on behalf of the Armenian Apostolic Church, welcome the 26 May decision of our homeland's government to officially recognize 28 May 1918 as the date of declaration of Armenian statehood in modern times 600 years after the demise of the last Armenian—Cilician—kingdom. [passage omitted]

Today, our nation stands on the foundations of its history, because the Armenian state continued to exist with the establishment of Soviet order on 29 November 1920, when the historic enemy threatened to exterminate the newly-created Armenia in a reenactment of the Genocide of 1915.

The Armenian Republic continued its existence in the United Republic of Soviet Nationalities in conditions of secure and peaceful development and has recently embarked on a course of becoming increasingly more autonomous. This, too, is our history which we must own and evaluate realistically and fairly.

At this historic juncture, the people of Armenia must set its sights on its future with a sense of national self-recognition and dignity, with the spirit of the unity of the people and the government of the Motherland and with the awareness of the supreme interests of our nation, never, but never, forgetting the geographic position of our homeland, the tragic experience of our past and the true extent of our nation's own strengths—factors which determine the political orientation and destiny of small nations in particular.

With this bull, We instruct all churches in Armenia and in the Diaspora to offer services of thanksgiving on every 28 May as they do on every 29 November.

May the memory of the heroes of Sardarapat and the architects of 28 May be blessed.

Glory upon our reborn Mother Armenia.

Vazken I, Catholicos of All Armenians,

Issued this bull on 14 June 1989 in the year of our Savior, 1438 in the Armenian calendar of the Mother City of Holy Echmiadzin.

### **New Measures in ArSSR Examined**

46050033b Paris GAMK in Armenian 29 Jun 89 p 1

[Article by Y. Kevorkian: "Beyond Formalities"]

[Excerpts] Who would have thought 5 months ago that members of the Karabakh Committee would not only be set free but would also be allowed to participate in the deliberations of the Armenian Supreme Soviet in an advisory capacity, that they would be able to speak there and that they would take part in debates?

Who would have thought that representatives of ordinary people (that is members of the Karabakh Committee and the people of Soviet Armenia in general) would be members of (at least four) Supreme Soviet committees which would be in charge of issues that are of deepest concern and anxiety to us? [passage omitted]

Is it a political gaffe that is being rectified these days? Does the leadership of Suren Arutyunyan really wish to return to its roots and to draw its sustenance from the people—that is, as is often said, "from below"?

We do not waver. By the close of the 25 June sitting of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, the Armenian Pannational Movement was an official body—an official conglomerate of numerous organizations. At this stage it can be said that Armenia has officially embarked on a course of pluralism and freedom of expression.

It would be ludicrous to refute the evidence. We do not refute it but we do not know where this situation will lead. Will it reach our tormented depths in both Armenia and the Diaspora? We have been in torment for more than a year. Our torment was more acute when the 11 became emaciated in prison. Our torment was deeper when the Artsakhians, the true architects [of the Karabakh movement] but also the oppressed, revolted.

They are still rebelling today. Our torment is still acute today because those brave people are in the same situation. Their circumstances have not changed, and they demand to be united with their Motherland.

We do not waver. We acknowledge the facts and pose the following question: Will glasnost, whose era finally

begins in Armenia, go beyond the limits of talk and rectify the mistakes of the past and the present?

We do not waver. Will Gorbachev raise his finger at the despots of Azerbaijan? Will the Vezirovs, Hasanovs or Haydarovs go to jail for the repression they practiced and the discriminatory policies they pursued?

The fundamental problem remains. The wound of Artsakh is still open and has not healed. Armenia enters the glasnost era which must be a true to its creed—an era of freedom of individual and collective expression and the realization of dreams.

Otherwise, while acknowledging the facts we will say: Let the formalities end so that we do not fall into the abyss of self-oblivion and become indifferent.

At this stage it is impossible to be indifferent, to forget the main problem and to be fooled by formalities.

At this stage it is the just solution of the Artsakh problem that defines glasnost with all its details and variations. [passage omitted]

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Iranian Interference in 'Missile Crisis' Reported

*London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic*  
13 Jul 89 p 3

[Article: "Iran May Enter as Party to 'Missile Crisis' in Lebanon; Expanded Confrontation Harbors Risk of Complete Division and Internationalization."]

[Text] Beirut—Since Khomeyni's departure, numerous questions have been raised on the options that will be taken by the new Iranian leadership at the domestic and foreign levels. Questions have also been raised on whether Tehran will resume observing the international rules of conduct defined in agreed-on principles and pacts, especially on whether it will refrain from interfering in other countries' domestic affairs. One of the most significant questions raised concerns Iran's role in Lebanon at a time when the Lebanese are becoming increasingly concerned with the escalating interventions that threaten to destroy whatever remains of their country.

The question concerning Iran's role in Lebanon has grown sharper in light of the visit being made to Tehran by Nabih Birri, Amal Movement leader. His militia, which supports Syria, is engaged in an open war against the pro-Iran Hizballah—a war that started a year ago and that has not ended yet. Interest in this visit and its outcome grew after successive reports to the effect that Birri will ask Tehran to supply his militias and the other militias allied with them with modern weapons. These weapons would include surface-to-surface missiles, on the pretext of establishing a "strategic balance" with the forces of the military government which is headed by Gen Michel 'Awn and which, according to Damascus, has gotten this type of missiles from Iraq.

What has contributed to giving these reports a degree of credibility is the statements Birri made prior to his departure from Damascus to Tehran, accompanied by Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati. Birri asked Syria to supply the Lebanese parties allied with it with surface-to-surface missiles and with modern tanks, adding that these parties are entitled to try to acquire them from another party if there are circumstances or factors that prevent Syria from supplying these weapons to its allies.

It seems that Birri headed for Iran's capital after the said parties failed to acquire this type of weapon from an Arab country which had previously supplied Lebanon's leftist parties with quantities of weapons, in addition to financial aid.

Informed sources in West Beirut have said that Birri has carried to Tehran a list of the weapons which the pro-Damascus Lebanese militias believe they need to confront General 'Awn. The sources added that along with this list, Birri has carried with him a plan to end the

conflict with Hizballah—a plan which includes some concessions in favor of that party.

The press commentaries made during Birri's visit to Tehran have implied that any Iranian support for Amal and its allied parties will be conditional upon uniting the ranks, i.e. giving Hizballah a place in any broad front that benefits from Iranian aid, whether in funds or in weapons.

How does the current Iranian presence in Lebanon look?

The Iranian presence in Lebanon relies on several mainstays, the first of which is the presence of members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard near the town of Ba'labakk in al-Biqa' and in Beirut's southern suburb. Originally, these men entered Lebanon in accordance with an agreement concluded with Damascus after 1982. Hundreds more Revolutionary Guards entered in the wake of the 14 March confrontation between the pro-'Awn brigades on the one hand and the Syrian forces and the pro-Syria Lebanese forces on the other. The Revolutionary Guard members have the full support of Iran. They often engage in arming and training operations conducted within the framework of Hizballah's activities and of the militias it controls.

Hizballah, whose spiritual leader is Shaykh Husayn Fadlallah, is the second, and most important, mainstay of the Iranian presence in Lebanon, especially since this party has, under various names and through various channels, seized the "western hostages" in Lebanon.

The truth is that the "western hostage" problem is one of the forms of the Iranian presence in Lebanon, especially since this problem has been transformed into some sort of a line of contact between Iran and the countries to whom the hostages belong.

In the field, the pro-Iran armed elements have full freedom of movement in Beirut's southern suburb which has been considered their stronghold since Amal succeeded last year in eliminating their military presence in South Lebanon, even though these elements have maintained a limited military presence in some points in the south. The armed elements themselves enjoy a large degree of free movement in the al-Biqa' area where Syrian forces are deployed. But this margin of freedom is influenced by the developments in Damascus-Tehran relations, especially when the confrontation between Amal and Hizballah escalates.

It is evident that Iran devotes great attention to its military and political presence in Lebanon. It has spent on this objective vast sums of money to attract young people, taking advantage of the tragic economic conditions Lebanon has been experiencing for 3 years.

Since the early 1980's, Iran's choice fell on Lebanon as a place to be infiltrated within the framework of the alleged "exporting of the revolution." The fact is that this choice is largely due to Lebanon being the weak link in the region after having been transformed by the

prolonged and draining war into a country with uncontrolled borders whose security authorities and agencies are totally incapable of controlling these borders. Perhaps Tehran's primary objective behind its infiltration of the Lebanese arena was to control the Lebanese Shi'ite card. The Shi'ite sect has become one of Lebanon's biggest sects. But the attempt to control this card has clashed with Syria's interest in the same card, considering that Amal is an ally of Damascus which has also succeeded in attracting political and religious Shi'ite leaders. The struggle or the tug of war for this card has always found its translation in the Amal-Hizballah clashes. Repeated negotiations under joint Iranian-Syrian auspices—the latest of which were held during Velayati's visit to Damascus—have not succeeded in putting a final end to these clashes.

Iran has used its presence in Lebanon not only to settle its accounts concerning the Gulf war but also to destroy any chance of Lebanon resorting to a domestic settlement similar to the settlement it relied on in the past. Iran's instruments in Lebanon have contributed to evicting the Arab and foreign embassies from the western part of Lebanon's capital. This does not mean that Iran is the only party desiring such eviction or benefiting from it.

When the battles erupted last March, Hizballah circles did not display enthusiasm to wage the battles against General 'Awn's forces in the belief that the artillery and missile exchanges may be beneficial to Hizballah. These circles expressed their readiness to take part in the battle if its objective is to uproot the Lebanese system altogether. The party circles implied that the party's actual participation hinges on settling the pending issues between Hizballah and Amal, including the issue of permitting the Hizballah fighters to return to South Lebanon and the issue of giving the tendency to which Hizballah belongs full freedom of military and political action.

With the increasing talk about the delivery of Iraqi weapons to 'Awn's forces and with the escalating confrontation between these forces and the Syrian forces in Lebanon, a new climate has developed between the two parties, and hundreds of armed Iranian elements have been permitted to enter the Lebanese territories. This has renewed Amal's fears. But it seems that the calculations that surpass the two parties have contributed to altering the positions, with Birri taking the road to Tehran which he had refused to visit for many years.

The question raised now is: Will Iran supply the Lebanese militias with ground-to-ground missiles? Western diplomats in Beirut believe that a step of this kind will be tantamount to a dangerous escalation in the Lebanese situation and that such escalation will cause not only the domestic players but also the regional players to lose control of the game. These diplomats add that Washington has told Damascus and Baghdad very clearly that

it absolutely opposes transforming the ongoing confrontation in Lebanon into a conclusion of the Gulf war or into an opportunity for settling the accounts pertaining to this war.

The diplomats have said that the introduction of modern Iranian weapons into Lebanon will constitute an explosive element that will entail extremely serious military and political consequences. Practically, such weapons can be delivered only through Syrian territory. In such a case, Syria will shoulder a large share of the responsibility, especially since western intelligence reports have demonstrated that 'Awn does not possess surface-to-surface missiles, even though 'Awn has not, for political calculations, either denied or confirmed this.

The diplomats added that supplying the pro-Syria militias with Iranian weapons will make Iran a partner in the decisionmaking in the areas where the Syrian forces are deployed. This will complicate any future settlement, not to mention the concern over what may happen in case a major conflict develops between Tehran and Damascus, even if only in the form of a confrontation between their local instruments.

The diplomats also believe that Israel's refraining from intervening in the ongoing confrontation in Beirut does not mean that Israel is not concerned with observing what is going on there. Israel may wish to punish General 'Awn for establishing some sort of alliance with Iraq. This is why it has withdrawn its ships from the Lebanese territorial waters and why it has not opposed the entry of other ships into these waters. But ultimately, Israel will not permit the deployment of surface-to-surface missiles in Lebanese territories and in areas from which Israeli targets can be hit. Such deployment will provide Israel with the justification to perhaps stage another invasion of Lebanon.

Diplomats believe that the introduction of Iranian missiles into Lebanon will eliminate the last Lebanese vestiges of the ongoing conflict there. They believe that this will push current developments in Beirut toward the circle of internationalization, which will culminate with either dividing Lebanon into a number of feuding protectorates or with a firm international resolution to drive all non-Lebanese armies out of Lebanon. The latter is what the parties to the conflict are trying to prevent.

### **AL-'AHD Blames ACC, U.S., Saudi Arabia, Libya for Sudan Coup**

#### **Coup Called ACC 'Experiment'**

*45040437 Beirut AL-'AHD in Arabic 7 Jul 89 p 7*

[Article: "Arab Cooperation Council Shows Its Teeth in Sudan"]

[Text] The recent military coup in the Sudan that overthrew the government of Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi was the first experiment in political solidarity among the countries of the Arab Cooperation Council [ACC].

One day after the coup, Egypt announced its support of those who carried it out and hastened to offer them aid. Within hours, Jordan announced its support of the participants in the coup. Iraq and North Yemen followed.

It was no accident that the ACC's member nations were the first supporters of the overthrow of the civilian government in the Sudan.

Iraqi, Jordanian, and North Yemeni support was in effect support for Egypt, which was proved immediately after the coup to be the principal force behind it, its main supporter, or at least the greatest beneficiary from its results.

From the beginning, Egypt took a stand against al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. It worked continually to render his job difficult, or intervened to create dissension between members of the successive coalition governments that al-Mahdi headed. Sometimes it drew close to the National Islamic Front [NIF], sometimes to the Democratic Unionist Party [DUP], and sometimes to Garang's rebels.

In the Sudan's relative democracy, Egypt saw a challenge to the dictatorship ruling in the land of the Nile—a contagious disease that threatened to spread to it. The government of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, like preceding Egyptian governments, always opposed the coming to power of the Ansar order and the Ummah Party, both of which al-Mahdi led to power.

The Ansar order, which was founded by Muhammad Ibn-'Abdallah al-Mahdi late in the last century, and which under his leadership achieved great victories over Egyptian, Turkish, and British forces in the Sudan, represented a movement striving for independence in the Sudan. This conflicts with official Egyptian thinking, which considers the Sudan to be only a subordinate country, an expanse without a will of its own.

Cairo was therefore unhappy with al-Mahdi's coming to power, particularly since he was one of the most prominent Sudanese politicians who had rejected the Camp David agreements. He had called upon Ja'far Numayri's Sudanese government, which had broken ranks with the Arab consensus to cut relations with Egypt, to fall in line with the Arab countries.

After al-Mahdi came to power in 1986, he suspended all agreements that Ja'far Numayri had concluded during his administration. One of these was the treaty of brotherhood with Egypt, which dealt with relations between the two countries in all areas. Al-Mahdi's government also halted participation by Sudanese forces in the joint American-Egyptian maneuvers that had normally taken place every year since 1980.

All this was more than enough for Egypt not to be pleased with the civilian government in the Sudan. Egypt's recognition of the coup's participants on the following day, the sending of an Egyptian emissary to

Khartoum 2 days later, and the subsequent visit to Egypt by a delegation of coup participants are proofs of Egypt's involvement.

But Egypt was not the only ACC country that helped overthrow the civilian regime in the Sudan. Iraq was on Egypt's side. Iraq had become furious at the friendly relations between the Sudan and Iran. Relations between the two countries became tense after Iraqi diplomats were involved in the assassination of Mr Mahdi al-Hakim in Khartoum.

Khartoum's charge that the diplomats had been involved in the assassination led to the withdrawal of ambassadors between the two countries.

However, this did not stop Iraq from sending military aid to the Sudanese army, which desperately needed aid because of the war in the south. The ranks of the army had begun to feel anger at the inability of al-Mahdi's government to carry out the army's demands and provide its essential requirements for embarking on the war in the south.

Iraq was thus able to find officers friendly to it inside the Sudanese army.

Political sources say that the invisibility of these officers may have been aimed at preparation for a subsequent full assumption of power.

The sources add that officers friendly to Egypt and Numayri and others friendly to Iraq were behind the coup.

The sources say that the coup would not have taken place had it not been for the existence of approval and support from the Americans, notwithstanding all the influence of Egypt, Numayri, and Iraq within the army.

The sources indicate that the coup in the Sudan comes in the context of a plan to restore the political map in the Arab region. The ACC was charged with this plan on behalf of the United States of America. The sources say that Saudi Arabia also played a principal role in wrecking the Sudanese civilian government by stopping aid to the Sudan, by curbing it, or by supporting forces hostile to al-Sadiq al-Mahdi.

One can say that with the fall of the Sudanese civilian government, the only civilian parliamentary government in the Arab region has fallen. One can also say that one of the most prominent functions of the ACC is to combat any form of popular representation in government, particularly since popular representation in government is incompatible with the continuance of American influence in the region.



**'Sudanese Sources' on Plot***45040437 Beirut AL-'AHD in Arabic 7 Jul 89 p 7*

[Article: "Libyan-Egyptian-Saudi Triangle Behind Overthrow of al-Mahdi's Government in Sudan"]

[Text] After 3 years of civilian government in the Sudan, the most important experiment in popular government in the Arab world has collapsed under the feet of the army. Thus the Sudanese saying has been proved true: Every attempt at civilian government inevitably is followed by a military coup that sweeps away all the achievements of democracy and returns the Sudan to a whirlpool of repression and terror, in keeping with the political system prevalent throughout the Arab geographical area.

In a way that leaves no room for doubt, the recent coup has revealed how unhappy the regional powers were with the existence of a free Sudan, not subject to external tutelage, setting its own political course without reference to the politics of alliances and axes that move the Arabs nowadays. The Sudan seemed to be an anomaly. It therefore had to be brought back into the Arab fold by sweeping away popular government and putting the army in charge.

Informed Sudanese sources have told AL-'AHD that the Libyan-Egyptian duo was behind the coup, which also enjoyed Saudi approval. The first signs of the coup appeared in al-Qadhdhafi's speech on the anniversary of the departure of American troops from his country. He called for a triple union between Libya, Egypt, and the Sudan. The speech was immediately followed by an unsuccessful coup attempt, which was discovered 2 weeks ago. It served as preparation for the recent coup, which was in harmony and accord with it. This explains why the new ruler of the Sudan began releasing those charged in the attempt as soon as his coup succeeded. Sudanese sources consider it unlikely that deposed President Ja'far Numayri had any role in 'Umar al-Bashir's coup, since he is too weak to direct the least important Sudanese officer on such a mission. However, the sources assert that the coup would not have taken place had it not been for the Unionists' support for 'Umar al-Bashir and their mediating and coordinating between him and the Egyptian authorities. In this regard, the sources ask why the coup coincided with the presence of the DUP's two most important leaders, Ahmad al-Mirghani and Zayn-al-'Abidin al-Hindi, outside the Sudan. They see this as an attempt to divert suspicion from the Unionist role in the coup. As for the arrest of 'Uthman al-Mirghani, the sources classify it as an attempt at camouflage by the participants in the coup, to create the impression that their movement leans toward no party. However, these sources also consider it unlikely that DUP people will have a share in the coming political formation, although they will have close relations with the new rulers.

In a related matter, the sources see the coup leader's statements about a campaign of executions to be carried

out against Sudanese political figures as a kind of foolishness and delusion. Embarking on such a course would put the Sudan on the brink of a ruinous civil war, since the Sudanese political parties possess armed militias, some of which are more powerful than the army. (The Ummah Party has a 90,000-man militia.) Furthermore, the main parties (Ummah, DUP, and NIF) enjoy wide popular support, which the hitherto unknown 'Umar al-Bashir lacks. Thus, the sources consider it probable that the leader of the coup will carry out executions of politicians of the third level and lower, to prevent control of matters from escaping from his hands. The sources say that the issue of the Sudanese south played an important role in the coup. The success of 'Umar al-Bashir's coup accompanies increasing talk about the need to end this problem, which burdens the Sudanese economy at the rate of \$1 million a day—according to participants in the coup. Commenting on this, the sources say that focusing on the costs of the southern war is aimed at convincing the Sudanese that their problems flow from the continued war with people of the one homeland and that solving this problem will prepare the way for a solution to all the Sudan's problems.

The sources add that the call for holding talks with the separatists, the sending of an Egyptian emissary to talk with them, and the invitation to John Garang from the participants in the coup, enter into the above framework. These things can be considered as preliminaries to show good intentions and indicate the opening of a new page with the southerners. This is to be followed by an agreement to cancel the application of Islamic Shari'ah in the Sudan, on the grounds that this will restore national cohesion and guarantee the return of peace. Thus, the sources assert that John Garang has an important role to play in the new political stage, which will see a pagan and Christian march on the Sudanese regime.

**PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS****PLO Questions U.S. Administration's Positions***44040493a Nicosia FILASTIN AL-TILAW'RAH in Arabic 18 Jun 89 pp 10-11*

[Article: "The Dialogue Is Still a Dialogue, Not Negotiations"]

[Text] It seems that the Palestinian-American "substantive dialogue" will be long and marathon. There is no reason to believe that Washington, for its part, is in a hurry for progress from a general idea to a clear plan, despite increasing demands for that from the Israeli Labor Party and to a lesser degree from the PLO.

16 December 1988: Weather stormy and cold, overcast with clouds; an hour of waiting.

22 March 1989: Same weather; 4 hours of waiting.

8 June 1989: Warm and pleasant weather; 4 and ½ hours of waiting.

Those were the dates and the weather conditions for the three sessions of Palestinian-American dialogue that took place at the same place, the guest house in Carthage, a suburb of the Tunisian capital.

The warm weather at the last session seems to have reflected the heated atmosphere of discussion between the delegations to the dialogue. In particular, the statements made by the American ambassador to Tunisia, Robert Pelletreau, Jr., head of the American side in the dialogue, show that the Bush administration still fully adheres to the Israeli point of view regarding the Middle East crisis, despite the fact that the Palestinian peace initiative has become pan-Arab, following the Casablanca summit.

Nevertheless, Mr Pelletreau's statement after the session contains positive elements. He said, for example, "This dialogue has developed from preliminary contacts to discussions of substantive questions. Today it has developed to consideration of serious questions in the step-by-step process of a complete resolution through negotiations based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 337, exchanging land for peace, Israel's security and recognition, and Palestinian political rights."

American Secretary of State James Baker repeated this language at the same time in Washington.

This language still vacillates in a context of generalities. It still rests basically, as Mr Pelletreau made clear in his statement, on the Shamir plan for elections in the West Bank and Gaza. Pelletreau said, "I stressed the U.S. Government's faith that elections will push the process forward and that the suggestions made by the Israeli Government are constructive and practical ones worthy of receiving a positive Palestinian response."

Pelletreau added in his statement, which he read from a paper, "Our hope is that the PLO will seriously consider this step and that the Palestinians and Arab governments will respond to it constructively."

Thus, the American Government has still not departed from the Israeli point of view about a settlement. The only new element is that the present American administration, unlike previous administrations, has not yet proposed a Middle East initiative. It has merely adopted the Israeli plan, so as to preserve a path for retreat, if, as is very possible, the plan fails.

Naturally, the new administration is still not ready to answer clearly the questions the PLO put to it in its letter sent this March. These questions included:

- Washington's idea about how to insure that elections are held freely and democratically, isolated from the presence of Israeli occupation authorities;
- What appropriate international supervision is proposed for the holding of these elections?
- What about participation by the Palestinians of East Jerusalem?

- How exactly do the Americans define the expression, "insuring the political rights of the Palestinian people"? In the view of the American administration, how can the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination and the establishment of their state, be guaranteed?
- The American administration says that it accepts the holding of an international peace conference, if this conference is well organized and prepared. What does that really mean? At what stage does the administration think that the international peace conference should be held? What is the American administration's idea of such a conference and of the parties that will participate in it?
- To what extent is the American administration really committed to launching a peace process that would include the end of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, guarantee the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, and achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East? What would the PLO's role in such a process be?

These and other questions form the heart of the PLO's request that the United States announce principles regarding its vision of a solution to the Middle East conflict. Thus, PLO Executive Committee member Yasir 'Abd-Rabbuh, head of the Palestinian delegation in the dialogue, stated after the meeting, "The PLO believes that the American administration has political responsibilities toward the completion of the peace process in the Middle East. It is therefore called upon to develop its positions so as to make the content of 'the political rights of the Palestinian people' clearer—by recognizing the Palestinian people's right to self-determination in freedom and without outside interference, under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of our people."

This means that development of the American positions must mean American approval for a Palestinian state. Practically, this must mean automatically raising the level of meetings with the PLO and a move from dialogue to negotiations. Time should not be wasted looking for alternatives to the PLO or in attempts to divide those inside [Palestine] from those outside. The latest of these attempts was embodied in the Shamir plan for elections.

Against this background, 'Abd-Rabbuh stated that the PLO "wants to stress again the point that was confirmed in Casablanca—namely, that elections in the occupied Palestinian areas can take place only after withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces and under appropriate international supervision."

A quick comparison of the statements by the two sides in the dialogue confirms that there is still a long way to go before the American administration is forced completely to acknowledge the Palestinian reality in the Middle East. The administration is still dodging to gain time, as usual, hoping that Middle East realities will change—by the might of the Almighty?

The American administration is still not prepared to offer what it considers to be substantive concessions in the Middle East, although it has been talking about substantive means.

Thus, we look forward to a hot summer of events, without tangible solutions. We await the fall, after the summer vacation in many countries. The beginning of this fall may see the beginning of movement in the Middle East. The Bush administration may bring out a comprehensive idea for a solution, one it may call an "initiative," after it exhausts the Shamir card that it has been espousing until now.

### **PLO, Israeli Strategy in Southern Lebanon Discussed**

44040493b Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 18 Jun 89 pp 25-26

[Article by Tawfiq Wasfi: "Belt of Fire in the North—Does Military Truce in South Lebanon Precede or Follow the Difficult Political Agreement in the Area?"]

[Text] Israeli commanders see military quiet in southern Lebanon as a test of the Palestinian political initiative. Palestinian commanders see things the other way around. They think that the credibility of Israel's approach to a political solution can be tested by a Palestinian-Israeli agreement to halt the firing on both sides of the Lebanese-Israeli border.

In the last 2 weeks, southern Lebanon and the eastern Biqa' Valley have witnessed a series of reciprocal military actions between Palestinian and Lebanese fighters, on the one hand, and Israeli and client forces, on the other, in an atmosphere of military tension unlike anything the region has seen for years. This military development has raised the concern of Israeli politicians. Some of them have connected it to the process of political dialogue between the PLO and the United States, a process that Israel is avoiding dealing with positively.

Perhaps what most worries Israeli military men and politicians is the relative success of some fighting commando groups in reaching beyond the "security belt" and entering Israeli areas that are supposed to have become free from the sounds of bullets. As Israeli military sources admit, an armed confrontation even occurred in the finger of Galilee, felling one Israeli soldier. This has been seen as a kind of failure by Israeli officers, who used to inform politicians of their ability to kill commandos infiltrating over the fence separating Israel and the insulating security zone. Furthermore, the operations have demonstrated the success of some attacking fighters in penetrating the security zone, challenging the extreme precautions and security measures, even after a series of air and artillery bombardment operations against bases and movement routes of Palestinian and Lebanese fighters in a relatively wide sector of the South, and particularly after the combing operation

by an Israeli unit late last month in the security belt and the closure of all crossing points between it and liberated Lebanese territory.

In a situation such as this, militarily one can expect more Israeli retaliatory operations, as well as some criticisms in military circles. An officer may even fall victim to the general atmosphere, as a scapegoat to explain the negligence revealed by the recent operations and confrontations. More importantly and more conspicuously, top Israeli political levels are talking about "the northern border" and events on it from the political angle, as was recently done by Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir and his foreign minister, Moshe Arens.

Linking Palestinian operations in South Lebanon and the intifadah in the occupied territories, Shamir fastened upon the increase of operations as his justification to claim that America's dialogue with the PLO was encouraging the latter to continue military actions and that the PLO wanted to use these operations to blackmail and put pressure on Israel. Commenting on the same matter, Arens went as far as to express amazement that the dialogue between Washington and the PLO had continued, despite the PLO's persistence in "acts of terrorism." One should note that in his recent meeting with American Secretary of State James Baker, Arens stressed that continuance of the Palestinian-American dialogue was "harming the Middle East peace process."

The contradiction here needs no explanation and clarification. Admission that the PLO has the power to make military decisions in southern Lebanon is no new addition to the realities and facts of the conflict. But doesn't that also entail admitting that the PLO has the right to deal with its position in that region in the context of its general political position—i.e., in the most immediate political sense, as a basic card that it holds in its comprehensive conflict with the Israeli enemy? That has been clear since the beginning of the Palestinian peace initiative late last year. The PLO understands a halt to terrorism and its condemnation in a broader framework. The PLO did not mean thereby to give up its right to set out from southern Lebanon to fight Israeli forces, as long as those forces allowed themselves the right to enter and leave that area to strike and kill Palestinians and their Lebanese allies.

Thus, if one points to the PLO's responsibility for military behavior in southern Lebanon, one must follow this by pointing even more explicitly to the need to deal with the PLO in that region as the decisionmaker on a fighting front where no agreement in the nature of a cease fire or disengagement has taken place.

Continuing in a game of blackmail in return for nothing is something to which the PLO will never yield, first of all because it is not forced to do so, and then because its position in this geographic area involves alliance relationships with other allies. The conditions of this alliance and of the long comradeship in arms require that there be full coordination with these allies in this regard.

If Shamir links the intifadah and the South Lebanon situation as two political cards in the PLO's hand, why does he not consider this to be a more objective starting point for dealing with the problems of the political settlement he is supposed to be seeking to achieve? How can the PLO—as Ze'ev Schiff says—trust Shamir's plan for elections unless a minimum of trust exists between Palestinians and the Israeli Government? Isn't there a possibility for an experiment of trust between the two sides, such as arriving at a cease fire agreement in southern Lebanon? This constitutes a very important test, not only for the PLO, as Schiff says; for the PLO established its credibility in a similar situation in 1981, while Israel was the one who violated the cease fire agreement. At the level of its various organizations, the PLO, specifically its political leadership, has confirmed its ability to force its members to accept its political position. In this situation, Chairman 'Arafat is not obliged, as some Israeli observers indicate, to prove his control over his followers and allies. The ball is in Israel's court and will remain there, until the reality of Israel's peaceful intentions is proved, not just in southern Lebanon, but also in the occupied territories.

However, the Israeli command does not want a military slow-down. It wants a political escape from the logical possibility that most international parties, even Israel's allies, have accepted—acceptance of the PLO as a valid “partner for realizing practical steps on the ground.” Given this obstinacy, Israel will persist in its operational position in southern Lebanon. This means the continuation of limited operations, such as air and artillery bombardment, and some preventative combing operations. This does not absolutely rule out a broad operation to try to reach all the places of Palestinian-Lebanese military presence, despite Israeli warnings that the zone of these extends outside the limits of the delineated line.

Israeli military recklessness has begun to increase after events of the last 2 weeks in southern Lebanon. Israeli War Minister Yitzhaq Rabin even warned Lebanese residents of the South that their lives would become unbearable if they helped fighters infiltrate into the occupied territories. In that case, “we will not allow quiet to prevail with them and not prevail with us.”

In the context of the same recklessness, Major General Yosi Peled, commander of the northern district, has made statements that his army will not stand with its hands tied in the face of the increase of operations in southern Lebanon. He threatened to launch operations that would “reach every place where the saboteurs are present.” However, the statements had other political and military aims no less important than deterrence and the guaranteeing of security to northern Israel.

Is Israel preparing for a broad Israeli operation aimed at snarling Palestinian-Lebanese operational lines for a long time? This would place new burdens upon the Palestinian political leadership and might influence its ability to support and lead the intifadah inside [Palestine]. It might also make the armed Palestinian presence

in southern Lebanon a less influential card. Israel thinks that an operation that succeeds even in the short term might restore confidence to the Israeli Army, which is suffering from the dilemma of its inability to put out the fire of the intifadah. Nor should we forget a more long-term goal—to confirm the Israeli role in Lebanon.

### **Palestinian Students Conference Held in Libya**

44040493c Nicosia *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH* in  
*Arabic* 25 Jun 89 p 24

[Article by Ruhi Rabbah: “Our Students in Libya Voted for National Unity, International Conference Calls for Stripping America of Veto”]

[Text] The General Union of Students of Palestine ended the third working session of its annual conference, the session of “the martyred leader and symbol, Abu Jihad [Khalil al-Wazir], and other martyrs of the intifadah,” on 8 June 1989 in Tripoli, in the Jamahiriyyah. The conference slogan was, “Let our people's intifadah continue inside the occupied homeland to end the occupation and achieve freedom and independence.” At the end of the conference, an administrative body for the Libya branch was elected. The national unity slate of brothers won. These are their names:

1. Manar 'Atallah
2. Mahmud Abu-Sittah
3. Sulayman 'Abidin
4. Jamal Barbakh
5. Khalid Hamid
6. Ashraf Abu-al-Naja
7. Khalid Muzhir
8. Jamal Rajab
9. Usamah Abu-Liyah.

Conference activities were dominated by an atmosphere of understanding and a high spirit of brotherhood in the context of Palestinian national unity. The final session was attended by Brother 'Izzat Abu-al-Rabb Khattab, the ambassador of the state of Palestine, representative of the PLO, and by representatives of the various groups of the Palestinian revolution and popular Palestinian organizations. At the end of their conference, the participants sent a telegram to Brother Abu-'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat], head of the state of Palestine, affirming that the student masses stood under the banner of the legitimate Palestinian government. They also sent a telegram of thanks to President Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, congratulating him for his stands on our people's intifadah inside the occupied Palestinian land. The conference issued a special communique in which the participants affirmed their commitment to the political line the PLO is following.

### International Conference

Also in Tripoli, a conference on human rights in the Mediterranean was held from 10 to 12 June 1989. The conference studied and analyzed subjects dealing with human rights. About 150 people from throughout the world participated. A delegation consisting of the following brothers represented Palestine: 'Abd-al-Jawad Salih (chairman), Muhammad Muqbil, 'Umar al-Misri, and Fathi Shaninu. 'Abd-al-Salam Jallud opened the activities of the conference.

The conference specifically discussed conditions in the occupied Palestinian land. It expressed its grave concern over deteriorating conditions and human rights violations in Lebanon. These things constitute a threat to the future of Lebanon's unity and independent existence. The conference condemned Zionist violations in southern Lebanon.

Concerning Cyprus, the conferees expressed their concern over the fact that foreign forces and bases continue to occupy parts of its territory, that United Nations resolutions on Cyprus's unity and independence have not been implemented, and that its territory is not united.

At the conclusion of the committee's activities, several recommendations were issued. The most important of these were:

- A special communique supporting the Palestinian intifadah against Zionist violations in the occupied Palestinian land.
- The holding of a conference to discuss Zionist violations of the rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories and seek the creation of international guarantees to safeguard the rights of the Palestinian people and enable them to determine their destiny in complete freedom.

The following points were included in the communique on the Palestinian people and their intifadah:

- Support for resolutions of the United Nations and human rights committees condemning Israel's violations of the rights of the Palestinian people. The conference demands international protection for the Palestinian people, so that they can rid themselves of the occupation and determine their destiny by themselves.
- The conferees appeal to the countries of the world to impose economic and cultural sanctions on the Zionist entity, until it respects international charters and human rights.
- The conference affirms that the right of veto was granted to certain countries in the Security Council in return for their responsibilities for protecting international peace and security. If the United States arbitrarily uses this right to protect Israel's practices and violations of all international principles and agreements, and to obstruct international condemnation of these actions, this right has become devoid of its

essential elements: the justification for enjoying it has become nonexistent, and it has become a harmful power not balanced by any obligation.

- The conference therefore demands that the United Nations Charter be amended, so that the right of veto is not used for political purposes unrelated to the essence of human rights.
- The conference holds that Israel's violation of Palestinian human rights amounts to war crimes against humanity and that the principles approved by the Nuremberg tribunal that investigated Nazi crimes apply to Israel.

### Economic Future of Palestinian State Examined

#### Potential of State Described

44040507 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
5-11 July 89 pp 32-36

[Article by Salih Qallab, with contributions from 'Abd-al-Karim Samarah in occupied Jerusalem and Ahmad al-Barsan in Los Angeles: "Bringing the Goal of Revolution Down to Earth: Palestinian State Needs \$2 Billion a Year"]

[Text] At the emergency meeting it held in Algeria last November, the Palestine National Council [PNC] decided to establish an independent Palestinian state. The Central Council, which is the second Palestinian command institution after the PNC, elected Yasir 'Arafat president of that state last April. Mr 'Arafat was elected unanimously. Continuing developments occurring in the light of the intifadah (uprising) continue to affirm that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has become a matter of time. Although the political decision to establish a state has been made by Palestinians, and that decision has received Arab and international support, the elements of that state continue to be the subject of study and discussion. Land and population are the foremost elements of this state: On what territory will this state be established, and who will become the people of that state? Will all Palestinians, approximately 5 million of them, become citizens of this state, or will the people of Palestine be residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip only? In addition, other elements to consider are the state's political structure and the state's institutions. Furthermore, there is the question of the capital, which, it is assumed, will be Jerusalem. Other matters which have to do with borders, economic aspects, water sources, the army, and security must also be considered. Since the establishment of this state has become the topic of discussion more than any other time in the past, AL-MAJALLAH prepared a general fact-finding report on the fundamentals and basic elements of the Palestinian state. AL-MAJALLAH is publishing its findings in a series of consecutive articles. The following article is the third in the series.

### 'Arafat in Japan in 1981: Large Number of Wealthy Palestinians There

As soon as the PNC, after holding an emergency meeting in Algeria last November, announced the establishment of the Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip based on UN Resolution 181 (the Partition Resolution which was issued in 1947) everyone started focusing his attention on the economic foundations and principles upon which the state which is being sought will be built.

Although this is a fundamental question of the utmost importance, it is known that the establishment of states in the world does not depend exclusively upon economic elements as much as it depends upon political goals and on the right of any people to determine their own destiny and achieve independence and sovereignty. Evidence of this may be seen in the United Nations Organization where countries with standing have become members of the organization even though the elements of their economies cannot be compared with the elements of the Palestinian state's economy.

If the same economic standard were to be applied, we would find that a country like Japan has been relying first and foremost on its foreign sources, and we would see that Israel itself had no economic advantages when it was founded in Palestine in 1948. When it was founded, Israel was almost totally dependent on foreign aid, accepting contributions from Jewish communities in the world or aid from the treasuries of western countries, chiefly from the United States of America.

What we find with regard to the Palestinian state, however, is that the question of the economy is brought up to cripple the Palestinian people and influence their will. It is those who enjoy a good standard of living who are clamoring about this matter. Camp residents and the poor, however, like the residents of the occupied land, are willing to face the problems of post independence just as they faced the difficult road to independence.

Some people think that the Palestinian people's right to determine their own destiny and establish their own independent state should not depend on any economic conditions. These people think that liberation is one thing and putting economic conditions in order is another. They also think that the economic situation of the Palestinian people under occupation can in no way be compared to the situation that will develop after the Palestinian state is established. Although such a comparison may be proper in some cases, it is not proper in the case of the Palestinian people obtaining their independence and establishing their state.

### Available Choices

It must be mentioned that the problems which the Palestinian state that is being sought will face are real and major problems. It must also be said that a challenging plan is required to overcome these problems.

Sacrifices by the Palestinian people, and a steady Arab position will also be required to overcome these problems.

It is obvious that for a rising, small country with limited resources, opportunities for economic growth in the world of international monopolies will be fraught with danger. It is obvious that for a country which was built on the ruins of a destroyed homeland, opportunities for economic growth in a world in which Israel will become an effective force will be full of challenges.

This does not mean, however, that the picture is gloomy. According to a study by Dr George 'Abid, executive director of the Geneva based al-'In'ash [Revival] Society, the establishment of a state as a national homeland in which the majority of Palestinians would live, will, with assistance from Arab countries, provide this majority with a unique opportunity to build a modern, healthy, and advanced society which can make an active contribution in the future to consolidate the peace and build up the entire area.

Assuming that the establishment of the Palestinian state will end the tension and the arms race in the region, western experts are of the opinion that Palestine will become a services state. Because of the vitality of its people and the experiences they gained during the years of suffering and homelessness, Palestine will attract Arab and international capital. It will become a financial center like Hong Kong, Formosa, and Singapore.

Western experts use Japan as an example of what they think will happen in Palestine. After its defeat in World War II, every sphere of activity in Japan had been destroyed. Soon, however, Japan occupied an advanced position among the advanced countries because it had managed to get rid of the burdens of military spending. Japan occupied such an advanced position because it was attracting capital and because its people are energetic and vital.

The fact that the Palestinian state did not develop in a vacuum strengthens the belief that overcoming this obstacle could be easy. The national Palestinian character developed in close association with lengthy experience. Over the past 20 years, the PLO managed to establish contemporary, economic organizations and institutions, including SAMID, a foundation for Palestinian martyrs. This foundation oversees Palestinian investments in Arab and foreign countries.

### The Language of Figures

Before the creation of Israel in 1948, Palestine was considered one of the foremost developing and advanced countries in the Middle East, according to the given facts of that period of time. Subsequently, after the partition was announced and the majority of Palestinians were expelled from their country, Palestinian economic institutions were moved to the West Bank, to east Jordan, and to a few neighboring Arab countries. That is why a short period of time after it was annexed to Jordan in the

early fifties, the West Bank became the industrial center for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. At the same time, the East Bank's development boom in the conversion and light industries relied basically on the experiences and the capital of Palestinians who had moved to Jordan and had become Jordanian citizens in the wake of the Jericho Conference. That was the conference which declared the merger between the West Bank and the East Bank and pronounced them politically and demographically part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

In the years during which the West Bank was part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, it was also a main source of agricultural products like olives and vegetables. This was especially true in the fifties and sixties before Jordan's contemporary rebirth. In 1965 agricultural production in the West Bank accounted for approximately 24 percent of Jordan's GNP [gross national product], and in the same year the West Bank's industrial production amounted to approximately 7 percent of Jordan's GNP. With regard to the Gaza Strip, which was administered by the Egyptian government after the general government of Palestine collapsed, agriculture in that area, especially the cultivation of citrus fruits, produced fruits which represented approximately 26 percent of total production.

After occupying what was left of Palestine in 1967, Israel started pursuing a policy whose main goal was the destruction of Palestinian economic institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel wanted to link the economy of the occupied lands to the Israeli economy. It wanted to turn the occupied lands, after destroying their industrial and economic institutions, into a consumer market for Israeli goods.

Israel proceeded with this concentrated policy, gradually attracting Palestinian workers and persons with technical expertise. The latest statistics estimate that the number of Arab workers who were working in Israeli establishments and factories up to the [onset of the] intifadah [uprising] was approximately 135,000. These statistics show that a worker's monthly income is between \$400 and \$600 a month.

Israel appropriated 1,111,000 dunums of farm land in Gaza after it was created in 1948. Only 364,800 dunums were left for Gaza residents and refugees who had sought shelter in Gaza and who now make up the majority of its inhabitants. On that basis, Palestinians who were living in Gaza lost 131,000 dunums of their land after the birth of Israel. All of this land was cultivated with oranges.

After Egyptians took over the administration of Gaza, the Egyptian Government once again encouraged the cultivation of citrus fruits there because there were no employment opportunities. Palestinians managed to cultivate approximately 75,000 dunums with citrus fruits. After the 1967 occupation, however, Israel set out to destroy Gaza's agriculture because it feared competition for its Israeli products. Between 1973 and 1979 Israel destroyed 25,000 dunums which were cultivated with

oranges and citrus fruits. In industry, Gaza was well-known for its clothing industry and for some of its other handicrafts. These activities were prohibited by laws enacted by the occupation authorities.

Existing industries in the West Bank have also been shut down and subjected to stiff competition from Israeli industries. The West Bank's industries are almost limited to manufacturing soap, soft drinks, candy, a few plastics products, canned meats, reinforced concrete, olive oil, furniture, cooking oil, milk and dairy products, tobacco, and canned tomatoes.

Whether in the West Bank or Gaza Strip, agriculture is the backbone of the Palestinian economy. Agriculture is expected to contribute approximately 21 percent of the national economy, but the principal problem in that area remains the problem of water sources. Israel sets a pre-condition with regard to any solution in the future: It wants to exercise total control over all sources of water in occupied Palestine, including water sources for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

There is another problem besides the water problem: It is the problem of marketing Palestinian agricultural products and competing with Israeli crops and with similar crops in some neighboring countries. It is generally believed that Arab countries in general will give crops from the Palestinian state priority in their countries even though these crops will be able to compete with Israeli crops in European markets.

Some people fear that Israeli products will be competing with Palestinian products in the markets of the new state if the solution which is now being sought involves recognition of Israel and opening all doors to it. These fears, however, are dispelled by assurances that local industries will be protected. The intifadah, which is going on now, has given rise to the notion that it is possible for Palestinian goods to resist Israeli goods and to compete with them as well.

Some people think that Palestinian industries will be protected by people's sense of patriotism, not to mention the measures which will be pursued by the Palestinian Government to protect those industries. Protection for Palestinian industries will lead to the creation of foreign markets, the increase of local consumption, and the creation of industries which are unlikely to become economically subordinate. It will lead to the profitable use of Arab cooperation and to the possibility of establishing a common Arab market.

### Capital

The Palestinian state will require considerable financial assistance. Some recently prepared studies indicated that during the first 5 years of its life this state will require \$10 billion: an average of \$2 billion a year. This sum will enable the Palestinian state to stand on its feet and meet the basic necessities which are required by its people. These studies state that \$270 million will be required for road maintenance and repaving; \$70 million will be

required for making improvements to the Port of Gaza, the state's only seaport; and approximately \$4 billion will be required to accommodate approximately 1 million Palestinians, for whom the construction of approximately 140,000 new residential units and the creation of approximately 380,000 employment opportunities will be required.

There is no doubt that after the period of transition and after years of laying down the country's foundations, the Palestinian state will have principal sources of revenue other than trade, agriculture, and returns from investing capital. Until it can stand firmly on its feet, this Palestinian state will need steady and regular Arab assistance, and it will need steady international assistance in the form of grants or long-term, low-interest loans.

It has been established that, after going through the period of laying down the country's foundations, (it is estimated that this period will not exceed 5 years), the Palestinian state will be able to provide two-thirds of its needs by utilizing its own resources. It is worth noting that in 1966 the tourist sector in the West Bank provided Jordan with an annual income of 11 million Jordanian dinars. Jerusalem, which will become the capital of the Palestinian state, contributed approximately 6 million dinars of that sum.

#### **Revenues From Tourism**

It is known that in addition to their agricultural attributes, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are likely to become major tourist attractions. In addition to the coast, the mountains, and the valleys, the West Bank and Gaza have religious landmarks that are Islamic and Christian. These include al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, Hashim's tomb in Gaza, the Church of the Ascension in Jerusalem, the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, and the Shrine of Ibrahim al-Khalil in Hebron. This means that if the Palestinian state has stability and a wise policy, it will become a first-rate tourist attraction. We are talking here about religious tourism. Estimates indicate that the number of Muslims and Christians who will be visiting the aforementioned religious sites will exceed 2 million per year. Furthermore, others will come to the area seeking rest and relaxation during the winter and summer seasons. In winter tourists would visit the Dead Sea, the city of Jericho, and the many villages in the Jordan Valley. In summer they would go to the mountains which stretch from Jinin in the north to Hebron in the south. Tourists would also visit the beautiful beaches of Gaza in summer.

It is assumed that attention should be devoted to the services sector if this state is to become a first-rate tourist attraction. Attention should be devoted to services such as transportation, hotels, and restaurants. Attention should also be devoted to handicrafts. It is here that the role of wealthy Palestinians becomes key. They are

supposed to take the initiative of investing their capital in these sectors instead of investing it in foreign banks and institutions.

Estimates indicate that the number of wealthy Palestinians who are well-known throughout the world is large. This was affirmed by Yasir 'Arafat, the president of the state of Palestine. Mr 'Arafat confirmed that during his well-known 1981 visit to Japan when he addressed a number of Japanese capitalists and affirmed before them that there are a large number of wealthy Palestinians in the Gulf area.

#### **The Available Choices**

The economic problem will not become a real obstacle for the Palestinian state. Estimates indicate that by 1997 average per capita income in that state will be \$1,338 per year. This is high compared with average per capita income in the countries of the world and in the so-called developing countries.

The PLO command must give the economy the utmost care, and it must arm itself from now on with adequate studies. All possibilities will have to be set forth so that the Palestinian state would not find itself in the future preoccupied with issues which could have been avoided. Although it may be totally involved in the political process and although it may be following the intifadah in the occupied lands daily, this in no way means that the economy of the Palestinian state may be ignored. All possibilities must be explored; adequate studies must be prepared; and an operations room specializing in watching the economy, equal to that which watches the political aspects of the state, is to be established. The fact that the economy is an important aspect of a state and has priority is pointed out by some studies which appeared recently. These studies proposed a large group of choices to Palestinians who will be living in the state that will be established in the real world after Palestine wins its independence. These choices would solve the economic problems that are anticipated. The first condition to the establishment of a strong and flexible economy that can stand up to threats of subordination and oppose the threat of being trapped into experiments that go nowhere is that the new system be based on the most sophisticated models of democracy. Such a system would thus be able to harness and mobilize all the energies and capabilities of the Palestinian people in the required development. Such a democracy would enable the fledgling state to avoid bloody conflicts, military coups, the construction of prisons and detention camps, the suppression of speech, and the repression of liberties.

According to the aforementioned studies the economic process in the Palestinian state must be comprehensive. Besides dealing with those aspects of the state's economy, the economic process must also deal with the social, cultural, and political aspects of the state. Also, the required complementary projects require that the new state have an irrevocable relationship with surrounding countries, especially the Hashemite Kingdom



of Jordan. This approach is prescribed by a set of interrelated factors, including the small area of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the dearth of natural resources in both places. It is also prescribed by the fact that one-fourth of the Palestinian people, even after the state is established, will remain in Jordan and in some of the neighboring countries, whereas the other one-fourth will continue for the foreseeable future to live in the state of Israel. These people are the people who live in the Galilee and the Triangle: we call them the Arabs of 1948.

The establishment of an independent, Palestinian state in accordance with the aforementioned specifications will undoubtedly attract Palestinian and Arab capital. The new Palestinian state will undoubtedly become an important international banking center.

Reference must be made here to the fact that Lebanon was an important Arab and international financial center before the civil war. Lebanon could have become the main center of support between the East and the West during the years of the economic boom.

It has been established that the aspirations of the new state will conflict with Israel's present-day aspirations to become the foremost financial and economic center on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean after a solution to the crisis in the area is found. To fulfill its aspirations the Palestinian state must utilize all the energies and resources of the Palestinian people. It must be able to establish distinguished relations with the outside world and with the bulk of its Arab world as well.

#### **DFLP Article Projects Economic Future**

44040507 Nicosia *AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic*  
2 July 89 pp 35-40

[Article by Ahmad al-Salih: "The Political Economy of the Intifadah in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: An Introduction to a Detailed Study"]

[Excerpts] It is the intent of this article to make a preliminary attempt to find out about the inner workings of the intifadah, or the essence of this phenomenon, in a manner that is consistent with the new historical situation. This will be done by touching upon the following:

First, this article will talk about the economic roots of this phenomenon. Understanding the economic roots of the intifadah and appreciating its political and social importance are significant steps which are being taken to analyze the practical functions which lie ahead for the Palestinian National Movement.

Second, this article will deal with the structural effects (and that includes the economic effects as well) which the intifadah could have on Israel's socioeconomic makeup. This would indicate that concessions could be obtained from Israel.

Third, this article will ask what are the prospects for achieving "an independent, national economy." What does that phrase mean with regard to breaking the

relationship of subordination to the occupation? [passage omitted, including footnotes 1-14]

#### **Third, Prospects for 'Achieving an Independent, National Economy'**

To eliminate the confusion which this phrase might initially create, reference must be made to the fact that an independent economy in the literal sense of the term does not exist anywhere in the world. We cannot give examples from history or from contemporary times when such an independent economy was achieved in any country. We cannot find an example of such an economy especially in our days when any country that wants to survive has to develop at least limited economic relations with other countries. This expression, an independent economy, is used figuratively in the economics literature because it defines positive functions which are set up to develop national production for the purpose of achieving something akin to equal trade relations with the economies of the more advanced countries. This makes relations between these countries less exploitative. In the case of the Palestinian economy under the intifadah, the phrase, an independent economy, means that Palestinian society is to depend on itself, especially on its own resources. Such an approach to growth sets the scene of action and thought in motion by considering an independent economy the maker of true independence and declaring it to be synonymous with true independence to augment the state of general national rebellion.

Among the facts which are available on the economy of the occupied lands and the circumstances surrounding the intifadah, the call for a separation or a clean break from the occupation is not informed. That is why we are calling for a selective break from the occupation. Thus, independence would become the goal of internal and external relations instead of these relations becoming restrictions [slowing down] the achievement of that goal.

Along these lines a leaflet which was distributed and signed by the United National Command tries to provide the basic elements and requirements for an all-out national rebellion. An item on action priorities stipulates that the responsibility of ensuring the success of the principles for this insubordination falls on the shoulders of the masses of people who are involved in the intifadah, whose list of priorities must include action "to spread the spirit of cooperation and equality among citizens; to develop among people a sense of giving and the spirit of confronting the occupation; and to foster their determination to confront the enemy regardless of the sacrifice. Citizens must become accustomed to frugal conduct, and they must try hard to furnish themselves with basic and essential materials only."

It is no secret that the moral aspect of self-reliance has important administrative and political implications. To achieve self-reliance, self-reliant conduct must become the prevalent mode of conduct everywhere: from the smallest communities in villages and factories to the

largest communities in the state. Workers will be obliged to rely as much as possible on whatever is available to them to try to solve their own problems. Workers will be obliged to participate in all decisions that affect their lives. We would thus achieve an advanced form of democracy in which people participate in the decision-making process. Such a political climate is essential for true independence, which involves both political and economic independence.

It is worth noting that economic considerations occupy an important and fundamental part in the appeals which are being made by the United National Command. The command knows that the lengthy battle it is engaged in requires the completion of an economic program that will, on the one hand, lead to a gradual break in the link between the Israeli economy and the Israeli economic structure [as published]. On the other hand, completion of this economic program will complement this gradual break and will ensure an alternative to that relationship of subordination after it is broken. It will also ensure that a Palestinian economy which is "relatively" independent is established. This can be done by setting up the material preparations for the development and advancement of the Palestinians' own economic capabilities.

A close dialectic connection between the political goal of national independence and the economic goal of pursuing economic independence is noticeable in the United National Command's appeals. It seems there is something like an agreement between members of the United National Command about this connection between the political goal and the economic one because it creates broad prospects for tearing down the foundations upon which the occupation stands. This connection also makes actual preparations for laying down the foundations of a national Palestinian authority. The goals and objectives which the intifadah is trying to achieve by means of a confrontational program in the area of the economy may be summarized as follows:

One of the intifadah's most important measures since its inception has been the policy of putting emphasis on the economic boycott of the Israeli occupation. It may be said that the economic boycott is a preventive, not an offensive measure, as numerous studies have suggested. The boycott will not place a stranglehold on the occupation since the support it receives from Zionist and imperialist forces in the world ensures the survival of the Israeli economy. The boycott is not an aggressive measure against Israel, but it is above all else, a defensive measure to protect the backward Palestinian economy, whose backward makeup is a result of the occupation authorities' arbitrary policies. The boycott is a defensive measure that is taken to ensure normal life for a rising industry and to continue the pursuit of independence. Eventually, the boycott would raise the standard of living of Palestinian citizens.

In this regard also, Boycott Appeal Number 2, which was issued by the United National Command on 2/25/1989, states: "To the free masses of the intifadah: As we bring

you the good news that the battles for economic liberation are about to begin, these battles that will free us from the domination of the imperialist Zionist economy and its control of our energy and our labor, we promise you once again that there will be no retreat. We renew our oath that we will not cease our efforts. We will continue our efforts to build our independent country, which will make its own independent political decisions and will have its own independent flag."

To ensure that the masses rally around this goal, the appeal states that the role played by merchants who complied with the items of the boycott appeal was very valuable. It praised the national media whose commitment to the boycott resolution manifested itself in their refusal to publish any advertisement from hostile institutions. The appeal salutes the masses of the uprising whose revolutionary conduct led them to rise above their desire for luxuries. The appeal also states that the strike forces' true revolutionary interpretation of the boycott was very valuable in firmly establishing the boycott. With pride and esteem it salutes the proud, economic institutions which are trying to develop the quantity and quality of their products to make them suitable to an independent Palestinian market. The appeal warns against the consequences of monopoly. It warns against the consequences of tampering with weights, prices, or quality, and the consequences of enriching oneself at the expense of the workers' toil and the livelihoods of the poor. The appeal calls upon authorized committees to tighten controls and provide guidance. It also salutes the owners of public and private vehicles for adhering to the boycott resolution. Then it offers a list that identifies those Zionist and imperialist products whose boycott is being requested.

What was mentioned in the appeal shows us that the Palestinian economy is becoming more important in the economic process, thereby diminishing the frightening and unjustified flow of Palestinian purchasing power to Israel. The flow of this purchasing power to Israeli production occurs at the expense of Palestinian production. Thus, as the ability to pay attention to the needs of Palestinian consumers and investors grows in the Palestinian economy, Palestinian consumers and investors will try to get consumer goods and services as well as investment services from the Palestinian economy. This will obviate the need for the Palestinian economy to worry about exporting those same goods and services and entering into many commitments with Israeli export companies, AGRISCO [International Information System For The Agricultural Sciences and Technology], and Jordanian export companies. Palestinian producers will not have to encourage exports through these companies despite increased subordination to them.

We notice that the Palestinian masses were not indifferent. Instead, they complied promptly with appeals from the United National Command to boycott the occupation. Israeli products which were subject to the boycott could not find their way into West Bank and Gaza Strip markets. The damage which befell the Israeli

economy is clearly evident in the factories which specialize in producing processed and canned foods.

Such compliance with the boycott is undoubtedly a good reason for a careful examination of the mechanism which is being used to effect the gradual and constructive shift and transformation in the intifadah. This shift, which is now underway and continues unabated, is being undertaken to nullify the effect of the laws which develop in marginal, subordinate, organizations that are being firmly established by the expansionist, settler, and annexation prone occupation. This shift in the intifadah will to a certain extent gradually transform Palestinian society from a consumer society to a productive one. It will slowly restore the dynamic nature of the local market, which had been diluted and made invisible in the Israeli market system. Values of cooperation and mutual assistance will become widespread, and these values will work against economic subordination, which has become entrenched. These values will work against values and habits which economic subordination leaves behind. Subordination to Israel's economy causes the breakup of Palestinian rural society, intensifies individual tendencies within that society, and spreads consumer values in an urban society. This mode of socioeconomic life also signifies that all opportunities to receive outside support (Palestinian, Arab, or international) which would serve the goal of independence must be utilized.

In this regard, reference may be made to the fact that, despite differences between the parties on several matters, there is something like an agreement in the predominant theoretical tendency in contemporary Marxist economic thought.<sup>15</sup> According to this theory ties with countries that are capitalist centers have to be broken so that economic independence can be achieved. This can be done by affecting local production and using international relations to achieve the goal of economic independence. Standards for development are to be set to nullify the laws of subordination (unequal trade, unequal development, and the breakup of socioeconomic structures which constitute the material foundation for foreign exploitation). And yet, this theory lacks a model (or an experiment) of what it proposes. Will the intifadah with its prospects become that model? Although this question is premature, there are early signs and indications that the intifadah could become such a model. If the intifadah is utilized and developed to serve as such a model, it would subsequently create the nucleus for economic and political independence with implications for Arab unity. The intifadah, as a model for the aforementioned theory, will strive to unleash the forces of capitalist production by providing democracy that will accelerate the accumulation of capital, and that would form the foundation for entering the market of the international division of labor under better conditions.<sup>16</sup>

Home economics is the alternative which was proposed by the intifadah's United National Command as the antithesis to dependence on the Israeli economy. This alternative, of course, is for the initial stage. It is an

alternative that is compatible with the deteriorating condition of the Palestinian economy. It is an alternative that will raise many questions about the economy. What will make home economics capable of confronting the advanced, Israeli economic institution? We have to start our explanation with the rule which states that the economy is the key to a community's social and political reality. In backward countries, however, this rule may be reversed, as it is in many cases where the social reality or the political system becomes the key to explaining the economic reality of that community. This happens because that community's economic organizations are backward.

As the objective factor matures, in the case of the intifadah, the rise of effective political forces which adopt an independent approach and can offer what is required by that approach is the decisive factor in bringing about a structural, national socioeconomic change whose aim is to eliminate relations of subordination. This effective political force, which can offer what is required for independence by unleashing and mobilizing the energies of all the people, is represented by the intifadah's United National Command. This national command has affirmed from experience that its appeals express the interests of the broadest classes, segments, and groups of Palestinians. The United National Command of the intifadah has demonstrated that it can always be very sensitive to the mood of the masses and that it can stir the energies of the Palestinian people into action.

The concept of home economics is one whose aim is to utilize the resources and capabilities which are available. Since the agricultural sector remains basically strong in any development process, it is being used as the foundation upon which productive projects can be built in agriculture, animal husbandry, and crafts. This would end the market's dependence on Israeli goods, which can be found in abundance, and it would prepare a suitable climate for confronting difficulties and shortages in food products which develop as a result of Israel's economic war. In Appeal Number 35, issued on 2/26/1989, the United National Command states:

"Let us work to prepare ourselves and our forces to step up our struggle. Let us prepare ourselves to embark upon a new stage in the conflict that will be stepped up in the near future. Let us work to strengthen our resolve and store essential materials." In addition, taking such action would develop the capabilities of the local market, which relies on national production, and it would provide industrial institutions with raw materials for manufacturing. Ever since Appeal Number 4 of 3 February 1988 was issued, the United National Command<sup>17</sup> has been emphasizing that "those who are capable of working and cultivating the land are to be mobilized so that as much as possible can be produced at home by boycotting the enemy's goods."

The mechanism which was prescribed by the occupation is based on relegating the role of the agricultural sector to

the sidelines because it is the basic economic sector which can provide employment to the largest number of workers. The agricultural sector can also provide the population with the means of earning a living, and it strengthens their connection with the land. At the present time the intifadah is trying to bring this mechanism to a standstill in a manner that is consistent with surrounding circumstances. Self-sufficiency in each household is becoming evident. People, for example, are getting their supplies from agricultural cooperatives.

In this regard the United National Command directed its appeals to agricultural engineers, owners of plant nurseries, and people with expertise and capabilities, to ensure steadfastness and to establish the material foundation of an independent economy. The United National Command wants agricultural engineers and agricultural experts to contribute by guiding and instructing peasants, farmers, and striking workers to achieve as much self-sufficiency as possible so that economic restrictions imposed by the occupation can be opposed. Expanding the range of action and developing cooperative and national production will increase our ability to work and produce national products. It will enable us to put up a better resistance to the enemy's economic measures. This seems clear in Appeal Number 6 from the United National Command whose striving land reclamation program called for cultivating the land to meet the needs of the besieged areas and to provide them with support.

In its Appeal Number 12 the United National Command called for making the 4th day of April a day dedicated to national action. The command made that appeal to support projects concerned with developing local production in the agricultural, industrial, and services sector; to secure the basic elements of holding on to the initiative and keeping up the challenge to the occupation authority; and to build the infrastructure of the National Democratic Command in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On National Action day everyone would work to produce as much as possible. Everything that is produced on that day would be used in the interests of those who have been damaged by the intifadah. This is to be done by authorizing popular committees in every city, neighborhood, village, and camp to distribute the income which was earned that day. The call for National Action Day continued to be made in subsequent appeals.

Thus, it becomes clear to us that the United National Command's management of the economic conflict is competent and flexible. The conflict is being managed to encourage personal initiative, to ensure that democracy in the field of production is becoming widespread, to ensure that production is being organized, and to ensure that the challenge to the authority's economic and political authority will be protracted as long as possible by having the masses watch all economic activities.

In its efforts to improve economic performance and stimulate growth in the occupied land, the United

National Command emphasizes the importance of austerity measures with regard to nonproductive spending. The United National Command is trying to raise the standards of production and to increase production in the occupied land. It is trying to establish guidelines for using national products so that material resources from savings as well as consumption of national products would rise. The United National Command is trying to establish guidelines for the use of resources, and it is trying to strengthen the cycle of local production in the fledgling formula for the Palestinian economy. In keeping with these efforts the United National Command emphasizes in its appeals the importance of having spending limits and curbing the confusion of priorities so that more resources can be provided for production to ensure that subordination to the Israeli economy will be brought to an end.

This uphill movement in the material world will essentially force the vital interests of the Palestinian people and the unique colonialist nature of the occupation into positions that are more and more contradictory, and that will intensify the battle to consolidate the Palestinian, Arab, and international program. This is the program which was represented by the resolutions of the 19th Session of the PNC. It is a program which affirms the rights of the Palestinian people, foremost among which is their right to make their state assume concrete form on the land of Palestine.

#### Footnotes

15. The theory of the center and surroundings is a theory that is talked about in contemporary Marxist thought. According to this theory the world's capitalist system can be properly understood only if it is seen as a complex, universal system whose parts are interconnected. The world's capitalist system can be understood only when it is seen as a system for dividing social labor in a way that allows the regular flow of the surplus in one direction between social communities that are distinctive. Such a system shows that backward countries can be found in an area surrounding the center of international economies. That center, which is represented by advanced countries, is the center which exercises indirect control over the areas around it. The economies of all those surrounding areas revolve in the orbit of that center which tries to steer those economies, keep them under control, and not allow them to flee from that control. Such a system affirms that any trade between two countries, even if they subscribed to the same political and ideological tendency, will serve the interests of the more powerful state. This theory adds that backward countries have no alternative but to free themselves from the grip of these countries at the center by affecting a new division of labor in the world to replace the existing division. This proposal was mentioned in the works of many Latin American economists like Andre' Gendard Frank and Barbishe. It can also be found in a 1957 doctoral dissertation by Samir Amin, an Arab Marxist. The dissertation was written under the supervision of Dr

Francois Perrault. This view is based on traditional Marxist literature by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Rosa Luxembourg.

16. The appeals that were issued by the United National Command are taken from different issues of AL-HURRIYAH magazine.

17. [Footnote 17 missing from text]

A large number of references and resources were also used. These include:

- AL-FIKR AL-DIMUQRATI (Democratic Thought) Magazine, Issue Number 5, from an economic report published about the occupied land.
- "The Arab Economic Report," the Arab League.
- The book, "Al-Intifadah wa Milad Dawlah Falastin," (The Uprising and the Birth of the Palestinian State): book number 1 in the "Al-Hurriyah" (Freedom) Book series, (1988).
- AL-'ULUM AL-IJTIMA'YAH (Social Science) Magazine, special issue: AL-'ALAM AL-'ARABI FI ITAR AL-TAQSIM AL-DUWALI LIL 'AMAL (The Arab World in the Context of the International Division of Labor), Kuwait, (1983).
- A few economic references specializing in development and subordination.

## BAHRAIN

### Study for Gulf Investment Opportunities Prepared

44040503b Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic  
20 Jun 89 p 9

[Article: "Gulf Consulting Organization: Private Sector's \$16 Billion Foreign Deposits May be Invested Locally"]

[Text] A gulf study said that there are hundreds of industrial investment opportunities in the Gulf, particularly in intermediate and final industries, be they petrochemical, steel or aluminum, and in engineering, food, mineral and other industries. The study especially stressed that all these opportunities need to be made public.

A Gulf Industrial Consulting Organization study added that the private sector has tremendous capabilities to achieve this goal. On the one hand, it has huge capital funds deposited abroad valued at about \$160 billion [as published], part of which is being recalled in the wake of the Black October crisis in world money markets.

It also has significant and rich experience, gained by establishing a large number of small and medium size industrial projects in the last two decades, and by setting up and managing industrial projects. Thus, it has fostered a conscious and trained class of businessmen capable of identifying and carrying out feasible industrial projects that can bolster the Gulf industrial structure and enhance this sector's role in economic development in the Gulf.

The study confirmed that the region is in the process of preparing a number of dossiers for investment opportunities in light and medium industries, to be promoted in a variety of ways, through industrial investment opportunity seminars in particular.

This experience has demonstrated sweeping success by holding seminars during which a number of economically feasible investment opportunity dossiers were presented to Gulf businessmen. Some of these opportunities have been adopted, and the organization is now preparing more dossiers on investment opportunities in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, to be promoted by investment seminars.

The study called upon the private sector to give serious consideration to investing its money deposited abroad in Gulf industrial projects that guarantee safety and lucrative returns. This is especially important, since such a move is bound to give a boost to the Gulf governments' tendency toward creating a diversified economic structure and a sophisticated industrial sector, able to contribute actively and effectively to the development process and to the economic and social growth of the Arab Gulf states.

### Project To Expand Island's Port Discussed

44040503c Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic  
28 Jun 89 pp 1, 5

[Article by Lutfi Nasir: "Port Will Be International, Will Serve Next Century's Needs"]

[Excerpts] Mr Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Karim, minister of finance and national economy, gave a special statement to AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ concerning the new port project to be built in Bahrain. His excellency said: "The project's consulting firm has concluded its study and will soon submit a detailed memorandum in this regard to the Council of Ministers. Upon tentative approval, we will begin implementation with the help of Arab funds which have agreed to finance the project and are now taking part in the relevant studies and appointment of consultants."

The minister added: "It looks like the choice site will be to the northeast of the city of al-Hadd. It will be an international port serving the growing economic and trade activity in Bahrain, and will draw part of the Gulf trade. We want it to be the port of the next century. It will cost a great deal of money, no less than 30 million Bahraini dinars [BD] and maybe more than 70 million, for it will be outfitted with state-of-the-art equipment, will be linked to a huge new industrial zone, and will take 6 to 7 years to complete."

Mr 'Abd-al-Karim began his statement by saying: "The government is taking a great interest in the infrastructure facilities and, in light of economic developments in the region in the last 30 years, Salman Port has been afforded a big share of it. It was opened in the early sixties and was enlarged in the seventies, rivaling at the

time the best ports in the gulf area. Moreover, it matches other European ports in productivity, according to a report by Portuguese consultants."

The minister said: "But in view of the economic expansion that has taken place in the region in general and in Bahrain in particular in the last 10 years, it is incumbent upon us to take a new look at this facility, as we did with regard to the airport, with a view to enlarging it. Just as the airport is associated with air transport, the port is associated with sea transport."

He said: "Salman Port is a major goods and services port, handling over 2 million tons of goods coming into Bahrain annually. It is a major trade outlet for Bahrain, given the country's age old position as a commercial state.

His eminence added: "Therefore, the trend now is either to improve Salman Port, or build a new one. The Portuguese consulting firm's report said we have several options."

"The first option," the minister said, "is to have a local port to satisfy local trade needs. The second option is to have an international port to cover part of the trade in the Gulf and to satisfy future needs arising from stability and renewed economic prosperity in the area. Moreover, a growing population will produce a natural increase in economic activity everywhere." [passage omitted] \* He said: "Right now, there are several problems related to the canal leading to Salman Port, in terms of its narrowness and its shallow water, and in terms of the port's underwater services such as certain electric cables linking al-Hadd and the Sitrah areas, some waterpipes, etc."

His eminence the minister continued his explanation: "Under the circumstances, we are thinking of building the port in another area, and we have come up with several options for the choice location. And, just like any basic structure in this project, we are trying to balance cost with economic and societal returns."

He said: "The plan is to turn to a new area that can serve several purposes, including making this new port the port of the future and of the next century, God willing. This entails linking this huge project to the development of industrial zones in Bahrain, whereby the port will be tied to a major industrial zone, and raising efficiency and productivity in order to cut costs as much as possible—given the present competition by nearby ports."

Mr Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Karim said: "This is a summary of the study which the advisors have presented. When we get the go-ahead from the Council of Ministers and put into effect a plan under which the Arab funds have actually pledged to put up part of the money. These funds are taking part in this study and in appointing the project's consultant."

The minister said: "If we translate the project into figures spread over a number of years, it will be reflected

in the state's future budgets as a key priority project. This is how we study and approve projects and how we set priorities in the state's general budgets, as was done in the case of the airport improvement project, the water and electric power utility project, and others. We will announce this project as soon as the Council of Ministers gives its approval and we shall get it under way immediately."

[Nasir] Does that mean that a new port may be built on Salman Port's existing site?

['Abd-al-Karim] As I have told you, Salman Port's location is congested. We plan to find another site, and the advisors and consultants agree with us on this. The choice site is in the northeast of al-Hadd which is actually the proper location for a future port. This will be accompanied by economic and societal research and studies pertaining to water and wind levels, etc. We believe this is the best site in view of its proximity to deep water.

The primary purpose of the port is to serve Bahrain's growing business needs. Just as we have an international airport, we are seeking to have a major international port serving Gulf business traffic and drawing part of its trade because Bahrain is located on the main shipping corridor going north. Furthermore, drawing part of the Gulf trade will render this new port more important than being a local port.

[Nasir] How much do you expect the new port to cost?

['Abd-al-Karim] Of course figures vary according to size and equipment. It could cost as little as 30 million BD or as much as 70 million or more. Therefore, as in any other major project, these figures are variable, and the cost will be determined when we reach a final decision on the kind of port we want—do we want it to be linked to a huge or a medium industrial zone, and so forth?

I believe this is a huge project which may take 6 to 7 years to complete. It will cost at least 30 million BD and may go up to more than 70 million BD. As I told you, what counts is that it is a big project that will cost big money.

#### **Chamber of Commerce-Government Relationship Discussed**

*44040504a Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic  
27 Jun 89 pp 1, 5*

[Article by Usamah Mahran: "Government-Private Sector Action Rules; Referring Bills on Commerce to Chamber of Commerce Before They Are Passed; Reorganizing Trade Registers and Reexamining Trade Representations Law"]

[Text] A plenary session was held yesterday between Habib Ahmad Qasim, the commerce and agriculture minister, and members of the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The meeting established the

basis of cooperation and rules of action between the government and the chamber in its capacity as a representative of the private sector. It was also decided to give the chamber broader powers to participate in the country's economic decisionmaking.

AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ has learned that it was agreed at yesterday's meeting to embody and underline His Highness Prime Minister Khalifah Ibn Salman Al Khalifah's directives on referring all bills pertaining to the commerce sector to the Chamber of Commerce Executive Board to study them before they are passed. It was also agreed to discuss reorganizing issuance of the trade registers so as to avoid the use of such registers by foreigners as a cover for engaging in commercial activities. It has also been agreed to reexamine the trade representations law anew.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the commerce and agriculture minister announced that a reexamination of the trade representations law through the joint committee of the Chamber of Commerce and the Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture has been decided on. More than a year ago, the ministry drafted a bill to amend this law and make it compatible with the nature of the current phase and with the local market needs by requiring that the agents representing a certain commodity supply all the spareparts connected with such a commodity to the consumers and undertake to supply certain quantities of the commodity to the local market periodically. The ministry has also drafted the executive regulations for the amended law. The chamber's previous executive board has acquainted itself with the law and expressed its observations on it.

The minister also said that it was agreed upon at the same meeting to establish organized and continuous contact between the chamber and the Ministry of Trade through the Joint Economic Committee. Agreement was also reached on an effective work system that makes it possible to discuss urgent issues with the hope of reaching tangible conclusions. This is so that such issues can then be referred to his highness the prime minister, in accordance with [the agreement reached] at the meeting which was held with him recently.

It was also agreed upon to develop the working method of the Joint Economic Committee between the chamber and the Ministry of Commerce to facilitate the task of its making decisions on all the issues presented to it for discussion.

The commerce and agriculture minister said that the means capable of dealing with difficult debts and bankruptcies and how the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in cooperation with the Ministry of Commerce, can contribute to developing fundamental solutions to the faltering debts and their impact on the bankruptcy cases, was also discussed at yesterday's meeting.

The meeting also discussed bouncing checks, and their effect on the commercial sector, and the issue of issuing

trade register permits and the need to regulate these permits so as to prevent their use as a cover by some foreigners to engage in commercial activity. The meeting discussed, moreover, the issue of the credit collateral required of contractors, as well as the issues connected with the unified economic agreement.

The minister announced that in the coming phase, the priority of discussion will be given to the commercial representations law which will be reexamined by the chamber and the Ministry of Commerce. All the issues raised for discussion will also be assessed so that they may be assigned priority and examined by the Joint Economic Committee.

The commerce and agriculture minister made his statement immediately after the meeting, pointing out that this plenary meeting was held to complement the minimeeting held between the ministry and a number of the chamber's executive board members.

Habib Qasim said: We have heard the opinions and proposals of the board members. The basis and rules of work between the ministry and the chamber have been established in light of the directives his highness, the redeemed emir, and his highness, the prime minister, issued in the wake of their recent meeting with the chamber's new executive board.

AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ has learned that the same meeting touched on the sale seasons, the trade fairs organized throughout the year, and the coalition contracting companies to which the Bahraini partner contributes a very small part of the capital, whereas the foreign partner undertakes, through these companies, domestic projects valued at millions of dinars.

The two sides agreed to continue to examine these issues through the joint economic committee, so that it may develop a clear-cut vision on them, and then refer them to the government's higher authorities.

### Electric Power Program Accomplishments Reported

44040503a Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic  
16 Jun 89 p 2

[Article by Hafiz Imam: "Minister of Public Works Opens Main Power Transformer Station in East al-Hurah"]

[Excerpts] The Minister of Public Works, Electricity and Water, Majid Jawad al-Jishi, yesterday morning inaugurated the main power transformer station East al-Hurah. The inauguration was attended by the ministry's assistant under secretaries, senior officials, and a number of engineers and advisors.

The minister inspected the different parts of the station and observed the system that controls the station's operations from the network's control center at Umm al-Hasam Station. He also listened to an explanation of

how this station will boost and control the electric power network in meeting growing public demand for electric power, and about the construction techniques followed in building the station, which has been equipped with two 66-kilovolt electric transformers. Following the inauguration, the minister said that this station is one of nine that have been constructed recently with a view to boosting the networks to meet the growing demand for electric energy. He pointed out that this is one of a group of three high transformer stations.

The minister explained that, for the first time, local contractors have been given a chance to import and install equipment, lay cables, and work on electrical wiring. He said: "By doing so, we have been able to save almost 1 million dinars in project costs and, at the same time, provide work for local contractors in this field, so that they can gain experience in electric power transfer." He emphasized that this station will help boost the networks and raise their capacity to meet the growing demand for electricity as part of the ministry's plan at this stage. [passage omitted]

On the other hand, Engineer 'Abdallah Jum'ah, chief of the electric power department, emphasized that the department's 1986-1990 program includes a plan to build 9 new 66/11-kilovolt transformer stations, boosting the electric power network in order to keep up with growing public demand for power, and supplying some new areas.

These stations are: Sar, al-Jufayr, al-Quful, Ra's al-Ramman, East al-Hurah, al-Khamis, al-Wadi, al-Nuzhah and al-Jisir.

He said: "The Islamic Development Bank helped finance the acquisition of transformer station equipment and 66-kilovolt ground cables used to link the stations to the transformer network." He added that five contracts have been awarded to international and local companies to set up the current transformer program. These contracts are:

luding electric equipment and civil works. The contractor is Sanyo-Fuji, at a cost of 12.53 million Bahraini dinars [BD].

Manufacture and exportation of ground cables and related goods. The contractor is B.I.C.C., at a cost of 2.74 million BD.

Civil works to lay ground cables. The contractor is al-Kawahaji Electric and Civil Contracting Company, at a cost of 0.31 million BD.

Ground cable wiring, welding and testing works. The contractor is (?COMSOP), at a cost of 0.63 million BD.

Control systems. The contractor is Asia (?Braden Boveri), at a cost of 1.47 million BD.

The plan's first transformer station went into operation on 5 May 1988 and the last station is expected to be put into operation in al-Jufayr at the end of 1989.

Regarding the East al-Hurah station which the minister opened yesterday, Engineer Yusif Fakhru, chief of projects at the electric power department, said that this station is a 66/11-kilovolt transformer substation which gets its electric power from the main 220/66-kilovolt transformer station at al-Safarah via another similar substation at Ra's al-Rumman.

The station is made up of two 66-kilovolt conduction and insulation switches connecting 60-megavoltampere and 66-kilovolt ground cables to two 66/11-volt with each of the 20-megavoltampere transformers feeding a series of 11-kilovolt distribution switches.

The station also includes control systems used for running and controlling the station's operations from the control center at the network in Umm al-Hasam.

### Aluminum Plant Expansion Plans Reported

44040504b Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic  
27 Jun 89 pp 1, 5

[Article by Lutfi Nasr and 'Adnan al-Musawi: "His Highness Prime Minister Devotes Great Attention to ALBA Expansion Project; Details of Project To Enlarge Aluminum Plant; Total Spending on Project Amounts to \$1.3 Billion and Will Increase Plant Production 2 and 1/2 Times; Major Role by Local Contractor in Implementing Project and Creating New Work Opportunities for Bahrainis"]

[Text] AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ has learned that the ALBA [Aluminum Bahrain] Plant expansion project receives the utmost attention from His Highness Prime Minister Khalifah Ibn-Salman Al Khalifah, considering that his highness was the originator this project from the beginning. AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ has acquired the full details of the project. At a cabinet session 2 days ago, his highness expressed his satisfaction with the progress made toward implementing the project, noting that this project will turn ALBA into one of the biggest aluminum plants in the world, and will contribute to creating major industrial activity and economic revival in Bahrain in the future.

Mahmud al-Daylami, the director of administrative affairs at ALBA Company, has stated that implementation of the first phase of the project has already begun, that the project in its entirety is expected to be completed in 39 months, i.e., by mid-1992, and that the first unit of the expansion project will begin production 34 months from now.

Al-Daylami further said: The spending on this gigantic project is expected to amount to \$1.3 billion. When all the plant units are completed in 1992, plant production will increase to 450,000 metric tons. The production capacity of the new smelter will amount to 235,000 metric tons annually. This capacity stands at 180,000 metric tons at present. Production will be increased to 207,000 tons before the end of this year.



He added: This project will provide new work opportunities for the country's citizens, including 400 major jobs. The number of ALBA workers will rise from 1,600 to 1,800 by the end of the project. This project will revive the country's economic and industrial activity. It will emphasize purchasing the requirements needed to implement the project via the local market. Transactions with the banks will also be boosted, taking into account the fact that the financing will be acquired from the local banks. Local contractors will play a major role in implementing this project. Moreover, the project will increase the number of factories in the country relying on aluminum production. A program is currently being drafted to invite bids to implement the various phases of the project.

Mahmud al-Daylami also said: Preparatory talks with the consulting firms, namely the (Bichens Aluminum Company and Bachtel Lavalin), an engineering consulting firm, have confirmed the possibility of increasing the production capacity beyond the capacity designed in the original expansion plan by increasing the new units to 288 units operating at a capacity reaching 295 amperes.

He said: The major expansion consists of building a new smelter parallel to the existing smelter and equipping it with the latest and most advanced technological systems and means that will put it ahead of the world's technologically and environmentally advanced smelters.

Al-Daylami noted: The major factory halls and units in the expansion will be totally different from the existing pattern in planning, size, and equipment. The new units will be 2 and 1/2 times bigger than the existing units.

He added: The new systems will make it possible to contain and reexploit 99 percent of the wasted gases through the use of dry-purification units.

One of the most outstanding aspects of the project is that the electric power needed to operate it will be supplied by building a sophisticated generator that operates by the so-called unified cycle system, i.e., by using gas and exploiting wasted heat simultaneously. The generator will use seven enormous turbines, five of which operate on gas and two on steam. Collectively, these turbines have a capacity of 800 megawatts, compared to the current generation capacity of 480 megawatts.

Mahmud al-Daylami said: The new highly efficient and notable new generators will replace the 19 old generators, making it possible to exploit natural gas better while ultimately doubling the electricity capacity with an increase of no more than 24 percent in natural gas consumption. The 19 old turbines will be kept as reserve to supply the smelter with power in emergency cases.

The company will continue to produce the anode poles needed by the smelter. This will require the building of a new carbon plant consisting of a preparation unit, dehydration furnaces, and a rod-production section.

He added: To deal with the big increase in the production of melted aluminum, the foundry will have to be enlarged and equipped with the furnaces and units needed to absorb this increase.

Despite the numerous changes and the enormous technological equipment, the [rail]road linking the smelter with the seaport will remain as it is presently.

As for the utilities and facilities handling and transporting the raw materials, their capacity will also be enlarged because 900,000 tons of ammonia will be transported to the smelter by land. For the purpose, a direct road will be built from the smelter to the port parallel to the railroad. Coke and tar will continue to be transported by the railroad.

Aluminum will be transported from the storage warehouses in the smelter to the smelting units by a sophisticated system consisting of channels that link the warehouse scoop with the units.

Al-Daylami also said that the major expansion project has economic and social benefits, especially insofar as Bahrain's conversion industry is concerned. The project will also provide 400 additional jobs for Bahraini citizens.

When measuring the savings in labor resulting from the modernization project against new work opportunities, we find that the total number of workers employed by ALBA will amount to nearly 1,800. As for productivity per worker, it will more than double over its present rate.

He added: Throughout 18 years of distinguished production activity, ALBA has developed and expanded. It now holds a prominent position and enjoys an international reputation as a strong and influential industry. There is no doubt that the major expansion will contribute further to bolstering and enhancing ALBA's position regionally and internationally.

With the presence of a smelter with international standing, and with a production cost considered among the lowest in the world, ALBA will become an accredited and influential force in the market in coming years.

He said that all of the plant's current production is marketed, with 70 percent distributed inside Bahrain, and that if world prices are low at present, there are great expectations that aluminum prices will be restored internationally when the project is completed and begins marketing its production in the world market. He added that the demand for Bahraini aluminum is currently growing beyond the production volume.

Concluding, al-Daylami said: It behooves us to note that the idea of this gigantic project emerged on the instructions of His Highness Prime Minister Shaykh Khalifah Ibn-Salman Al Khalifah.

## EGYPT

### Seven Points Proposed To Solve Economic Problems

45040422 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic  
14 Jul 89 pp 50-51

[Article by Mahmud Salim in Cairo: "Seven-Point Comprehensive Reform Assures Solution to Egypt's Economic Crisis"]

[Text] There is no denial that there is a degree of disparity between the viewpoints of employers and employees in Egypt. That disparity was the reason why several questions surrounded the joint declaration recently signed in Cairo by the two parties.

The declaration, which can be called a new "covenant", proposes a number of policies and projects that the two groups—based on their experiences with developments in Egypt and with issues confronting the Egyptian economy—envision for installing the foundation for a sound and strong economy.

What, in detail, does the declaration say? What do its authors say and what viewpoint do they project? How did they arrive at that vision despite their disparate outlooks?

The story of the meeting between employers and employees began about a year ago and is told by Dr 'Adil Jazzarin, president of the Egyptian Federation of Industries. He says the idea for the meeting was conceived during the annual conference in Geneva of the International Labor Organization which is built on three major pillars—governments, employers, and employees. The three groups participate in the organization's meetings and conferences whose resolutions are issued by consensus of the three groups in a democratic atmosphere of cooperation to serve the interests of all.

He adds: The idea was received by tremendous understanding and enthusiasm by Federation of Labor President Ahmad Al-'Amawi as well as by all employer organizations and associations to which it was presented.

The concept therefore turned into a reality and implementation began last December. The goals for joint effort were set at the first large-scale meeting of concerned employers and employees. Those goals are to study means to increase production, fight unemployment, resolve the current economic crisis, and overcome obstacles to investment.

A secretariat general was indeed put in place. Groups were created, each comprising a number of expert and specialized representatives of employers and labor. Each group took it upon itself to study a specific problem. There were seven groups in all, covering all problems related to economics. The secretariat general reviewed the recommendations of the working groups and submitted a statement for amendment and approval by the

boards of directors of all participating federations and organizations. The statement was eventually issued in its present form.

It is no secret that before the declaration was amended, there were objections to some of its articles. Those objections originated with certain labor unions. Agreement was finally reached on the covenant on national effort for development and it was approved by the various parties.

What does the declaration say? It represents in reality the first time in Egypt's economic history that a consensus was reached by the two main faces of production, i.e. representatives of employers and of employees. They met in the belief that the country is their homeland; that the economic suffering of Egyptian citizens, no matter the justification, can no longer continue; and that Egyptian economic ills can only be cured by improving and increasing productivity. They were convinced that there were methods, motives, and a price to pay for increasing productivity, and that decisive steps must be taken to reach that goal.

The meetings included a number of Egyptian Federation of Labor officials led by federation president Ahmad Al-'Amawi, and employer representatives Dr 'Adil Jazzarin, president of the Federation of Industries; Sa'id Al-Tawil, president of the Egyptian Businessmen's Association; Mahmud Al-'Arabi, president of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce; Muhammad Ghanim, president of the Association of Investors of 10 Ramadan City; Dr Ahmad Abu-al-'Anin, president of the 6 October City Investors; and Muhammad Rajab, president of the Economic Committee of Businessmen in Alexandria. Economic expert Muhammad Ghanim took charge of the secretariat-general of the preparatory committee for the joint declaration.

Decisive steps had to be taken to change the Egyptian economic reality and to put into effect a general framework for economic reform in all fields. Those had to be submitted to the government of Dr 'Atif Sidqi for study and for adoption of suitable policies and procedures for their implementation.

The first step towards targeted economic reform is to coordinate all steps to ensure that they are comprehensive, and simultaneously cover all areas by providing a healthy economic climate, without which businesses would choke no matter how good the intentions. Experience has proven that partial cures that address one problem without the other, soon drop their fruits and become ineffective.

Education is first on the list of reform priorities. The government has taken some diligent steps towards reforming education in Egypt but we, as employers and employees, feel that that reform remains superficial and has not reached into the deep. The depth sought here involves curriculum and ways and means of relaying knowledge to students.

What counts is not how costly or involved the educational process but how high the level of accomplishment. Support for the concept of free public middle and secondary education for all, and of free higher education for those highly qualified, does not preclude allowing—even encouraging—private middle, secondary, and trade schools as well as private universities for those able to pay their tuition. It would not be social justice for the state to pay the costs of educating those who do not excel.

The second step in the reform program involves the public sector. The procedures are clear cut—liberate it from the control of the administration and various oversight agencies and separate its budgets from that of the state. The internationally recognized principle is to effectively separate management from ownership. This will never be accomplished by merely changing nomenclature from organization to authority or sector as long as they remain controlled by the concerned minister who actually combines management with ownership. To separate the two we must first remove the direct authority of the minister from the management of corporations. The ideal solution is to abolish the specific division of public sector organizations, and then divide the corporations into holding complexes, each of which would supervise a number of corporations and their various comprehensive economic activities. The complexes and corporations would compete together under managements free from the control of combined ownership and management.

However, there are those who believe that that would be unconstitutional, that the People's Assembly should have oversight over all matters of public funding, and that oversight can only be exercised through ministerial responsibility.

The joint declaration deals with that point by suggesting the creation of the position of deputy prime minister for public sector affairs to head a supreme council that would follow-up on these complexes and provide liaison with the general policy of the state. The law establishing that the council should guarantee noninterference in the management of complexes. It would be understood that authority over corporations would be vested only in their general assemblies.

A discussion of the public sector brings up another important issue—the necessity of reviewing the positions and laws governing the relationship between public sector companies and the ministry of finance as well as the manner in which their financial surpluses are handled.

It was also suggested to resolve the issue of Arab restrictions on public sector products by adding a suitable margin of profit to the cost of production.

As for workers and employees, the labor covenant believes that public sector companies should be free to devise regulations suitable to the nature of work in each sector, subject to agreed guidelines, and that wages and

incentives should be tied to the quality of production. It also calls for reassessing the bonus system, including the remuneration of top management, and for allowing corporations greater freedom of action in the reward and punishment of their workers within agreed limits.

The third step in the reform program concerns the private sector whose role in development, both employers and employees agree, is impeded by bureaucracy.

The fourth step touches on the rights and obligations of citizens towards their government. The state, should it exact its rights from citizens, must lead by example and fulfill its obligations to them. Applying this principle to the general state budget, it becomes incumbent upon the government to exercise caution and deliberation with every public expenditure. This kind of controlled public spending would instill in every citizen the desire to supply government with the resources to improve his lot. Every true rationalization of expenditure means an increased flow of funds, and that no citizen would balk against paying his [share] of taxes and fees.

The fifth step involves the necessity of putting a stop to inflationary waves that play havoc with real income. Weak productivity intensifies the adverse effects of these inflationary waves by affecting the availability of goods and services and by contributing to increases in the cost of production itself.

The sixth step deals with securing the role of financial institutions in providing suitable financial and investment climates. It makes no sense that capital market instruments in Egypt are limited to stocks and loans. World financial markets develop new instruments daily for use by specific segments of investors and for purchase by certain segments of savers. Financial institutions are intermediaries between savers and investors. Required, then, are new savings and investment vehicles to fit the needs and wants of various savers and investors. The return on each instrument should be commensurate with inherent risk.

The seventh step calls for limiting the state's dependence on the banking system for financing the general budget deficit. The less dependent government is on the banking system the more opportunity the latter will have to adequately finance other sectors without generating additional inflationary pressures.

Those were the seven points suggested as a program for economic reform by the declaration of employers and employees, in addition to another set of proposals for solving the problems of investment, imports, exports, and taxation.

The points were addressed by Federation of Labor president Ahmad Al-'Amawi who said that labor unions in Egypt are keen to study economic conditions in order to surmount obstacles by proposing complementary solutions within the framework of constitutional principles.

The Federation of Labor president adds: That prompted a meeting between representatives of employers and labor, who are the two sides of production, in order to hold discussions and express viewpoints on how to drive production and improve productivity. This is how they arrived at their proposals and penned that declaration.

The declaration, according to Sa'id Al-Tawil, president of the Egyptian Businessmen's Association, reflected the deep conviction of employers and employees that the problems of Egypt can only be solved through the efforts of its own sons.

He adds: The enormity of the problems facing us as Egyptians mandates that we make no differentiation between private, public, cooperative, or any other sector, or between employer and worker. We are all Egyptian, bound together by Egypt.

Muhammad Ghanim, secretary-general of the preparatory committee for the joint declaration, says that President Mubarak has admonished all legitimate organizations not to complain of government actions if they resort to passivity and depend on the government to conduct studies and implement steps it deems appropriate. President Mubarak has reiterated more than once his demand that such organizations study their problems in depth and propose constructive empirical solutions.

Since the economic problem and its solutions command top priority on all levels; since employers and workers are the broad front that affect the economic problem and are affected by it, and since it is the consensus that increased production is the primary treatment for our economic ills, it is therefore good planning that employers and workers present joint, constructive and deliberate studies of what they believe would promote production.

Says Muhammad Ghanim: But...a minority has seen fit that employers and workers reach a consensus and sign a joint declaration. They will be the ones to benefit or suffer in either case.

There is no denying that each group has its own ideology and the policies to implement that ideology. There is also no denying that there is a certain degree of disparity between employer and worker views, but this does not preclude a common national ground where the two poles of production would meet to confront the problems of the fatherland rather than being driven away from the basic problems and its solutions by diffused thinking and confrontational attitudes.

That describes the declaration signed by both employers and workers. As the president of the Egyptian Federation of Industries Dr 'Adil Jazzarin says, the declaration is not a magic wand that would solve all our economic problems.

### Article Explores Reasons Behind Egyptian Pound's Strength

45040453a London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
8 Aug 89 p 6

[Article: "AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Explores Dimensions of Unprecedented Phenomenon; Dollar Drops 40 Piasters in 10 Days Versus Egyptian Currency; Cairo Prepares to Float Pound and Free Currency Market"]

[Text] Cairo—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Bureau—For the first time since the 1970's, the dollar exchange rate has dropped in the Egyptian market. Experts note that this is the opportunity for the Egyptian economy to float the pound's exchange rate. Can this step be accomplished at present and what are the real reasons behind the pound's triumph versus the dollar in the latest battle after successive losses and defeats? Let us return to the starting point which shows that, at the peak of the pilgrimage season when the demand for dollars increases and with the return of Egyptians from abroad for summer vacation, the Egyptian market witnessed, by the end of July, a unique phenomenon unprecedented since 1970 or, to be precise, since 1975 when the dollar equaled 60 piasters. The important event is embodied in the exciting and unprecedented drop in the dollar exchange rate, considering that the dollar lost 40 piasters of its value in 10 days. The market is waiting in anticipation and speculators in the currency market stand confused before the unexpected losses—losses estimated at no less than ¼ million pounds for every million dollars in the money changers' possession.

The exchange rate now stands within the limits of 260 piasters per dollar whereas it had reached 3 pounds [300 piasters] earlier. The dollar exchange rate in the black market or free market has neared the current price in the banking market, ranging from 257-259 piasters per dollar.

In the light of this situation, speculators in currency have not been able to stop the money-changing operations in the banking market and to reduce the market's dollar supply so as to stem the sudden collapse of the [dollar] exchange rates. The Egyptian Central Bank has exploited the situation and taken the initiative by letting the banking apparatus provide export credits that exceed the apparatus' intrinsic resources by 10 percent instead of the six percent previously allowed. The objective was to strike the money changers with an iron fist, to besiege their activity at home and abroad and to let the free banking market move the price more flexibly, thus allowing the price to reach 261 piasters per dollar. For the first time in Egypt, the dollar market has turned in favor of the buyer, not the seller. Despite the power and influence they have accumulated throughout 10 years, the money changers have not been able to raise the exchange rate to its previous level of 290-300 piasters per dollar because with the continued and ever increasing dollar flow into the market, importers do not feel that they have to resort to the black market.

There is a feeling among those dealing in the currency market that the [dollar] exchange rates will drop even lower. This has strengthened the urge to sell dollars at the [current] low price. Specialists in the currency market note that the dollar exchange rate would possibly have dropped to less than 250 piasters if it weren't for the presence of the banking market whose exchange rate is within the limits of 257 piasters per dollar.

The banking authorities had not imagined that the drop would continue at these high rates. But they point out that this situation is the best because the banking market and the banks are able for the first time in long years to maintain relative stability in the Egyptian currency market. Simultaneously, the banking market and banks have been able to increase the free banking market's currency resources, which have risen to \$7 billion since this market was founded 2 years ago.

### Follow-Up

To demonstrate what has happened in the currency market to date, it behooves us to trace the exchange rate since the beginning of this year when this rate did not exceed 232 piasters per dollar in the banking market and 243 piasters per dollar in the free market. But then the dollar exchange rate began to suddenly register amazing and abnormal increases in April and May, thus exceeding 3 pounds per dollar by the end of June. While the difference between the banking market exchange rate and the free market exchange rate had been no more than 9 piasters, i.e. 4 percent, it suddenly jumped in June to 40 piasters, or nearly 25 percent, before the banking market exchange rate was moved from 248 piasters to 262 piasters per dollar. The current banking market exchange rate has dropped to about 257 piasters per dollar, with a difference of 3-4 piasters from the free market exchange rate. Observers and specialists have been at a loss in interpreting these developments, even though several circles have rushed to attribute the developments to their efforts. For example, the Ministry of Interior has announced the discovery of millions of dollars circulated in the currency market and has attributed the developments to the drug law and to the beginning of the execution of drug smugglers. In its statement, the ministry said that the strict currency market control, the arrest of defendants and traffickers, and implementation of the new drug law, are behind the drop in the dollar exchange rate.

### Return Season

Minister of Economy Yusri Mustafa has said that the season when Egyptians return [home for summer holidays] and the efficiency of the banking market have been behind the drop. The economy minister notes that the banking market's daily revenues have risen to \$8.2 million, and that these revenues enable the banking apparatus to perform its role in serving the currency and foreign trade transactions and the private sector's activity which benefits from most of the banking market revenue. In his analysis, the economy minister notes that

he expects the dollar exchange rate to continue to fall and that this fall is not a "temporary" condition, as some think it to be, but a return to normalcy now that speculation has been ended. He notes that confidence in the economy has gained obvious strength, and that the wave of rumors which pursued the banking apparatus in the wake of the crisis of the money investment firms has ended. But according to the diagnosis of Muhammad Farid, chairman of the executive board of the Egyptian International African Bank and one of the figures concerned with the Egyptian currency market, there are a number of factors which contribute together to the Egyptian pound's triumph versus the U.S. dollar after numerous rounds in which the Egyptian pound lost so badly that it reached a critical phase in April and May. Currency traders had expected the exchange rate to rise to 3.5 pounds prior to the pilgrimage season. It is well known that in this period, traders resort to what is known in the banking language as the "purchase in advance" of a 3-month salary of Egyptians working abroad. This is the annual vacation period when these Egyptians take leave from their jobs and return home. In this climate of speculation, the dollar exchange rates rise, thus greatly distancing themselves from the bank exchange rates. What helped this method succeed were the rumors spread about the banking apparatus and about a government plan to seize deposits in foreign currency to repay debt installments before July 1989 and the reports that a part of the U.S. aid for Egypt was expected to be frozen. But the climate changed suddenly and for numerous reasons, the most significant of which was the cooperation of the banking apparatus in providing credit in an unprecedented manner, using 10 percent of its resources instead of the 6 percent previously permitted. This shows the ability of the banking apparatus to use its own reserve resources. This, in addition to issuance of the drug law and the announcement about agreement in principle with the IMF, has contributed to the reasons which, collectively, have brought about the unexpected drop in the dollar exchange rates in the Egyptian market.

### Expectations

Analysts expect the dollar exchange rate to stay at its present level for no less than 2 months to come. This rate may even drop further if the fiscal policy of curtailing imports, which is followed currently by the government, continues simultaneously with flexibility in the banking market exchange rates. It will also drop if the banking apparatus provides the credit needed by the public and private sector from its own resources, so as not to give importers the opportunity [reason] to resort to purchasing foreign currency from the [black] market and, consequently, revive speculation in the pound.

The Ministry of Economy says: We will be watching the coming short period. If the present situation persists, and if dollars continue to flow to the market at the same current levels, then we can launch the final phase of the banking market development: namely free the exchange rate, making it subject to supply and demand. This will

lead to floating the Egyptian pound versus foreign currencies without fear of collapse of the pound's exchange rate. But this will not be done until the Central Bank Council, which has set the exchange rate at 70 piasters per dollar for essential goods such as wheat, flour, sugar and tea, meets.

### **Rabi' Gives Reasons for Foreign Policy 'Failure'**

45040418 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 11 Jul 89 p 6

[Interview With Dr Hamid Rabi' by 'Abd-al-Fattah Fayid; date, place not given; "In Wake of Recent Developments in Arab Arena, Dr Hamid Rabi': Rapprochement Is Big Step But It Is Not Result of Egyptian Foreign Policy Success; Our Foreign Ministry Is Warehouse for Fortunate Employees; Presidency Views Ministry as Mere Decoration; Israel's Apparatus Has Gathered Terrible and Fearful Information on Us; Up Until This Moment, We Know Nothing About Them; We Have Failed Internationally in Dealing With Superpowers; We Have Also Failed Abysmally in Subduing Israel"]

[Text] [AL-SHA'B] Dr Hamid Rabi', what is your assessment of Egyptian foreign policy generally in the recent period?

[Rabi'] If we try to assess Egyptian foreign policy, then we must acknowledge that it has been a failure from 1975 up until this moment. I am, of course, speaking of the foreign policy up until this moment, excluding Egypt's return to the Arab ranks and the Casablanca summit because their outcome has not become clear yet. But they may become a turning point in the future.

[AL-SHA'B] What are the reasons for this failure?

[Rabi'] There is more than one reason. We will mention the reasons in their entirety and then explain each separately. It is a policy with no clear objectives. Second, it has not learned how to exploit its resources and instruments.

Third, it has generally been timid, and at times even a cowardly and vacillating policy.

(Rabi' went on to explain point by point:) Clarity of objectives means that the objectives are determined and arranged in an ascending order. It also means that it is clear in the foreign policy leader's mind that there is a maximum he aspires to achieve, and a minimum which he will not agree to surpass. The lack of clear objectives leads to muddling.

We can say that, in this sense, Egypt's foreign policy since the July revolution, specifically since Syria's secession [from the union with Egypt], has been a failure, excluding the few years which preceded the 1973 war. The objectives of Egyptian foreign policy became shaky after the second disengagement agreement specifically. It was no longer clear in the foreign policy leader's mind whether he wanted to rescue Egypt from its internal crisis or to solve the Palestinian problem, and whether he

wanted to solve the Palestinian problem through the bridge of the Arab approach or the bridge of the personal approach on behalf of Egypt, in its capacity as a state responsible for the Middle East.

### **Where Are Our National Objectives**

To date, Egypt's policy does not arrange its objectives, and does not know what its supreme national objectives are. The objectives are now Arab, which they were not in previous years. It should have been constant and well-arranged, at least in the past 10 years. What has happened is that the Arab objectives have now ascended and become dominant, whereas they were not in previous years. This has happened without a change in circumstances. The circumstances are the same and yet the objectives have changed.

The second reason for the failure of Egyptian foreign policy is that it has not controlled its instruments and has not exploited its resources. Three instruments must exist if a foreign policy is generally to be successful. These instruments are the diplomatic instrument, the media instrument, and the army.

It is obvious that for the first time, the diplomatic instrument and its influence have declined. The media have not reached the stage of understanding their function in foreign policy. Their entire function is to hail and sing the praises of the ruler. Be it so. But what do I do vis-a-vis the outside world?

As for the army, it is an instrument of war as it is an instrument of deterrence, i.e. of preventing war. Herein lies the army's importance and task in foreign policy.

[AL-SHA'B] How has efficiency of the diplomatic instrument declined?

[Rabi'] We must first stress that regardless of any other considerations, Egypt is a country which has an international status. It is a status that emanates not from a void but from Egypt's history. This history has proven that Egypt is the only force in the region capable of playing an influential role in the Middle East. But this position has diminished. The efficiency of Egyptian diplomacy has declined because it no longer possesses effective tools. The most important of these instruments is a trained and capable diplomatic apparatus, whereas our diplomatic apparatus is, regrettably, no more than a group of employees who do not understand their real task—namely to deal with foreign powers skillfully. Moreover, our Foreign Ministry is tantamount to a warehouse for fortunate employees who go to other countries and most of whom do nothing more than count the days to collect dollars. They may even exploit their job for personal gain. With pain, I say this as a result of what I have seen personally.

Another point connected with the above point is that the presidency of the republic has wrested a large part of the ministry's powers and has come to believe that the Foreign Ministry is no more than a decoration. There is

no doubt the presidency of the republic, represented in the person of the president, is responsible for foreign policy. But this responsibility should be exercised through the Foreign Ministry, not replace it. The Foreign Ministry is a national agency that is more constant and stable than the presidency, whose agencies change with the change of president.

The second instrument of diplomatic efficiency is the success of the Foreign Ministry in gathering information. Regrettably, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry has no information. For example, we have embarked upon peace with Israel. The ministry has an information gathering agency and we have an academic information gathering agency. Do we have an agency that gathers information on Israel? We have an embassy where it is rare to find a person who speaks Hebrew. Their agency has gathered fearful information about us in Cairo and we know nothing about them.

The third instrument is research centers. When we compare ourselves with Israel, we find that this small country has 7 research centers which cooperate with their Foreign Ministry, which compare [their information] with universities and intelligence centers, and which issue studies on every problem. They are studies that provide adequate and (carefully considered) information and then offer the prognosis and the solution, or propose solutions and outline the merits and drawbacks of each solution.

In our country, the research centers produce nothing but trivial scraps of paper which are read by the janitor but which neither the specialist nor the official needs. Such papers are often presented in symposiums which imagine that they offer solutions to problems. This is nonsense.

[AL-SHA'B] We have talked at length of the failure and its causes. Are there specific manifestations in which we can feel this failure?

[Rabi'] The first and most evident manifestation of the failure of Egyptian foreign policy is that this policy has not learned how to subdue Israel in recent years. When dealing with Israel began in 1975, Israel was utterly weak and Egypt was at the peak of strength. Fifteen years have passed and Israel is now at the peak of strength and Egypt is utterly weak. It is a failure by all criteria. We have not learned how to deal with Israel's parties and with the explosive developments inside Israel. We have not learned how to deal with world Jewry.

This abysmal failure is a result of the fact that Egypt did not include this objective in its plan: I have dealt with Israel, now I must subdue it. The second manifestation is this policy's failure in dealing with the United States, or with the superpowers generally. The dealings with the Soviet Union ended up in estrangement. Even though the relations with the Soviet Union have begun to improve, we must fully realize that the Soviet Union is

planning to return to [resume relations with] Israel and to rely on it. We must keep this in mind. Isn't this a failure?

Moreover, the dealings with the United States are based on laxity and weakness and on begging for aid, whereas Israel defies the United States and reminds it that the aid it is given is not aid but a military agreement. Israel also reminds the United States that with this military agreement, it enables the latter to control the Middle East at the cheapest price.

As for us, we accept the U.S. aid as assistance, and not a military agreement. That allows the United States to save itself military expenditures.

This foreign policy's Arab failure is evident in its relations with Libya. It is also evident in Ethiopia because this policy has agreed to support a military regime against Arab and Egyptian interests, and to march in Ethiopia's bandwagon. This policy's biggest failure is in Sudan.

Dr Rabi' adjusts his sitting position, displaying utmost interest, and says: Sudan is the most important point about which I want to talk. He then embarks on the subject directly: We don't understand that Israel seeks to besiege Egypt. The Arabs don't understand that the conflict is between Egypt and Israel fundamentally, and that the other forces are peripheral supporting forces.

(Explaining, he added:) Our relationship with Sudan is two-sided:

First, the arable lands in Sudan. Sudan possesses 100 million of the most fertile lands in the world and science has proven that these lands are enough to feed the Arab world.

Second, water. We live on water that comes to us from South Sudan.

The plot that is said to be hatched against Sudan is a plot against Egypt, not against Sudan. The plot has three links:

The first link is Israeli, and it seeks to deprive Egypt of any ability to integrate with Sudan. Israel has blockaded Egypt from all directions, except the south. So the relationship with Sudan has to be struck in order to make the blockade complete. To the north, Israel's navy is deployed, along with the U.S. Navy. To the east, thanks to the severed Arab relations. To the south, thanks to the game with al-Qadhdhafi, (regardless of the latest developments in the Arab arena).

There remains the south.

The second link is an economic link. The major companies are no longer interested in Egypt, and no major company will be interested in it. If compared with Central Africa, which abounds with coal and petroleum, Egypt is a very narrow market.

The third link consists of the U.S. strategic dimensions. The United States wants to link the Atlantic Ocean with the Indian Ocean. This can be accomplished only through Central Africa (Sudan, Kenya, Uganda). Dr Hamid Rabi' stresses his words, saying: In view of all this, how can Egypt stand silent? How can Egypt stand silent when Sudan has limited abilities and limited capabilities?

The failure of the Egyptian policy vis-a-vis Sudan confirms anew that Egypt cannot live without sound relations with Sudan.

Egypt's policy vis-a-vis Sudan has never been sound. In 'Abd-al-Nasir's era, this policy was founded on disinterest in Sudan, except in sentimental aspects. Al-Sadat's policy was designed purely to protect Numayri's regime.

There has to be a wise policy toward the sisterly Sudan.

To date, there has been failure at the Arab level. I ask: Are there in the world two countries which belong to the same national community, and between whom estrangement lasted more than 10 years, (regardless of the latest developments)? I am not talking of the other side's (Libya's) faults. I am talking of my faults.

Why should I play their game? Is this in Egypt's or in Israel's interest? Is it in the interest of Arabism or in the interest of the Arabs' enemies? Libya has played the wrong game dictated by the enemies of Arabism and Islam and so have we. Isn't this a failure?

[AL-SHA'B] But isn't this Arab rapprochement, and isn't Egypt's return to the Arab ranks a success for Egyptian foreign policy?

[Rabi'] We need not debate that Egypt's return to the Arab ranks is essential and had to happen. However, it has not happened as a result of the success of Egyptian foreign policy, but as a result of certain circumstances, specifically:

1. The Gulf war, which made the Arabs aware of their need of Egypt. The Gulf region, including Iraq, wants to protect itself and is talking very persistently of providing the region with an Egyptian army. Iraq itself realized this. If it had not been for the Egyptians in Iraq, the war would not have been concluded successfully. The Egyptian presence allowed Iraq to recruit one million Iraqis to fight Iran.

2. The Lebanon crisis: This crisis has demonstrated that Egypt has an influential role in the region and that this crisis cannot be solved without Egypt's presence. The partition of Lebanon is a prelude to partitioning the other Arab countries. Not only Syria but also Saudi Arabia itself is ripe for partition. Moreover, there is an Israeli plan for a coming war whose features have begun to become clear.

This is why Egypt has returned to the Arab ranks. This does not mean that I don't want it to return. What I mean to say is that this return has been imposed on

Egypt. Consequently, Egypt's foreign policy is a failure, and this policy does not realize that this return must have different components from those existing in the past. The framework is different, the regional framework is different, and the domestic framework itself is different. The Soviet Union no longer supports the Arab world as it supported this world in the past. The difference between us and Israel has become vast. The domestic situation has disintegrated with the decline of the standard of living, with the presence of strong tendencies that are independent of the government, and with the presence of other conditions that forewarn danger.

All the circumstances have changed and those in charge of Egypt's foreign policy still fail to comprehend this change. To them, Arab solidarity is no more than a conference in which they exchange warm applause. There is no better proof of the fact than the Arab Cooperation Council which was created more than 4 months ago. We notice that the steps following its proclamation have been very slow.

[AL-SHA'B] I took this opportunity and asked him: What is your opinion of these Arab blocs that have appeared along with the cooperation council to which you have referred?

[Rabi'] These entities are an effective element in bringing the Arab brothers closer to each other. They are also an effective element in bringing about unity gradually.

But there is another possibility which one fears within the current framework of 1989, namely that these blocs may turn into a means of pulling parts of the Arab world away from the entire Arab entity. The two parts we fear for are the Arab Maghreb, and the Gulf Cooperation Council, which fears for itself. It is feared that this council, which is Asian, will turn inward and pull East Asian countries towards it. As for the Arab Maghreb Council, it may attract the EEC agreement to it. Consequently, the Arab East, which is the region of problems, may remain distant and isolated.

We must understand that this is one of the elements of the Israeli policy—an element that makes it possible for Israel to launch violent operations in this Arab East.

### Conference on Political Prisoners Provides Statistics

45040417a Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 11 Jul 89 p 2

[Article by 'Amir 'Abd-al-Mun'im: "Opposition Leaders in Solidarity Conference With Political Prisoners"]

[Text] Opposition party leaders criticized the continuing arrests of politicians and the bad treatment to which they are subjected inside Egyptian prisons. They demanded that martial law, by which the country is being governed, be repealed.



At the conference, which was held at the National Progressive Unionist Grouping [NPUG] last Wednesday evening to show solidarity with political prisoners, the party leaders called for rallying forces and uniting ranks to oppose the misuse of power.

All the representatives of the national forces attended the conference. Foremost among the participants were Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, Khalid Muhyi al-Din, 'Adil 'Id, and Mubarak Abu-al-Fadl.

Eng Ibrahim Shukri said in his speech, "We are living nowadays in the shadow of barbaric practices against human rights. We are deprived of all freedoms. More than that, they call us to account for the thoughts that pass through our minds.

"There are things about which we should not disagree—such as the situation we are now experiencing."

Concerning the effect of the deteriorating conditions on attempts at development, Shukri added, "They exert their utmost efforts to encourage investment. They establish tax breaks and credits, but they do not want to be convinced that the general atmosphere in Egypt does not encourage any investor—Egyptian, Arab, or foreign—to work in our country. If they want to solve Egypt's problems, they must pay attention to the rights of citizens and the maintenance of their dignity, so that the people will work along with the governments."

#### Uniting Ranks To Stop Tyranny

Shukri added, "These countrymen imprisoned behind bars are the free, because they spoke their mind. We, on the other hand, are all prisoners and live in a big prison. We must therefore think of a way for the parties to come together to stop this tyranny."

He pointed out that the central security police had come to outnumber the Egyptian army.

Shukri said, "They have chosen this way; we must choose our way and settle our differences. We are all threatened, as long as the emergency law is brandished at our necks."

Shouting angrily, Shukri said, "They have jettisoned the rule of law. They have despised the judiciary and people's freedoms. They are interested only in staying in power. They have neglected the people's rights, until the gap between poor and rich has widened so much that it is greater than the gap that existed before the revolution. The chasm has become greater and greater."

Shukri ended his speech, saying, "The broad masses need someone to give them advice and counsel. They yearn to hear the true other opinion. They only need someone to organize them. That will only come to pass with the right beginning. It will unite all political tendencies around a single goal with which we will begin."

Counselor al-Ma'mun al-Hudaybi said, "We have obtained information about prisoners from the minister of justice. It indicates that in the period from February

1986 to 9 February 1989—i.e., Major General Zaki Badr's term as minister of interior—the number of detainees totaled 12,472. If we add to them the number of people arrested after the al-Fayyum incidents, the number comes to 15,000. Some people have been arrested more than once, despite the issuance of release rulings on their behalf. Thus, the total number of people arrested amounts to about 17,000. The minister of justice's statement mentioned that 16,311 complaints had been submitted. The emergency state security courts had considered 15,564 complaints and had ruled that in 12,447 cases there had been no justification for arrest. In other words, rulings rejecting the arrest exceeded 80 percent.

"9,242 appeals were presented to contest release rulings; 8,000 of these were rejected. If this indicates anything, it indicates that the emergency authority is being used treacherously and unjustifiedly to arrest people. What is said about exploiting the judicial system is said on the one hand and rendered ineffectual on the other. People remain slaves to the authorities for months and months in prison."

Next, 'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad, a member of the presidium of the Wafd Party, spoke. He stressed that this government, with its confused, tired policies, was a collapsing, timeworn, corrupt government that could find protection for itself only by using the weapon of compulsion and terror. "The emergency laws are used only to gag mouths from crying out against the corruption of dishonest people. Every day we see wholesale raids on homes. They break down doors, snatch fathers from their children, and throw them uncharged into dark prisons. The arrest warrants are distributed to the police precincts so that minor officers can use them in settling their personal enmities."

In his speech, communist representative Mubarak Abu-al-Fadl demanded the formation of a national committee to defend prisoners and the repeal of martial law. The nucleus of this committee could be formed by the public parties and the forces that are hidden from publicity.

In his speech, lawyer 'Adil 'Id pointed out what prisoners are subjected to after arrest and how arrest warrants are issued dated after the actual arrest in order to keep detainees under police control as long as possible.

Finally, NPUG leader Khalid Muhyi-al-Din spoke. He began his speech by saying, "The democratic margin in Egypt is threatened with destruction. What has brought us to this was a series of recurring incidents. First, there was the unprecedented impudence with which Consultative Council elections were falsified. Never before have we seen such impudence. Some think it is a rehearsal for People's Assembly elections. The government has no sensitivity about telling the world that they were falsified. Second, there was the government's impudence in rejecting the judgment dealing with the members of the People's Assembly."

Khalid Muhyi-al-Din ended his speech, saying, "We are beginning the journey at this meeting—the journey toward ending imprisonment and the emergency law, the journey toward the loaf of bread."

### **Bank Report Reveals Public-Sector Project Failures**

45040428 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 18 Jul 89 p 6

[Article by Fikri 'Abd-al-Mutallib: "As We Start Third Year of Five-Year Plan, Project Implementation Falters, Performance Stumbles; National Investment Bank Overseeing Implementation of Plan Affirms That Less than 50 Percent of Investments Implemented in Eight Ministries, Two Public Organizations, Three Service Organizations, and the Fourth, an Economic Organization"]

[Text] The projects of the Five-Year Development Plan, which is now in its third year (July 89 to July 1990), are still afflicted with faltering implementation and haphazard performance. This was confirmed by investigative reports from the field compiled by the National Investment Bank which is financing the larger part of the plan's projects and is overseeing their follow-up.

The report mentioned that these projects were under the authority of eight ministries, two public organizations, three service organizations, and one economic organization.

It is astonishing that the Ministry of Planning, which is responsible for the preparation of the plan and for overseeing its implementation, heads the list of ministries that are being accused of having a low level of project implementation. Only 32.9 percent of the original investments in material projects have been implemented, and 29.5 percent of the amended investments have been implemented.

This being the case, it is not extraordinary then that one of the eight ministries is one which is extremely important for national security. This is the Ministry of Military Production: 45.8 percent—36.5 percent.

In the remaining ministries—the Ministries of Health, Manpower, Social Affairs, Culture, Religious Trusts, and Civil Aviation—the projects which were implemented did not exceed the previously mentioned implementation percentages. And this shows why the standard of services to the public has declined.

In addition to the aforementioned ministries, one may mention the Public Organization for Sanitary Drainage in Alexandria, the Public Organization for Water in Alexandria, the Scientific Research Academy, the Supreme Council for Youth and Athletics, al-Azhar University, and the Radio and Television Association.

### **Health Is in Danger**

To clarify the picture, let us consider the projects which are under the authority of the Ministry of Health. The

report by the National Investment Bank says that implementation of these projects is faltering, either because the investments that were made in these projects were small, or because contracting companies do not finish the jobs which were assigned to them on time. This is true of the teaching hospitals in Banha, in al-Sahil, and in al-Matariyah; it is also true of the Polio Institute and of the Institute for Cardiac Surgery. The total cost for the two institutes amounts to 48.6 million pounds. In addition, there is the al-Haram Hospital project, and that hospital is subordinate to the Cairo Institute for Therapy.

The bank's field investigative committee revealed that the number of hospital beds was disproportionate with the area of the hospital, which is built over an area of five feddans. The report also revealed that the hospital had a large number of foreign experts; that luxurious materials were used to complete construction; and that materials were imported from abroad to maintain the facility. That increased the total cost of the project.

### **Blatant Examples of Dereliction of Duty**

Although the National Investment Bank affirmed in its report that between 50 and 75 percent of the total projects that are associated with the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Electricity and Power, and the Ministry of Housing and Utilities were actually implemented, (and these ministries are the three major ministries of production) a detailed reading of some of these ministries' important projects shows numerous blatant examples of negligence. In the industrial sector, construction work to refurbish al-Tabiyah Plant, which belongs to al-Nasr Company for Canned Foods, was not completed during the 18 months that were scheduled for completing the job. Electricity and water service to the plant, which are necessary for production, were also delayed. In addition, no attention was given to ensure a continuing and steady supply of the agricultural products which are necessary for production. Consequently, the plant has not been operated at full capacity, according to the report by the field investigating committee.

And yet the report failed to mention how much of a cost increase the state will have to bear as a result of this negligence. It said no more than that 7.7 million pounds in investments were implemented during the first 5-Year Plan (1982/83-1986/87) and that the total investment costs which are necessary to complete the production lines was about 18 million pounds. The current 5-Year Plan (1987/88-1991/92) earmarked the sum of 15 million pounds for the completion of the production lines.

But officials of the follow-up committees appealed to al-Nasr Company to develop its products quickly so it can regain its local and foreign markets. They appealed to the company so it would not expand production beyond the limits of its marketing capabilities. They also asked the company to use existing buildings for additional storage space instead of building new warehouses.

By comparison, the follow-up report declared quite clearly that the faltering implementation of construction and the delay in contracting with technical experts for the garment cutting unit of the Dikrnis Clothing Project increased the total costs of the two stages of implementation [and prolonged the time required for implementation] from 5 to 7 years. The cost of the machinery also rose as a result of the delay in signing a contract for the machinery.

The follow-up committees also noticed that the company was assuming large financial burdens as a result of the presence of foreign experts. These foreign experts were there on a semipermanent basis under the pretext of supervising production and design.

In this regard, officials of the National Investment Bank forgot to demand that local experts be utilized to carry out such functions. That would be consistent with the claims made by the Minister of Planning who said that Egyptian experts should receive priority in the projects of the plan.

The failure to realize anticipated profits is one of the other consequences of the fact that project implementation is faltering. Anticipated profits were not realized because the producer's fixed and variable costs exceeded budgeted costs. This is confirmed by the project to refurbish the National Company for Metal Industries.

#### Waiting for a Concept

Matters are worse at the Iron and Steel Company where 2 million pounds in investments earmarked for a project to transport and deliver raw materials from the mines during the first year of the plan (1987-1988) were not implemented. This project was not implemented because the investments that were earmarked for it depended upon credit terms in foreign currency. That is not compatible with what company officials require. Company officials think it is necessary to have unrestricted access to foreign currency so that project requirements can be purchased.

It is astonishing that no changes were made in these investments as the second year of the plan came to an end. According to the field investigative report, company officials are waiting for the National Investment Bank and the Ministry of Planning to tell them, as promised, their concept of a plan to develop the mines and strengthen transportation and handling methods in the mines.

Although examples in the industrial sector are numerous and blatant, observations on projects in the electricity and energy sector are extremely grave. The bank's investigative report warned of major damage to the north Cairo transformer station whose replacement costs are estimated to amount to 15 million pounds.

#### Sanitary Drainage Falters

In the housing and utilities sector, follow-up activities in the field affirmed that implementation of sanitary drainage projects was faltering due to a shortage in local currency, which was earmarked to finance these projects, or to a delay in approving the engineering sketches for the projects.

This is also true for the sanitary drainage plants in Qalyub, in Shibin al-Kawm, Tanta, al-Mahallah al-Kubra, Isma'iliyah, Qina, and Port Sa'id. The total cost for these plants amounts to 676.1 million pounds. In addition, three plants in rural areas will cost 72.5 million pounds.

#### Secret Investments

This being the case in some of the plan's projects, the failure of the National Investment Bank's report to investigate the status of investments which were implemented in the ministries is provocative. Among these ministries three are sovereign ministries. The bank's report failed to investigate implemented projects in two economic organizations, one sovereign organization, one judicial organization, one service organization, two control agencies, and the People's Assembly as well.

However, the report mentioned only general statistical data on the value of these investments. It also mentioned how much of these investments, which were earmarked for those agencies, were implemented.

Did these statistics come from the data provided by these agencies, or were they the product of the field investigation which was carried out by the National Investment Bank's experts and officials? Because the report does not answer that question, the question which has to be asked here is this: If the bank found out about the investments designated for these agencies in the course of its field investigation, why did the bank not report on these investments in its report just as it reported on investments which were implemented in other agencies?

If, however, the source of these statistics is the data provided by these agencies, why then are they being singled out and treated differently from the way the remaining ministries and organizations in the state are being treated? Are the Ministry of Interior, the non-sensitive agencies of the Ministry of Defense (public services and vocational training centers), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministries of Planning, International Cooperation, and Insurance above being subjected to the scrutiny of follow-up activities?

Is the Presidency above the state and above the law? Why should the investments that are made by the presidency, by the People's Assembly, by the Central Agency for Organization and Management and Administrative Supervision, by the Suez Canal Authority, by the al-Sadat Academy for Management Science, and by the National Population Council be concealed from

observers and experts? Are all these institutions above the state and above the law?

These are questions we are setting forth in front of everyone who is concerned about this country. Concerns about the plan are to be continued.

### New Projects Change Agricultural Land Ownership

45040453b Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic  
3 Aug 89 p 1

[Article: "Wali Announces Executive Measures for President Mubarak's Directives; Private Sector To Own 51 Percent of Agricultural Project Firms in Governorates"]

[Text] In implementation of President Husni Mubarak's directives, it has been decided to award 51 percent of the ownership of agricultural project firms in the governorates to citizens and youth. This will be done with the objective of developing these firms and managing them in an economic way that increases their productivity and provides new work opportunities. Ownership will be awarded in the form of shares, with 50 percent of their value covered by soft-term loans from the Agricultural Credit Bank. Implementation is to begin in four governorates: Al-Fayyum, Dumyat, al-Minufiyah and the New Valley. The loans will be repaid from the share profits.

Dr Yusuf Wali, the deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture and land reclamation, announced this yesterday at his meeting with members of the National Party's Agriculture and Irrigation Committee. He added that the ownership of 101,000 feddans, valued at 750 million pounds, will be awarded to their occupants. Soft terms have been set for the sale of these lands and 110,000 citizens have applied to buy them. Contracts awarding the ownership of nearly 5,600 feddans in four governorates will be concluded this week. The farmers [in these lands] have paid their debts, amounting to more than 1 million pounds, to the Agrarian Reform Authority.

Dr Wali said that President Mubarak has instructed that a survey be made of all the cultivable land in the governorates within 1 and 1/2 months so that the ownership of state-owned lands may be turned over to those farming them. The governor of North Sinai has been empowered for the first time to award the ownership of 100,000 feddans in the governorate to youth and farmers.

At the meeting, the deputy prime minister and National Party secretary general asserted that the [local] wheat supply amounted this year to more than 3 million tons and that this year's average production per feddan amounted to 14 (irdabbs) [dry measure], compared to 4.82 (irdabbs) in 1952. He also asserted that the experiment of producing thin [al-tibaqi] bread, in which the Ministry of Supply has succeeded, has led to savings of 30 percent in wheat and flour in the governorates. He

also noted that there has been a surplus in fruit production this year as a result of the uniform use of improved seed for most crops. Dr Wali further pointed out that one variety of watermelons cultivated on 170,000 feddans this year is one of the reasons for the success in fruit production this year.

Dr Wali also issued a decision permitting the licensing of unlicensed wells already drilled by farmers, provided that the methods of drip and sprinkler irrigation are employed. If irrigation is done by flooding, the contract [license] will be canceled.

In a related development, Dr (Ahmad) Juwayli, the governor of Dumyat, announced at the committee meeting that a study is being conducted on a plan to produce a loaf of bread with 1/2 the weight of the current loaf.

Dr 'Abd-al-Ahad Jamal-al-Din, the chairman of the Higher Youth and Sports Council, asserted that an agreement is being currently worked out with the Ministry of Agriculture to allocate 40,000 feddans in al-Natron area to set up the biggest agroindustrial community totally established by youth, beginning with land reclamation and ending with construction of the complementary industries, with state loans. The plan is to award full ownership of the project to the youth.

Dr Jamal-al-Din added that the Youth and Sports Agency has already set up 157 small production projects in the youth centers and that this year's plan calls for 150 more projects.

### Fifteen Companies Request Employee Ownership Plans

45040427b Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 4 Jul 89 p 6

[Article by Hisham Mubarak: "Employee Ownership of 15 Companies Sought To Increase Production"]

[Text] Fifteen companies requested the introduction of a stock acquisition plan for their employees. The Ministry for International Cooperation decided to set controls and standards to compare the companies which are applying for such a plan and determine which is to be given preference over the other. This announcement was made in front of a management symposium by Ahmad 'Abd-al-Salam, undersecretary of state for the Ministry of International Cooperation.

Mr 'Abd-al-Salam affirmed that the standards which the ministry was considering at the present time included one which would give new companies priority since the value of these companies' shares can be easily determined. As far as existing companies are concerned, it would be possible to form a committee for the purpose of having those shares evaluated.

Mr 'Abd-al-Salam affirmed that priority would be given to export companies and companies which employ a large number of workers. He said that this system would

not apply to partnerships, but that it would apply to joint stock companies only. He also said that one of the banks would guarantee the company.

Mr 'Abd-al-Salam affirmed that the controls which were being considered by the ministry would give priority to workers who would be making their stock purchases with small amounts of money. This will ensure that the largest number of workers will benefit from the plan. No worker will acquire company shares that are worth more than the total salary he earns in a certain number of years—5 years for example.

Justice Mahnud Fahmi, former president of the Money Market Authority addressed the symposium and said that it would be possible to apply such a plan in Egypt by setting up an association for employees in each company that has stock whose value is appreciating. The plan could be applied to companies whose stock is part of these companies' capital; it could be applied to companies whose stock is traded on the stock exchange; and it could be applied to companies that have their own independent, legal status and their own independent financial standing.

Justice Mahmud Fahmi suggests that people employed in the founding organizations of these companies be asked to participate in the employees' association to spread the benefits and make it possible for the largest number of workers to participate in the plan and benefit from it. This would require that Article 84 in Law Number 159 be amended to prop up public sector companies in this regard.

Engineer Fathi al-Fiqi, president of the Transportation and Engineering Company, talked about the experience of a new company, the Alexandria Tire Company. He said that this was the first experience in that area and that the investment cost for the project amounted to 350 million pounds. He said the company's capital was 138 million pounds; that construction of the project would last 3 years; that annual sales would amount to 200 million pounds; and that the project would realize approximately \$30 million in annual savings in the balance of payments.

Engineer al-Fiqi said that the company obtained \$59 million in loans from Italy; \$37 million from the European Investment Bank; and \$10 million from the International Development Organization.

He announced that the Ministry of International Cooperation approved funding for the project. It agreed to make the remaining sum of 42 million pounds available to the project, provided it receive 50 percent of the stock coupons until the loan is paid back. As far as the remaining 50 percent are concerned, part of that would be distributed to the workers, and the rest would be held in reserve.

### Writer Alleges Torture Practiced at State Security Headquarters

45040417b Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 11 Jul 89 p 12

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Quddus in "Fellow Countrymen" column: "The Loathsome Tunnels of Ladugli"]

[Text] An urgent message to the president, the Egyptian people, and those everywhere who care for human rights: An immediate investigation is needed into what is happening now inside the worst and most loathsome place of torture for Egyptian citizens. The criminal officers and intelligence agents doing this must be punished as befits these blatant human rights violations that besmirch my country's reputation, dignity, and honor, and push her into the mud and the depths.

The place where these crimes are happening lies in the heart of the Interior Ministry, in Ladugli, at the main headquarters of the Bureau of Investigation for National Security—a place with an evil reputation in Egypt and abroad. Until very recently, torture was carried out in the prisons. Now the situation has changed; scandalous violations of human rights take place mainly inside the loathsome tunnels and locked rooms of Ladugli. They are a mark of disgrace on the entire system of government.

I do not know the position of high government officials, with the president at their head, on what is happening. I pray God that they will intervene as quickly as possible to stop the tragedies that happen there. But if they know about these crimes and consent to them by silence, then they have committed a grievous sin toward themselves, their country, and the people of Egypt. If that is the case, I complain about them first to God, then to fellow countrymen and public opinion.

The latest person subjected to loathsome torture in Ladugli was my friend, Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Latif. He is a man whom I love whenever I meet him, because he is a fine example of a truly religious person. He is as far as can be from extremism; yet they had no mercy on my friend. He was subjected to loathsome, unimaginable torture. The criminals denied him food and drink. They slapped him and kicked him and used all sorts of objects to hit him. They gave him electric shocks. It is a sin, by God, that this should happen in my country. I ask how Egypt can advance even one step forward, while in it there is torture worse than the Nazi period and medieval barbarism.

The charge against my friend was the same charge that I, too, personally bear with pride: We belong to the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that the state does not recognize! What an honor the charge is to him and to me! My friend is in danger; rescue him. I beg you! I know that the investigation bureau gang, headed by the interior minister, is lying in wait for me. My turn is coming to be subjected to the most loathsome kind of vengeance, as a reward for being insolent toward this gang ruling Egypt.

Thy protection, O Lord! I ask Thy protection, while I defend those who are wronged, persecuted, and oppressed in the land.

### Columnist Defends MB against Accusations of Violence

45040414a Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 4 Jul 89 p 5

[Article by Mustafa Mashhur: "Divine Punishment To Befall Those Who Slander Believers"]

[Text] "Those who traduce believing men and believing women undeservedly shall bear the guilt of slander and a gross sin [al-Ahzab: 58]."

It is natural that activities to promote truth be subjected to campaigns of distortion and skepticism, and it is natural that those who promote truth risk being subjected to injustice, persecution and murder. Naturally, unfair people make false charges against those who promote truth to justify their injustice to public opinion. This is the nature of the conflict between truth and falsehood. Moses, may the peace of God be with him, was accused of immorality on earth many years ago by pharaoh and his followers; and the messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him salvation, was called a liar, a mad man, a magician, a poet, and a priest by idolaters.

Promoters of falsehood take such actions for no other reason but their certitude that the falsehoods they are trying to promote will be brought down by activities which promote the truth. Promoters of falsehood think they can keep the lid on activities to promote truth and silence those who promote the truth by being skeptical, by making false accusations, and by hurting, torturing and killing people. But whatever they do, the promoters of falsehood can never come close to doing that; the light of truth can never be extinguished by man. Furthermore, "Allah will ward off evil from true believers" [al-Hajj: 38]. God the Great speaks the truth.

"They would extinguish the light of Allah with their mouths: but Allah seeks only to perfect His light, though the infidels abhor it. It is He who has sent forth His apostle with guidance and the true faith to make it triumphant over all religions, however much the idolaters may dislike it" [al-Tawbah: 32-33].

Activities by the Muslim Brotherhood [MB] to promote their message are being subjected to the same kind of distortion and skepticism. MB members are being subjected to injustice, and they are being harmed and persecuted. Their only offense is their involvement in promoting the truth which has been set forth by Islam. The MB is calling for the application of the canonical laws of Islam.

To explain the truth about the MB's appeal to people in general, no words can be more fitting or more precise than those used by the late martyred imam, Imam Hasan al-Banna, may God have mercy on his soul, to introduce

the MB's activities. Imam al-Banna's words are the best I can find to refute all the suspicions and false accusations that are being made against the Muslim Brothers.

The martyred imam says, "We would like to tell people about our purpose, and we would like to make our method clear to them. We would like our appeal to them to be neither ambiguous nor inscrutable. We would like our appeal to them to be brighter than the sun, clearer than the dawn, and more evident than the finest hour of the day.

"We would also like our people to know—and all Muslims are our people—that the MB's activities are innocent and honorable. The Muslim Brothers are engaged in decent activities that rise above personal ambitions and disdain material benefits. The Muslim Brothers leave passions and prejudices behind and move forward on a path set for them by the True God. As they proceed on that path, they bless and extol those who promote it. 'Say: "This is my path. With sure knowledge I call on you to have faith in Allah, I and all my followers. Glory be to Him! I am no idolater"' [Yusuf: 108]. We do not ask people for anything: We do not require them to pay money; we do not ask them for a fee; we do not gain distinction from them; and we do not want them to reward us or to thank us. Our Creator will give us our reward.

"We would also like our people to know that the affection we have for them is greater than that which we have for ourselves. We would willingly lay down our lives for their honor if our lives could redeem that honor. We would willingly lay down our lives if our lives could redeem their glory, their dignity, their religion, and their hopes. It is because of this strong emotion which has gripped our hearts and overpowered our feelings that we have that attitude toward our people. This emotion we have has robbed us of sleep and brought tears to our eyes. It breaks our hearts to see the conditions that surround our people. It breaks our hearts that after seeing these conditions we yield to humiliation, accept degradation, or give in to despair. We are Muslims who work for people more than we work for ourselves, and we do that for the cause of God. We work for you, dear people, and not for anyone else. We will never work against you. In doing what we do, we do not bestow favors upon people, and we do not see ourselves as superior. And yet we do believe what God Almighty said, 'It was Allah who bestowed a favor on you in guiding you to the true faith. Admit this, if you are men of truth' [al-Hujurat: 18].

"If wishing were useful, we would very much wish that our nation could see what we feel in our hearts and hear what we think in our minds. Will our fellow countrymen see anything in our hearts but the good feelings and good wishes we have for them? Will they see the sympathy we have for them? Will they see that we are devoted to their interests? Will they find anything but excruciating pain because of this situation that we have come to? But we believe that God knows all that. Only He can give us the support that will pay off in success. He is the One Who

holds the key to people's hearts. 'Truly, he whom Allah misleads has none to guide him. But he whom Allah guides none can lead astray. Is Allah not mighty and capable of revenge?'" [al-Zumar:38].

This is the truth about the Muslim Brothers and their message. This is the truth about their attitudes, their emotions, and their feelings for people. All of this was manifested in practice and in a variety of ways during the life of the martyred imam and after his death as well. These truths about the Muslim Brothers are still being manifested today, and God is witness to that. The Muslim Brothers have not changed and have not shifted. The hardships they experienced under successive ruling regimes did nothing to change them and alter those feelings, even though these hardships involved harm, torture, and murder as well as being imprisoned and arrested without having committed any crime. And all this was inflicted upon the Muslim Brothers for no reason other than the fact that they were promoting the cause of God and the application of God's law. Nevertheless, Muslim Brothers will continue to want good things for all people, even those who participated in harming them. They will pray for their guidance and repentance out of concern for them and because they fear the painful punishment that God will inflict upon them. When the messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him salvation, appealed to those who worshiped more than one God, he referred to the harm they will endure, and he said, "Guide my people, O Lord, even though they do not know it."

Imam al-Banna made it clear to the Muslim Brothers that enduring hardships was a divine tradition for those who have a message to preach. Messengers were exposed to hardships, and so was our messenger, may God bless him and grant him salvation. The first believers were subjected to harm, torture, and murder, and the prophet used to advise them to be patient. At the same time, he used to bring them the good news which promised them victory and mastery.

Imam al-Banna says words that convey the same sense in his message, "Bayna al-Ams wa al-Yawm," [Between yesterday and today]. Among other things, he said, "You will find many difficulties in front of you, and you will find many obstacles on the way. When you do, you will know that you have started taking the path of those who promote God's message."

The imam then says, "The iniquitous will use everything they can use to oppose you and stifle your message. They will seek the assistance of weak governments, of people with weak morals, and of people who expect to be paid by them and by you for harming you and attacking you. Your message will be questioned by everyone; you will be accused unjustly; and every effort will be made to find fault with your message. Your message will be portrayed in the worst possible light. The iniquitous will do that by relying on their power and authority and their money and influence.

"They seek to extinguish the light of Allah with their mouths; but Allah will perfect His light, much as the unbelievers may dislike it" [al-Saff: 8].

"You will undoubtedly be initiated then into a stage during which you will be tried and tested. You will be imprisoned and detained, and you will run the risk of being killed and driven out of your homes. Your property and your interests will be confiscated; your businesses will be interrupted; and your homes will be searched. The period during which you will be tested may be long. 'Do men think that once they say: "We are believers," they will be left alone and not be tried with affliction?' [al-'Ankabut: 2]. And yet, God did promise you that after you endure all that, you will have victory. God promised rewards for the virtuous who fight for the cause of God. Are you still determined to be God's followers?"

This was what Imam al-Banna said before the Muslim Brothers' trials and tribulations started. It seems that no matter how lengthy their trials and how severe and cruel their tribulations will be, the Muslim Brothers are determined to champion God's cause. Had they been seeking worldly rewards or striving for power because they covet fame or power, as some hired writers falsely claim they do, they would have renounced this message and abandoned this course after being subjected to a few of these predicaments. They might have even given it all up after being subjected to fewer predicaments than the ones they were subjected to. After all, the course they took led them nowhere but to prison and detention camps. The course they took brought them nothing but harm, torture, murder, and homelessness. Had they been seeking worldly rewards, they would have chosen their own health and well-being a long time ago. But the fact that they continued to preach the message of God one generation after another despite many obstacles proves with certainty that they want none of this world's ephemeral fame and pleasures. All they want is God's reward, His approval, and a place in His Heaven.

Islam drives Muslim Brothers to become preoccupied with the issues and concerns of Muslims everywhere. Islam drives them to become concerned about the massacres, the tragedies, and the religious discord which Muslims are being subjected to in many parts of the world like Palestine, Afghanistan, India, Cambodia, the Philippines, Bulgaria, Russia, Syria, and elsewhere.

Muslim Brothers are truly concerned and deeply worried about the condition of Muslims in our Islamic countries. Muslims are being humiliated and disgraced, and they are bewildered and confused because they have strayed from the precepts of their religion and the laws of their God. When Muslim Brothers demand the application of the canonical laws of Islam, and when they proclaim the phrase, "Islam is the solution," they truly believe that there is no other solution but the Islamic one because it is a solution that comes from God. Who is Perfect and Merciful with His creatures. God is Omniscient: He

knows everything that concerns His creatures; and He knows what is and is not good for them.

Why then is this war being launched against the MB organization? Why are there schemes against the Muslim Brothers? Why are they being restricted and beleaguered? Why is the MB organization denied legal status while other organizations are allowed to have this constitutional right? Why are the Muslim Brothers being denied this constitutional right when they represent the largest group of people in society? Some fair-minded writers who made that fair demand affirmed that the MB organization represented the rational and enlightened tendency in Islam. These writers affirmed that Muslim Brothers had nothing to do with the ways of violence. I made that clear in a previous article, and I [also] made it clear that it was the Muslim Brothers who were subjected to violence and government terrorism over a period of time that lasted more than 40 years. When I said that, I forgot to mention that of all the forms of terrorism and tyranny that were used against them, the most gruesome was the massacre at Turah Penitentiary where more than 20 fellow Muslim Brothers died. Unarmed Muslim Brothers were attacked in their cells by the tyrannical ruler's gun-wielding soldiers. They were attacked for no reason; there had been no justification or rebellion to provoke such an attack.

Why are all these schemes being devised against the Muslim Brothers? Why are they being harassed and restricted? The Muslim Brothers want our Islamic communities to have a good and happy life under God's tolerant and fair laws. They are making every effort and spending everything they own to make that happen without violating any laws, even though they do not accept these laws. The Muslim Brothers are continuing their effort to bring a good and happy life to Islamic communities even though laws which were tailored to keep the Muslim Brothers from exercising their legitimate rights remain in effect. These laws are irreputable laws like the Press Act, the Political Parties Act, the Elections by List Act, and other such irreputable laws.

When Muslim Brothers run in parliamentary or other elections, their aim is to assert God's message and God's law by going through legal and recognized channels. Why then are they confronted with this vicious war against them? Why are these unconvincing falsehoods being disseminated about them, like the ones that were disseminated when they ran in the recent Advisory Council elections?

Why is it that young people find the path to corruption and dissolution to be easy, paved, and accessible while the road to divine guidance and divine obedience is full of thorns, arrests, harm, and harassment? I had mentioned previously that if the same level of harassment and persecution that was used against those who promote Islam and the Islamic message were used against drugs, we would have eliminated the drug problem.

It is a favor from God that wherever Muslim Brothers go, they set a good example by their conduct, their sincerity, and the love they have for their country. Because they obey God and seek His pleasure, Muslim Brothers leave a good impression and set a useful example to others.

I conclude this article by affirming that Muslim Brothers will continue to love their country and their fellow countrymen, the citizens of Muslim countries. They will continue to do everything they can to achieve good things for all humanity by depending on God's religion and God's law. With God's help they will not abandon this course. They will content themselves all the while with the knowledge that all they seek is God's reward. They pity those who stand in their way and harm them because God will inflict a painful punishment on these people. They are confident that God will grant them victory. "He gives victory to whom He will. He is the Mighty One, the Merciful" [al-Rum: 5].

#### **Faculty Member Argues Against Boycotting Coming Elections**

*45040414b Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 4 Jul 89 p 6*

[Article by Dr Salah 'Izz, assistant professor of engineering at Cairo University's College of Engineering: "A Boycott Was Not a Solution"]

[Text] The world is stunned as it watches the events which are taking place now in the countries of the eastern bloc, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary. The world's reactions to events there have been varied. While some see in them signs and indications that free nations do not tolerate injustice and oppression, no matter how long such injustice and oppression may last, others ignore them as though they were associated with other creatures who were not human. The people of Egypt have been afflicted with rulers who do not hear, who do not read, and who do not know. Egypt's rulers remain indifferent to attempts made by honest writers to draw their attention to what is happening inside the country and abroad. They remain indifferent to the advice these writers give them to help them learn from what is happening now and what happened in the past to their predecessors. It were as though God distracted them and made them unable to understand the significance of these verses. God Almighty spoke the truth when He said, "I will turn away from My signs the arrogant and the unjust, so that even if they witness each and every sign they shall deny them. If they see the right path, they shall not walk upon it; but if they see the path of error, they shall choose it for their path; because they disbelieved Our signs and gave no heed to them" [al-A'raf: 146].

The most significant evidence we can cite to prove the truth of our statement manifested itself recently in the government's attitude toward the campaign which was launched in AL-AHRAM by Dr Yusuf Idris. The government seemed to ignore that campaign, which lasted for 1 whole month, and it seemed indifferent to Dr



Idris's revelations about the dimensions of the devastating war which the government in Egypt, yielding to the demands of the International Bank For Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), has been waging against the cultivation of wheat. The attitude of those who are in power is such that they believe Egypt to be their own plantation; they believe they can do in Egypt anything they want. As far as they are concerned, anyone who wants to protest can beat his head against a wall or jump in a lake. And the inattentive and unconscious Egyptian people might just as well go to hell!

After the farce of the Advisory Council elections, the late Mustafa Shardi wondered if President Mubarak really believed that the Advisory Council elections had not been falsified. He wondered if the statement which was announced by the minister of the interior was credible. We think that we are beyond asking this question now because we already know the answer to it. Unfortunately, the blindfold which the cohorts of evil placed on President Mubarak's eyes is becoming thicker every day. We will say no more in this regard but that this is a matter between God and President Mubarak. We cannot believe that President Mubarak did not hear reports about this election farce from Radio London, from the Voice of America, and even from Radio Israel. An international scandal for Egypt was the product of these elections which illustrated the extent of the cultural backwardness and political decadence under which Egyptians have been living. The president may make up all the excuses he wants to make up for himself to justify the crimes which were committed by his aides. None of these excuses will do him any good on the Day of Reckoning, the day of sorrow and regret. "[On that day man shall be informed of all that he has done and all that he has failed to do.] He shall become his own witness; his pleas shall go unheeded" [al-Qiyamah: 13-15].

As far as the appeal to boycott the elections is concerned, and this is the appeal that is being made by the Wafd and Grouping parties, I think we all understand the eternal truth which tells us that rights which have been stolen are not given back; they have to be seized. [A well-known poet said,] "Demands cannot be achieved by wishing; one must instead seize what he wants from this world." This is God's law in His universe: It is invariable and unchangeable. Rights can only be seized by positive actions. Rights cannot be extinguished as long as people continue to demand them. Rights which are not backed by force have no value and no substance. No despotic regime in any country will voluntarily give up power.

Some people say that for us running in the elections without guarantees to ensure the integrity of the elections process was not appropriate. Setting such a condition is truly astonishing. Does it make sense, especially after the Advisory Council elections farce, for the government to take the spontaneous action of offering us such guarantees on a silver platter? The government would have us believe that it wants the participation of the opposition, and it is unfortunate that we fall into this trap. It is a trap because the opposition which the

government wants is a docile opposition which it has found among those who accepted appointments to the fraudulent Advisory Council. Moreover, requiring such guarantees as a condition to participating in the elections would be incompatible with Mr Shardi's assertion that the ruling party places no value on the nation's interests and on Egypt's future. Mr Shardi says those who are in power "would not mind losing everything to keep those 'white slaves' in their seats of power." We agree completely with this statement which illustrates the extent to which the mentality of Egypt's rulers has deteriorated. This statement completely denies the possibility that Egypt's rulers will give up their intransigence, their haughtiness, and their disdain to respond to a single demand made by the opposition.

We are dealing with people who have no character and no morals. The loss of Egypt's respectable image in the world will not affect them at all, as long as they can continue controlling the spoils they hold. The loss of Egypt's respectable image will not affect these people at all as long as they can continue using the country's resources to feed themselves and to line their own pockets. "When the Hour of Doom overtakes them, the wrongdoers will swear that they had stayed away but one hour. Thus they are ever deceived" [al-Rum: 55].

We respond to the statement that participating in the elections would be a farce by claiming that events have gone beyond that stage. The ruling party has decided to reveal its true self, or as the late Mr Shardi wrote, "The present picture is very much like that of someone who has been engaged in dishonorable acts and who was no longer interested in hiding his crimes or concealing his imperfections because the truth about him had been brought to light." "If the wrongdoers had all the treasures of the earth and as much besides, they would gladly offer it on the Day of Resurrection to redeem themselves from the torment of Our scourge. For Allah will show them that with which they have never reckoned. Their evil deeds will become manifest to them, and what they scoffed at will encompass them" [al-Zumar: 47-49].

I also think that everyone agrees that the local and worldwide furor which followed the Advisory Council elections farce would not have happened had the coalition stayed out of these elections. The blatant fraud which took place in these elections would not have had such repercussions had there been no opposition candidates and representatives running. If the coalition had participated in the boycott, the record would have shown that the government's candidates had won their seats in an honorable manner, and everything would have been done very quietly. But I saw how much anger, wrath, and resentment people felt after they heard Zaki Badr's statement. That statement made them realize that the time had come for them to take matters into their own hands. Therefore, if our participation in any future elections will bring about such an outcome, that is, if it will stir people's anger and wrath, what more can we ask for? Winning a seat in any council is not an end in itself; it is only a means to an end. The real goal is to wake

people up from their stupor and to restore them to consciousness. If we do that by participating in the elections, we will have achieved an interim objective even if we do not win a single seat as a result of the fraud.

The appeal which is being made to boycott any future elections is essentially a dangerous reinforcement of the passive and indifferent values which have become widespread in our society. Boycotting the elections would keep the Egyptian mind chained to patterns of apathy. It would make Egyptians accept the status quo and yield to it. It is imperative that all sincere national forces fight this contamination of our minds with all the determination, intelligence and skill they can muster. We do not know how a boycott can awaken and provoke the people's conscience when the government's candidates can win elections without a fight and without having any headaches. The issue must remain alive until all the criminals become equal in their injustice and people's wrath with them grows to the point of prodding them into action.

The logic upon which this appeal to boycott the elections rests is the same logic used by everyone who refuses to register to vote or who refuses to apply for a voting card. This logic is based on refusing to take any positive position until prevailing circumstances and conditions change. It were as though these circumstances and conditions could change themselves! If we think that a change in conditions can come about spontaneously, let us then just wait until the tyrannical regime delivers to us our stolen freedom and heals our wounded dignity. God Almighty says in His perfect verses, "Allah does not change a people's lot unless they change what is in their hearts" [al-Ra'd: 11]. If Egyptians were to depart from the path they had become accustomed to and if they were to renounce their passive and indifferent attitude, they will have laid the cornerstone in the effort to mold a new psyche for Egyptian citizens, and they will have taken the first step toward the change which is being sought.

The only thing we have to do is believe that victory comes from God. We must believe that victory is inevitable and that it is around the corner. All we have to do is do what needs to be done to achieve victory: we have to strive; we have to be patient and persistent; and we have to be convinced that what we do is not being done in vain. We have to believe that what we do is first and foremost being done in the interests of our own afterlife and in the interests of our children's lives. We must understand that we will not reap the fruits of our efforts now, but that, God willing, our children and our grandchildren will. This then is a matter of time. The only freedom which we must spurn and fight against is the freedom to despair and to be passive. Since the unruly forces of evil have taken up positions against us inside the country and abroad, the freedom to despair and to be passive must never be one of the choices that could be made available under the political and social conditions in which we live. Or in the words of God Almighty, "Thus Allah seals the hearts of ignorant men. Therefore,

have patience. Allah's promise is true. Let not those who doubt drive you to despair" [al-Rum: 59-60].

### Columnist: United States Using Israel To Kill Palestinians

45040427a Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 18 Jul 89 p 5

[Article by Mustafa Mashhur: "Russia, Afghanistan, America, and Palestine"]

[Text] We must live in the real world; we must not be deceived by anything else; and we must not chase mirages. It is clear that Russia's position on the question of Afghanistan so far is against the Muslim people of Afghanistan. Russia fought a brutal war against the people of Afghanistan, using all the weapons it has against these ill-equipped, heroic people who forced the Russian soldiers to withdraw. Russia fought a brutal war in Afghanistan which destroyed everything and resulted in the death of 1.5 million people. Five million people migrated as a result of this war; thousands of people became handicapped; millions became orphans; and villages and cities were destroyed.

And yet, the Russians are finding it difficult to let their client fall or resign. They are continuing their support for him, and they are giving him all the weapons he needs. The Russians are allowing the war between the Afghani people to continue as the number of war victims rises and the destruction grows. Is such a position considered fundamental to a superpower, or is it considered dishonorable and evidence of that superpower's inhumanity? Is such a position an indication of the injustice which befalls every nation that becomes the victim of a communist government, as a result of being directly conquered by the Russians or by their communist party clients? Every communist who has been deceived and who was led to believe that communism calls for peace should call upon Russia to abandon the ruling regime in Kabul and negotiate directly with the mujahidin an agreement to establish good neighborly relations. As far as we know the mujahidin are willing to negotiate. Any communist who remains silent and does not call upon Russia to do that acknowledges to himself that he supports that policy.

This means that such a communist can find himself in his own country taking the same position that the client government in Kabul is taking. Any delay on Russia's part in taking that position would further distort the image of Russia itself and the image of its supporters and loyalists. If we were to examine the United States' present position on the question of Afghanistan, we would find that it is different from its position prior to the Russians' withdrawal. We would find that the United States is tolerant and friendly with the Russians at the expense of the people of Afghanistan. We find the United States agreeing with Benazir Bhutto on the question of Afghanistan and assuming a position that differs from that of Ziaul Haq. We find the United States dragging its feet about recognizing the government of the

mujahidin, even though they control most of the territory in Afghanistan. If we were to shift [our attention] to the United States' position on the question of Palestine, we would find that the United States backs the Zionist enemy and supports him materially, politically, and militarily. The United States supports all the Zionist enemy's positions, thereby opposing public opinion in the Security Council and in the United Nations as well. Just as Russia used its soldiers and its clients' soldiers to kill and destroy the people of Afghanistan, the United States is using the pampered and subsidized Zionist enemy to kill and destroy the Palestinian people.

Anyone who thinks the United States is not to be blamed for all the actions taken by the Zionist enemy in Palestine, Lebanon, Tunisia, Iraq, or Egypt is wrong. Anyone who thinks the United States is a friend of our countries or our people is dead wrong. The United States sees and hears what the Zionist enemy's soldiers do every day against all Palestinian groups and against Palestinian people of all ages. The United States takes no action when it sees Zionist soldiers killing people; when it sees Zionist soldiers breaking people's bones and injuring them; and when it sees them blowing up Palestinians' homes, deporting them, and doing other things to them. The United States even uses its veto against any resolution condemning the Zionist entity. We do not think that the Zionist enemy would dare use such brutal methods if the United States were to abandon its watchdog in the area and stop feeding it our people's flesh.

It is an insult to human intelligence to think that the United States would stir up the wrath of its dog and be fair to the Arabs of Palestine. To mislead a few misguided Arabs and to keep some hope alive in their hearts, the United States will sometimes have a few officials issue statements expressing the United States' displeasure with some of the enemy's actions. The deportation of Palestinians from Palestine, for example, is an action that the United States is unhappy with. The United States also expressed its displeasure with the conditions which were mentioned recently by the Likud Party to conduct elections. Because the Labor Party indicated that it was not happy with these conditions, a few misguided persons may have been led to believe that Shim'on Peres was more flexible than Shamir and that dealing with Peres would be easier than dealing with Shamir. These two are switching roles.

Why is the United States engaged in such an outcry against the government in China? Why is it taking measures against that government for using violence against those who were calling for democracy in China? Why doesn't the United States adopt the same posture against the Zionist enemy who wants to seize other people's land by force? Would the United States allow a foreign nation to take away one of its states? Would the United States assume the same posture it is assuming with the Zionist enemy? The United States' policy is causing the United States considerable harm. It is a policy which affirms that the United States opposes democracy and freedom, which it claims to support but

does not in fact practice. By pursuing this policy the United States is doing something every day to provoke the hostility of Islamic nations. The United States should not be deceived by the positions taken by governments. Whereas governments come and go, people are forever. Although the United States might have the loyalty of some governments whom it helped bring to power by means of a coup, this abnormal method will not last. A long-term policy requires that people's feelings be taken into account; it requires that people's wishes be considered and not opposed.

When we consider Russia's position on the question of Palestine, we find it similar to the United States' position on the question of Afghanistan. Russia's support for the Palestinian people and their rights has been symbolic. Russia is being courteously civil to the United States and its protege, that Zionist entity. It has taken steps to improve relations with the enemy, and it is allowing Russian Jews to emigrate. Some of them will immigrate to occupied Palestine.

This is how the East and the West coordinate their actions against Islam and Muslims. It is expected that this conflict between truth and falsehood will continue. God's law, however, will not change. "Thus Allah depicts truth and falsehood. The scum is cast away, but that which is of use to man remains behind [al-Ra'd: 17]." But you, Palestinians, should know that your cause is a just cause. You should know that sensible people will stand by you. All those who are fair and not biased and all those who can discern the truth and who are not deceived must support you. Every Muslim who is concerned about his Islam must also support you because this is a question that concerns all Muslims everywhere on earth. God will grant you victory if you are sincere. Be patient, and victory will be yours. "Every hardship is followed by ease [al-Sharh: 5]."

The international conference, the election plan, and all other such plans are designed to stop or contain the intifadah (uprising). After that is accomplished, the enemy would tighten his grip.

The enemy must be made to feel that having us coexist with him, living under occupation, under his control, and subject to being arrested and harmed, is quite unlikely. The enemy must be made to understand that his withdrawal is a must. He must be made to understand that the emigrants must return and that the Palestinian people must regain their full rights.

The Zionist enemy built his policy on expansion and on not recognizing permanent borders. The Zionist enemy is evasive and does not keep promises. He does not adhere to any decision made by any international organization unless that decision serves his interests. What he does not take in peace, he takes in war; and what he does not take in war, he takes in peace. We should not be deceived by his evasions and his twisted methods. Nor should we be deceived by the United States' policy which supports all his positions.

### **Hizballah Radio Says Egyptian Shaykh Tortured**

*NC0808064089 (Clandestine) Voice of the Oppressed in Arabic to Lebanon 0530 GMT 8 Aug 89*

[Text] Egyptian authorities have transported Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman to the hospital following the brutal torture to which the shaykh was subjected in the prisons of the Egyptian regime. Shaykh 'Abd-al-Rahman was arrested with a group of worshippers on charges of resisting the authorities. According to a western reporter, the shaykh and his followers complained of having been tortured, and signs of their torture were visible.

Two days ago, the Egyptian authorities began a trial of 45 Muslims on charges of seeking to establish a Muslim state.

## **ISRAEL**

### **Energy Minister Shahal Discusses Politics, Partisanship**

*44230144 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
30 Jun 89 p 2B*

[HA'ARETZ interview with Energy Minister Shahal by Dan Shilon; date, place not given]

[Text] [HA'ARETZ] Moshe Shahal, is modesty one of your more striking qualities?

[Shahal] Among other qualities.

[HA'ARETZ] Does a modest man call himself Galileo Galilei, the way you did last week?

[Shahal] During these hot summer days I saw a need to escape a little from the things that upset me. When I see with what seriousness they are trying to silence people and prevent them from expressing their opinions, I have to make comparisons. The truth isn't that I tried to compare myself to Galileo Galilei, but rather to the period in which the Church decided that the earth is flat and not round. That comparison occurred to me when they phoned me and told me they were going to fire me because I said we have to talk to the PLO.

[HA'ARETZ] You give the impression that there is nothing you won't pretend to be an expert on!

[Shahal] I wouldn't say that. There are a lot of things I am not an expert on. I express myself on things only after I have checked into them. Neither my friends nor my enemies would claim that I don't prepare. On anything that I claim to have expertise, I do my homework.

[HA'ARETZ] As a man who does his homework and presents himself as someone who sees into the distance, you are also remembered as someone who beats his breast in repentance for shortsightedness, for example, your support for the war in Lebanon.

[Shahal] It is even much more serious from my point of view and for my liability. Had I not seen how things

would fall, I would not have said afterward that it was gnawing at me and that I was sorry. I really did see the situation. My opinion, from the first day, was against the war in Lebanon.

[HA'ARETZ] If that's so, why did you support the war and vote for it?

[Shahal] I admit that I made a mistake. I will not forgive myself for it. It follows me to this very day. It may be that it affects the way I take my positions today following that vote, and from the day that I stopped serving as chairman of the faction, I swore that I would make no more compromises. I will point out things only the way they are.

[HA'ARETZ] But in practice, you continue to compromise; you say, in fact, that you are in favor of negotiations with the PLO. Why don't you get up and say about your theory: "Yes to negotiations with the PLO which will lead to a Palestinian state?"

[Shahal] You are too quick in your conclusions about a Palestinian state. Even within the PLO, there are different voices on that subject. But it is true that the Israeli government is hiding its head in the sand. There are politicians, even within my party, that hide from reality. All of this does not mean that I propose talks with the Palestinians without conditions.

[HA'ARETZ] Preconditions?

[Shahal] Not preconditions. But we have to maintain a balance in defending our rights as well as those of the Palestinians. I investigated and looked into the subject and I met with some Palestinians. I am prepared today to speak with any Palestinian who will tell me that he recognizes the existence of Israel, UN resolution 242, and that he opposes terror and has no future claims like the right of return. I will speak to any such Palestinian, whether his name is Feisal or Yasir.

[HA'ARETZ] Do I hear an invitation from Moshe Shahal to Yasir 'Arafat to come to Jerusalem?

[Shahal] I am ready to invite Yasir 'Arafat, just like any Palestinian, if he says the things I just mentioned.

[HA'ARETZ] In fact, that's what he says.

[Shahal] There is still some debate about the nuances.

[HA'ARETZ] Why are you being so devious?

[Shahal] I am not devious. Even with Egypt, where no one questioned the need and desire to make peace with her, there was a need to create preconditions for negotiations and lay the necessary groundwork. Likewise on the Palestinian issue, you can't talk without preparation. But the government of Israel should have announced that it was prepared to talk with any Palestinian on the basis of those four conditions. I also maintain that without talking to the Palestinians on the outside, the dispute between us and the Palestinians will not be

settled. I argued with Yitzhaq Rabin when he suggested nurturing a Palestinian leadership in the territories that would compete with the PLO. Anyone who suggests that sort of thing isn't dealing with reality. Or he is lost and can't read the map or he wants to live with delusions and with deceiving the public. There are two kinds of Palestinians: Those who are identified with the PLO and those who are identified with the fundamentalist stream. There is no third group. Therefore a government which has an astute perception of reality would have to say that it is ready to talk with them, because you only make peace with your enemies. To set up conditions is legitimate. The conditions can be clarified in the framework of the preparations.

[HA'ARETZ] Meanwhile you continue to sit in the government, which, in your opinion, does not see things astutely and which is now initiating a political course the details of which are not agreed upon even by its proponents; isn't there a broad common denominator between you and Yitzhaq Shamir on imprisoning Palestinian representatives who would be PLO people?

[Shahal] I don't know on the basis of what law book or political agreement the Defense Minister says these things. You cannot disqualify someone, a resident of Judea, Samaria or Gaza, from representing the residents if he is elected. As long as he has committed no real crime, you can't disqualify him. We agreed to that at Camp David. Even Begin promised not to go into the integrity of those elected. It is beyond me where my friends in the party get these things which are not grounded in reality.

[HA'ARETZ] Against that background it must certainly be strange to you that it is the Minister of Justice, Dan Meridor, a Likud person, who is watching out for the law and blocking Yitzhaq Rabin in his attempts to prevent the High Court of Justice from dealing with expulsions from the territories.

[Shahal] Anyone who holds the rule of law dear has to fight this demand by Yitzhaq Rabin. I will oppose it in the clearest, loudest, and sharpest way. I cannot conceive of the State of Israel blocking an appeal to the High Court of Justice that asks for a review of the legality of the actions of the Israeli government in the territories. Anyone who is not afraid of their facts, their data, and their motives has nothing to fear from the High Court of Justice. It hurts me that such a demand would come from the very camp I belong to. I had an argument with the Defense Minister about similar issues, both in the government and in sessions of "our ministers." This debate will continue. I will give my full support to the system and to the Justice Minister—if he continues to go this route. I acted the same when the Prime Minister surfaced his suggestion to change the orders for opening fire. The law book is not something that should be changed every minute. I saw a lot of decisions from that book still in the days of the British mandate. Then, as now, the High Court was the only thing standing in the way of government arbitrariness. We cannot sit in a

government that will decide on amendments to prevent criticism of its actions by the High Court of Justice. In any case, I would not be able to continue sitting in such a government.

[HA'ARETZ] Against the background of these remarks of yours, don't you feel that your party is in a rather sad situation as compared to the apparent enlightenment of the Likud leaders?

[Shahal] It is a period in which a lot is happening. I hope it is a period that will judge each one of us according to his world view and according to his ideological belief. It is a fact that in the government today there is a group of ministers from both parties, all of them jurists, who will stick by their beliefs even if they do not sit well with most of the other government ministers.

[HA'ARETZ] Was the Shin Bet incident an example of that?

[Shahal] It certainly was one of the examples of the behavior of the Labor Party. I can tell you a secret with regard to that. I don't like to threaten resignation. But if I didn't succeed in getting my party to press for an investigatory commission, I had made up my mind to leave the government. I had a letter of resignation already prepared. The debate was with party colleagues and lasted a full night all the way till daybreak. That also hurt me a lot. I had hoped that after 7 years in the opposition we had gotten away from government compromises and had become a political movement that would be the dam to hold back the urge to dismantle basic principles. My colleagues quickly forgot the lessons of being in the opposition. That was also true in the debate over changing the instructions for opening fire. On that subject I must congratulate Ehud Olmert and Dan Meridor. I am happy about cooperating with them. When someone stands up for our basic principles, I couldn't care less about his political affiliation. If we lose those fundamentals, we will lose our sanity completely in this country.

[HA'ARETZ] You seem to be affirming the image of your party as a sinking ship or a political wasteland.

[Shahal] My party today is in a very difficult situation and a very serious crisis. It suffers from ideological confusion and organizational and leadership problems. The leadership problem actually began 15 years ago. From the day of the first confrontation between Peres and Rabin the party has gotten into a situation in which the personal issue has become dominant and has overshadowed discussion of basic principles. That situation continued for ten years, until 1984. That year Rabin and Peres reached an agreement, out of mutual fear or mutual convenience. As a result, the process of paralysis in the party has continued. If no solution is found to the leadership problem in the party, it won't be able to continue as a partner in important political decisions. That is painful and troubling. But I am not one to throw up my hands. There is a need for far-reaching changes in leadership, in the foundations of the party, and for

sounding a loud and clear call for a rational Zionism around which a large part of the people can rally.

[HA'ARETZ] Putting Moshe Shahal at the head of the Labor Party would be the solution?

[Shahal] To tell the truth, I don't know. That was never part of my personal ambition. In fact, I never achieved what I really wanted to, which was to be Justice Minister for a term or two and then to get out of politics. I prepared myself for that and thought I would be able to contribute in that area. The job of Prime Minister and candidate for government leadership was not on my agenda. But the party has become anemic. A lot of people are turning to me and saying they agree with me and that I give them the feeling of someone who knows what he wants.

[HA'ARETZ] Therefore you have to accept the decision of your colleagues?

[Shahal] I don't know yet. I have heartburn over that. Still, I am sure that there has to be a change.

[HA'ARETZ] What qualifies you over Shim'on Peres or Yitzhaq Rabin to lead the party or the government?

[Shahal] I have a cogent view of reality; I am ready to fight for my beliefs, even if they aren't popular; I have the steadfastness to carry out things I believe in even if I have to hit my head against the wall; and, above all, I have the ability, born of experience, to restore the public's faith in politicians.

[HA'ARETZ] Is Shim'on Peres lacking in these things?

[Shahal] I don't want to get into personal criticism, but it may be that politics needs someone square who means what he says. That kind of person wouldn't ask for a pardon for the Shin Bet people in order to avoid investigation and scrutiny.

[HA'ARETZ] Before the recent elections you weren't so bold as to say things like that about your party. You were once considered Shim'on Peres's errand boy. Shlomo Naqdimon in YEDI'OT AHARONOT called you a "team player" in carrying out the things that you now decry. How come you're suddenly so brave?

[Shahal] There are some things that are only looked at in terms of their result. The result is that the Labor Party has lost its life blood. It has ceased to believe that it can provide solutions for this nation. It has an excellent platform, and no one has yet come up with better solutions than those of our platform. Nevertheless there is something basically wrong with us. The fact is that the party is not accepted by the public. In such situations in the Western world, there is generally a change in leadership; there is no escaping that conclusion. In fact, we in the Labor Party are already beyond the period of Rabin and Peres. I swore that I would no longer call white or black, gray. Gray is no solution.

[HA'ARETZ] Moshe Shahal could be a nongray political response to the young leadership of Likud like Dan Meridor, Ehud Olmert and Beni Begin?

[Shahal] The problem in the Labor Party isn't a problem of one man. You have to have a whole new lineup of leaders. Back in 1984 I advised Shim'on Peres to advance the members in the 30-and-over age bracket to the front line of the leadership.

[HA'ARETZ] It seems that you missed the train.

[Shahal] Unfortunately, that, in fact, wasn't done. But it has to be done from now on.

[HA'ARETZ] Given the tradition of your party, we'll see the result, apparently, in 40 to 50 years.

[Shahal] Who knows, maybe Shamir, Peres and Rabin will still be in the leadership to watch the process. I won't be there anymore.

[HA'ARETZ] Your colleagues in the government and in your party describe you as a "no holds barred careerist." Why?

[Shahal] I really don't know. Everyone is entitled to his opinion. Even if it were true, I work very hard for my career.

[HA'ARETZ] Do you have national ambitions?

[Shahal] To the extent that mortal men can have national ambitions, they have them.

[HA'ARETZ] Why do you make so many political appointments?

[Shahal] I don't see anything wrong with that. I didn't make any political appointments in the Ministry of Energy. But in the government corporations I am in charge of I, of course, appointed people I know from politics. They are good, talented people. If you want me to work and head up a policy, it wouldn't occur to me to appoint people I don't know. There's nothing wrong with that.

[HA'ARETZ] Why don't you see to it we get an uninterrupted supply of electricity?

[Shahal] That's a complicated issue. We won't have an uninterrupted supply of electricity until the middle of next year.

[HA'ARETZ] Are you blaming former Energy Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i for that?

[Shahal] Not just him, though he certainly had a hand in it. Others, too. Moda'i was responsible for the delay in setting up the power station, even according to the testimony of Yitzhaq Hofi. I appeal here to the State Examiner to look into everything that happened and is happening from the moment the decision was made to set up the power plant in Ashqelon, including the decisions made when I was already Energy Minister. I will

accept her finding. Meanwhile I am doing everything to assure a surplus of energy in the future. A future Energy Minister will reap the benefits.

[HA'ARETZ] Yitzhaq Moda'i commented about you that you "concoct things that are beyond imagination."

[Shahal] Minister Moda'i's tongue is rich in verbiage. But in comparison to what he said about his party colleagues, I deserve an embrace from him. The facts speak for themselves. Minister Moda'i has stopped responding to anything I proposed in the government, in documents, and in facts.

[HA'ARETZ] You introduced a gasoline reform. You promised price competition and improved service. Nothing happened. Why?

[Shahal] I don't agree on the question of prices. Prices here are 30 to 40 percent lower than in Western Europe.

[HA'ARETZ] Not as a result of competition between gas stations?

[Shahal] Competition is currently being discussed in the High Court of Justice. The oil companies have done and are still doing everything to prevent competition between gas stations. This is the showcase of reform. In fact, there is competition for the big consumers, but a million and a quarter car owners in Israel don't feel the competition nor even an improvement in service.

[HA'ARETZ] Are you in favor of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in Israel?

[Shahal] Absolutely.

[HA'ARETZ] Then why, at the time, did you vote for the proposal to require reporters to be licensed?

[Shahal] You made that comment to me once before in the past and did me wrong. I have always opposed any legislation that would limit freedom of expression in the press. Out of concern for freedom of expression and basic rights, I brought up an idea that was to be based on the voluntary compliance of the media—so that they would settle among themselves all the problems that you, also, rail against. The idea was that the reporters would act, within the framework of their institutions, like a legal office. There was also the question of who was a reporter, but I didn't want any part of that issue.

[HA'ARETZ] How important to you is the press?

[Shahal] It is very important to me. It is the central medium that facilitates balance in the expression of opinions.

[HA'ARETZ] Good friends of yours say that you are "publicity crazy."

[Shahal] Those who say that should be seen by a doctor to find out whether it is a personal or a mass disorder. I

am no more publicity crazy than any other politician who does things and wants the public to know about them.

[HA'ARETZ] Are you among those who leak things from government sessions?

[Shahal] Absolutely not. But when there are things that have to be brought to the attention of the public, I tell it like it is and report them. There is a kind of fraud involved in leaking. A politician, especially a member of the government, who deals in "give and take" loses his credibility.

[HA'ARETZ] Yitzhaq Moda'i, who was already mentioned here, once suggested that you be given a daily column in the papers to satisfy your lust for publicity, if you would only "get off the backs" of the members of government.

[Shahal] I would be very grateful to Moda'i if he could arrange a daily column for me somewhere.

[HA'ARETZ] What did Minister Roni Milo mean when he said about you: "Moshe Shahal is a swindler who is under suspicion of fraud?"

[Shahal] I have no interest in going into that. It would be a shame to mess up an interview by putting me on some kind of irrelevant trial and asking me to deal with some comment that isn't worthy of response.

[HA'ARETZ] Doesn't it have something to do with fixing of grades on your transcript? What is your official version of the matter?

[Shahal] I don't think there is any need to talk about it. Everything was proven to be wrong; it goes back into prehistory and maybe even further than that.

[HA'ARETZ] Why didn't you sue Roni Milo for slander?

[Shahal] It wasn't even worth a law suit.

[HA'ARETZ] Are you a wealthy man?

[Shahal] Not the way people think.

[HA'ARETZ] What is your net worth?

[Shahal] Not much.

[HA'ARETZ] In the United States they generally publicize these things.

[Shahal] When everyone publicizes them, I will, too. But it is much less than people think. I live modestly. I don't go to a lot of social affairs. I live a modest, "straight" family lifestyle. I zealously guard my privacy, especially that of my family.

[HA'ARETZ] Some of your legal dealings occurred when you were a Knesset member. Was there a conflict of interest there?

[Shahal] As far as I can remember, with regard to the matters that I dealt with, no one could claim that I was involved in any kind of conflict of interest. I imposed a lot of rules on myself that were not required and that do not exist to this day. For example, I never met with a government personage on a topic that touched on some area I represented.

[HA'ARETZ] Your elegant dress and manner do not exactly befit the image of a labor leader.

[Shahal] A week ago in HA'ARETZ you interviewed the minister of justice, and I take comfort in the fact that he is in a similar position. That is part of a person's inner nature. It puts me in a better disposition. You have to have a little pleasure in life, too. I am very sensitive about the esthetic side of things and am at pains to look my best. I suggest you come see me on the Sabbath at my home. There I let myself go, and you will find me unbuttoned, entirely unencumbered, with no tie or jacket.

[HA'ARETZ] Is friendship a supreme value in your view?

[Shahal] True. That is a very big thing for me. I have to mention something personal here. At the time when the proposal was raised to replace Yitzhaq Peres with Yitzhaq Navon and Peres had almost no supporters left, a colleague approached me and hinted that the matter was already settled and there was a majority in the center of the party for the switch, and that my support of Peres would affect, as he put it, my political prospects. My response then was that I preferred not to be in any political framework over reneging on a friendship. That is the way I am to this day.

[HA'ARETZ] Shim'on Peres, apparently, would not cite you today as a true friend.

[Shahal] I would allow that he would not try to change history.

[HA'ARETZ] Apart from the mistake that you made, in your own words, in your support of the war in Lebanon against the dictates of your belief and conscience, did you make any other big mistakes?

[Shahal] One big mistake I made was, perhaps, the decision to go into politics.

[HA'ARETZ] Did you also make a mistake in agreeing to be interviewed by HA'ARETZ?

[Shahal] No, even though I have reservations about one part of the interview.

[HA'ARETZ] Will a day come when people will shout from the city squares: "Shahal, King of Israel?"

[Shahal] God forbid! I am against kingship and against expressions of that sort. My desire is to be alive when there will be peace between the State of Israel and her neighbors, when we will realize our vision and be able to

contribute ethical values to the world. I wish for myself to be a partner in that, whether in an official capacity or otherwise.

[HA'ARETZ] Thank you.

### **Yafo, Ramla Members of Fatah 'Terrorist' Squad Uncovered**

*Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew*  
1300 GMT 25 Jul 89

[Text] The security forces and a special police investigating team from the Ayalon District have uncovered a Fatah terrorist squad in Yafo. This happened during the past few weeks. The squad included three Israeli Arab youths from Yafo who are in their 20's, and another Israeli Arab minor from Ramla. Our correspondent Shim'on Vilna'i reports that the four were recruited for Fatah by an activist residing in the Ramallah area. He directed them to hurl Molotov cocktails, eliminate individuals suspected of collaboration with the authorities, and attempt to obtain weapons from criminals for Fatah members. All four were detained before they were able to carry out attacks. Two of them were members of extremist leftist groups: One was a member of Hanitzotz [the Spark], and the other was a member of LAQAM, the Revolutionary Communist League. The four have been held pending the end of legal proceedings, and a charge sheet against them has been submitted by the Military Advocate General's office to the Lod military court.

### **Decline in Government Income Reported**

*Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English*  
3 Aug 89 p 8

[Report by David Rosenberg]

[Text] The recession continued to eat into government income last month, as revenues dropped 16 percent in real terms from year-earlier levels to NIS [New Israeli Sheqels] 2.3 billion, the Treasury reported yesterday.

The Finance Ministry said that since the beginning of the budget year in April, revenues had lagged behind those for the same period in 1988 by about 13 percent, or about NIS 1.3b.

Income tax receipts dropped less sharply in July, down only 10 percent from a year ago to NIS 1.3b. For the April-July period, revenue from income taxes fell 12 percent from 1988 levels.

The biggest decline came in customs and value-added tax [VAT] revenues, reflecting the sharp fall-off in imports in recent months. The Treasury did not provide any sheqel figures for the category, but said income had plunged 23 percent in July from a year earlier. The decline in customs revenues apparently accounted for the bulk of the drop.

Although the Treasury didn't break down revenues for July alone, for the April-July period it said customs



revenues had plummeted 33 percent, while VAT income had fallen only 6 percent. Combined VAT and customs income fell 16 percent in the period.

The Treasury attributed the declines in revenues to the slowdown in the economy, the lower customs rates that went into effect earlier this year as part of Israel's trade accord with the European Community and the impact of the devaluations at the end of 1988. The later hurt the profits of corporations while often increasing their dollar-denominated debt.

### **'War of Attrition' Over Magnetic ID Cards for Gazans**

*Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English*  
2 Aug 89 p 12

[Report by Mikhal Sela']

[Text] The coordinator of government activities in the territories, Shmu'el Goren has set August 18 as the day after which no Palestinian from the Gaza Strip will be allowed to enter Israel without a magnetic identity card.

"The magnetic cards were not planned to separate the Gaza Strip from Israel," a source in the Civil Administration told THE JERUSALEM POST, "but to beef up our control." In fact, neither side thinks that, with the enforcement of the new regulations, the Gaza Strip will be cut off from Israel.

Meanwhile, the popular committees in the Strip continue their "war of attrition," collecting the cards from Gazans to prevent them going to Israel under the new regulations.

Since the beginning of the operation two months ago the Gaza Civil Administration has issued about 35,000 cards at a charge of NIS [New Israeli Sheqels] 20 each. Only Palestinians who, according to the administration, have paid all their taxes and been cleared by the security forces are eligible.

On the face of it, an official pointed out, Gaza has been separated from Israel since long before the intifadah [uprising], with a fence around the Strip and gates at the border checkpoints. "But in practice it's impossible to detach the Strip, mainly because of the nature of its economy." The area cannot provide work sources for the approximately 50,000 Gazans who travel to work daily in Israel, bringing back about NIS 1b. annually.

Since the beginning of the ID card operation, intifada activists have looked for ways to foil it. "We consider it nothing but another means of oppression against us," a Jabalyah resident told THE POST. "We know that they are stronger than us, and in the end they win; but it's a war, and we have to try our luck." At first, masked activists stopped people in the streets, forced them to hand over the cards and broke or burned them. Now they collect the cards from door to door, mainly at night. A

family in Jabalyah was seriously beaten this week for refusing to hand over the cards.

A month ago, the military authorities at the checkpoints started random checks, preventing people without the cards from crossing into Israel. The next morning, a 10-day strike was called, and masked Palestinians erected their own road barriers at dawn, preventing cars from travelling to Israel, smashing car windows of those who tried to violate the intifadah order.

While Palestinians estimate that 90 percent of the cards have been confiscated by the intifadah activists, Civil Administration officials cite a much lower percentage. Asked whether the Palestinians could boycott Israel and stay at home, a Civil Administration source said it could be done if the PLO could send NIS 80,000 every day. "They have a choice: either to starve or to have someone else send them the money. The first alternative is more likely."

### **Talks Held on Indirect Trade With South Africa**

*Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 13 Jul 89 p 1*

[Report by 'Aqiva Eldar]

[Excerpts] Israel has been holding contacts with South Africa recently on the construction of warehouses in Israeli ports and the storage of coal in them for later shipment to countries that have imposed an embargo on trade with the apartheid regime. An Israeli Government resolution from September 1987 bans such deals, but customs authorities recently seized two containers shipped from Denmark to South Africa through Israel. [passage omitted]

The economic adviser at the Israeli Embassy in Johannesburg recently reported to the Ministry of Industry and Trade that he conferred with the director general of the South African coal mines authority, with whom he discussed the proposal of setting up warehouses in Ashdod and Elat from where coal would be exported to a third party. The adviser noted that he held these talks following earlier contacts held by Minister Ari'el Sharon. According to him, South Africa is looking for ways to export coal through new intermediaries. It is currently being sent to Antwerp and Rotterdam, from where the shipments proceed under other flags. The final customer usually ignores the origin of the coal, as South African prices are quite attractive.

Deputy Finance Minister Yosi Beilin told HA'ARETZ that the incident in which the two containers were seized was not the only one in which goods en route to South Africa were confiscated here after being sent from producers who do not export to South Africa directly. Beilin added: "We will not allow Israel to become a launderer for exports to South Africa, nor will we be pimps, which is most contemptible. We have enough troubles of our own."

The deputy finance minister further said that he will continue to oppose the "vain idea" of exporting through Israel South African coal to countries that have embargoed that country.

### **West Bank Collaborators Conducting Reprisals in Villages**

*Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 28 Jul 89 p 2*

[Report by Gabi Bashan]

[Text] An investigation conducted in the Janin District by Najib Abu-Raqiyya, the representative of the Citizens Rights Movement [CRM] in the Triangle, shows that the collaborators in the West Bank have decided to put a halt to the attacks on them and have set up private militias. Abu-Raqiyya claims that the collaborators have organized themselves and have carried out reprisal actions against villages.

Abu-Raqiyya reported an incident in which collaborators shot Muntaha 'Abd-al-Rahman, a 3-year-old girl, in the village of Nazlat 'Isa. The girl's father submitted a complaint to the military government in Tulkarm.

Collaborators imposed a curfew on Ya'bad village and fired shots in the air. As a result of the shooting, windows were shattered in the village gas station and in several houses. The windshields of several cars were also shattered and doors were damaged. Residents of Ya'bad who wish to set out on the pilgrimage to Mecca are forced to pay 200 dinars to get an exit permit for Jordan. Collaborators park opposite the military government in Jenin and extort protection money from all those standing in line to arrange their affairs.

The collaborators set up roadblocks at intersections and throw stones at Arab cars.

A local resident, Baslan Saddaq Abu-Bakr, was kidnapped on 14 July, taken to Kafr Tura, and severely beaten. When the mayor of Ya'bad learned of the incident he turned to the military government in Jenin, which sent an IDF [Israel Defense Forces] patrol to rescue the man. The kidnappers were not arrested.

On 12 July in Kafr Tura, collaborators shot animals belonging to Hasan Abu-Hamada Ziyad. On the same day, collaborators attempted to kidnap Ya'bad resident Ziyad Da'mas in Baqa al-Gharbiyya and pistol-whipped him. The collaborators told the gathering crowd that they were policemen, but when the victim said they were collaborators, the assailants fled.

Abu-Raqiyya said that complaints about all these incidents have been filed with the military government.

The IDF spokesman claims to have no knowledge of any incidents of this kind.

CRM Knesset Member Dedi Zucker, who received the report, said he is still checking the facts included in the investigation, but added that they match similar stories he hears from the scene.

The names of all the collaborators referred to in this item were withheld from publication by the editor.

### **Navy Developing Pilotless Helicopters**

*Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English  
1 Aug 89 p 12*

[Report by defense correspondent Kenneth Kaplan]

[Text] Haifa—The Navy has begun developing, along with Israel Aerospace Industries, a small, pilotless helicopter with attack and electronic warfare capabilities, Navy Commander Mikha Ram said yesterday.

The estimated cost of the helicopter is between \$2 million and \$4.5 million depending on the type of armaments it is equipped with, and it will fit on the Navy's existing missile boats, he said. No completion date for the project was given.

Speaking to defence reporters at the naval base here to mark Navy Day, Ram said the Barak anti-missile missile, developed by the RAFAEL armaments authority, is to be in operation in the Navy by 1992.

The cost of the control system and complement of missiles for each boat will be some \$20 million, with the missiles costing between \$100,000 and \$150,000 apiece. Recent tests of the vertically-launched missile had demonstrated it could locate incoming enemy missiles from any direction, he said.

Ram said the past year had been a critical one for the Navy, with the approval of the two major purchases marking a turning point. Even if the Navy does not play a decisive role in war, he said, it still contributes to Israel's security, and therefore should be given the necessary means.

He said the Navy was about to begin a modernization process to keep its Saar 4 class missile boats in use through the next decade. According to THE MIDDLE EAST MILITARY BALANCE, the Navy has 12 Saar 2 and Saar 3 missile boats, eight Saar 4 (Reshef) boats, and four Saar 4.5 (Aliya) boats. The Saar 4.5 boats are longer and faster than the Saar 4, and are capable of carrying Dauphin helicopters used for anti-submarine warfare, electronic warfare, and over-the-horizon target acquisition.

The three Saar 5 boats on order, which will also carry helicopters, will be the first boats of their type in the world in which a major effort was invested to reduce their radar, sonar and electronic warfare signatures, Ram said. This effort to make the boat less detectable was essential in helping it to survive on the future naval battlefield.

The Saar 5 boats will be able to track down and attack submarines, but will be very difficult for submarines to detect, Ram said.

The Navy will continue to gradually replace its fleet of 37 Dabur patrol boats with the faster and more stable Dvora, which Ram said is based on the same, simple and trustworthy system that the Dabur had proved to be.

Ram said the Syrian navy cut down the size of its fleet which blockaded Christian ports last month once attempts to bring in weapons were halted. However, Syrian boats continue to patrol some 15 nautical miles off the Lebanese coast, he said.

Ram denied that Israel Navy boats escorted supply boats up the coast of Lebanon during the Syrian blockade, as had been claimed by Christian Lebanese sources, but said the navy had continued to patrol off the southern Lebanese coast to prevent terrorist infiltrations.

Ram said there had been no contact between the Israeli and Syrian navies during the blockade.

The threat to Israel posed by the Syrian navy has not changed during the past year, Ram said, as the Syrians have already succeeded in building the force they deemed necessary after suffering defeat in the October War. "The major revolution in the Syrian navy already took place," he said.

Ram said the exact cost of the two Dolphin-class diesel-powered submarines to be purchased from West Germany would be \$567 million. He said the 1,550-ton Dolphin will be far quieter than other similarly constructed submarines.

### **Drug Statistics Cited; "Foreclosure Law" for Dealers Passed**

*Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 27 Jul 89 p A12*

[Report by Yosi Levi]

[Text] Approximately 1,500 incidents involving the sale of dangerous drugs were registered during the first half of this year. This constitutes a rise of 56 percent compared to the same period last year.

In compliance with the commissioner's express orders, the police will now tackle the drug-dealing issue with extra diligence. Drug use has also increased from the same period last year, but less steeply, rising only 17 percent. Altogether there have been approximately 2,400 registered cases of drug abuse.

The police seized approximately 6 tons of hashish, 22.5 kg of heroin, over a kilogram of cocaine, and approximately 2 kgs of methadone (a synthetic drug which serves as a heroin substitute) between January and June of this year.

This week the Knesset passed the foreclosure law for drug dealers. This law authorizes the authorities to

confiscate property belonging to drug dealers and their families. According to this law, it is possible to confiscate the property or possessions of the drug dealer, his mate, or any of their children who are not yet 21.

## **KUWAIT**

### **Plans To Invest In France Detailed**

*35190159: Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 23 Jun 89 p 30*

[Article by Marc Cerep]

[Excerpt] Following their forays into Great Britain and Spain, the Kuwaitis are now turning their eyes on France. But instead of making the stock market raids that livened up London and Madrid last year, they are appearing in France armed with the best intentions in the world. They recently presented Michel Rocard's government with a novel proposition that is being kept confidential for the moment: the emirate wants to participate in projects being carried out by French companies in developing countries.

It was the Emir of Kuwait himself, Jabir Al Sabah, who first brought up the idea of French-Kuwaiti economic cooperation during his latest visit to Paris, in September 1988. Emerging from diplomatic limbo, the idea has gained ground thanks to the persistence of the Kuwaitis. At the end of March, a delegation from the French Treasury and the Directorate of Foreign Economic Relations (DREE) visited Kuwait to meet with Fahad Al Rashed, director general of the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), which is the financial arm of the emirate's Ministry of Finance. Al Rashed made the offer more explicit: the KIA is prepared to put up \$1 billion every year for 3 years—nearly 7 billion francs—to finance investments by French companies in the four corners of the world.

It is true that that is not an extravagant amount for the Kuwaiti Government, which administers over \$80 billion in foreign assets inherited from the blessed but now departed days of petroleum income. But by launching into joint venture operations, Kuwait is radically altering its investment policy. For a long time, the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO), which is the KIA's representative in London, invested its savings in traditional banking or stock market products (deposits, Treasury bonds, and stock portfolios) or in real estate, with only a few billion being channeled into the petroleum industry (refining and distribution). But over the past 2 years, the KIO has launched into a vast strategy of takeovers in every direction. While gobbling up 20 percent of British Petroleum—Great Britain's largest company in terms of turnover—the KIO also took off for Spain, where it launched one takeover bid after another. That approach showed its limitations very quickly. Last autumn, Her Majesty's Government asked its former colony to reduce its holdings in British Petroleum to 10 percent, while in

Spain, the Kuwaiti attempt to gain a foothold in the banking industry came to an abrupt end.

Minority interest: So in crossing the Pyrenees, the KIA's strategists have abandoned their spectacular assaults and are seeking partners for investment in the Third World. Being pragmatic financiers trained in the Anglo-Saxon school, what they are looking for are countries that are genuinely developing, such as Thailand and Burma or all of economically "liberal" Asia. At the same time, joint ventures with France might extend to the Arab countries, of course, and to Africa (especially Islamic Africa), but also to East Europe. Latin America, on the other hand, has been ruled out from the start. As for the financial arrangements, Kuwait has established only two rules: the projects must exceed 50 million francs, and Kuwait will retain only a minority interest. Everything else will be up to the French partner, since the Kuwaitis have no desire to become industrial operators.

But French companies will still have to respond to the offer. For the moment, the Ministry of Finance and several banks are discreetly contacting large companies whose profile meets the requirements in sectors as varied as the hotel business, water treatment, and electronic components. [passage omitted]

## MOROCCO

### Egypt Aids in Readmittance to OAU

45040419A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
14 Jul 89 pp 1, 2

[Article by Talhah Jabril: "Egypt Helps Pave Way for Morocco's Return to OAU"]

[Text] A number of Moroccan envoys are touring the African continent to deliver messages to its leaders from King Hasan II. Well-informed diplomatic sources made a connection between these tours and speculation about Morocco's possible return to the Organization of African Unity [OAU] which it left in November 1984.

This speculation currently making the rounds came a few days ago prior to the holding of the OAU summit in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, prompting some people to say that Morocco's return may occur during this summit. Moroccan sources in Rabat report, however, that the Moroccan monarch wanted to apprise the African leaders of the results of the emergency Casablanca Summit and to convey Morocco's viewpoint concerning UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar's endeavors to organize a referendum in the Sahara. Asked whether this tour was aimed at helping Morocco regain its seat in the OAU, these sources replied: "One seat is not enough for two," an indirect reference to the difficulty of Morocco's return to the OAU while the "Sahara Republic" maintains its membership in the organization.

Some news reports had mentioned the possibility of freezing the "Sahara Republic's" membership in the organization as a compromise allowing Morocco to reserve its membership. The Moroccan sources commented, saying: "The OAU created this problem and it should seek to solve it."

In this direction, Gabon's president, Omar Bongo, yesterday announced that he planned to ask Mali's president, Moussa Traore', chairman of the current OAU session, to freeze the Sahara Republic's participation in the organization until a referendum is held in the West Sahara.

Nonetheless, the Moroccan sources persisted in their view that the current tours by Moroccan envoys are aimed at conveying Rabat's points of view to African leaders.

They added: "Morocco is concerned at the present time with bolstering its bilateral relations with the African countries."

It is obvious here that following its withdrawal from the OAU, Morocco sought to bolster and consolidate its bilateral relations with the African countries in spite of the fact that its membership in the OAU and its subsidiary organizations had been frozen.

It is also obvious that Moroccan diplomacy has maintained its presence in the African arena. Last year, during the Francophone summit, Morocco served as host to more than 40 African presidents. Moreover, Moroccan diplomacy has actively sought to settle the conflict in Angola and has many times mediated similar conflicts in Africa.

Some diplomatic sources had intimated that Egypt, scheduled to preside over the next OAU session, may undertake efforts to readmit Morocco to the OAU. These forces called attention to the role Morocco played in readmitting Egypt to the Islamic Conference Organization and the Arab League and, on this basis, they expect Egypt to play a similar role at the African level in appreciation of Morocco's endeavors.

Diplomatic sources made a connection between such speculation and the message Abdelhadi Boutaleb, general manager of ASISCO (expansion unknown), will deliver tomorrow from the Moroccan monarch to President Husni Mubarak during Mubarak's presence in Paris to attend the bicentennial celebrations of the French Revolution.

It is noteworthy that Boutaleb had played an unpublicized role in Egypt's return to the Islamic Conference Organization during the Islamic summit held in Morocco in 1984. It was said at the time that Boutaleb was the one who drew attention to the absence of a resolution in the Islamic Conference's minutes suspending Egypt's membership in the organization.

It is now apparently clear, given the good evolving relations Morocco and Algeria, that the OAU "knot" is

about to be unravelled even though it is too early yet to talk about a date for a referendum. Even de Cuellar did not hide his pessimism about the possibility of organizing a referendum in statements he recently made in New York.

It is clear that the Sahara conflict has entered a phase that can be called a "full cooling-off period." In this context, it can be pointed out that the last month's latest battle between Morocco and the Polisario has raised many questions concerning the course of the conflict, particularly in view of contradictory statements the Polisario released about that battle. The front's leadership issued a statement in Tindouf, Algeria, denying that the battle had occurred, while the Polisario radio had reported, prior to this statement, that it had. French sources pointed out that this contradiction confirms news reports that a Polisario splinter group currently positioned in Northern Mauritania in an area outside Mauritanian troop control had undertaken the attack.

#### **Awqaf Minister Interviewed on Islamic Activity**

45040421 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic  
14 Jul 89 p 55

[Interview with Dr Abdelkebir Alaoui M'dghari; date, place not given; "Moroccan Minister of Awqaf and Religious Affairs to AL-HAWADITH: Rectifying Islamic Faith Serves All Islamic Affairs"; first four paragraphs are AL-HAWADITH introduction]

[Text] Casablanca, Morocco, is currently witnessing a beehive of construction workers working day and night to complete building the biggest mosque in Africa and the third biggest mosque in the world after the Mecca and Medina mosques. Arab leaders expressed their strong admiration for the mosque plan when they visited the site during the special Arab summit which convened last month.

King Hassan II had appealed to the Moroccan people to contribute to building an Islamic cultural landmark facing across Europe and the western world, and the Moroccans rushed to contribute to building the mosque. A sum of 300 billion centimes was collected in just 40 days. The first donor was King Hassan II who contributed 6.9 million dirhams, or the equivalent of \$800,000, of his own money. Donations then poured in from more than 2 million Moroccans. The mosque minaret rises 100 meters, and it will have a laser beam directed toward Mecca, to which Muslims turn for prayer. This beam can be seen from a distance of 35 kilometers.

The mosque is being built on 2 hectares of land. It is 100 meters wide, 300 meters long and 60 meters high. It will accommodate more than 100,000 worshipers. It will also include a separate hall for women worshipers, a religious school, a museum, and a library.

In an interview with Dr Abdelkebir Alaoui M'dghari, the Moroccan minister of awqaf and religious affairs, AL-HAWADITH asked him about the progress of work at the mosque.

[M'dghari] The King Hassan II Mosque project, which is being built in Casablanca currently, is a complete Islamic cultural edifice. In addition to the mosque, the project includes a library, a religious school and a museum. The project has underlined clearly the Moroccan economy's strength and position, considering that millions were collected in few days. It has also underlined the Moroccan people's vitality and unity, the readiness of all Moroccans to defend the Islamic values and sanctities, and their trust in their wise political leadership.

God willing, the mosque will turn into an existing reality in a few months and will be added to Morocco's religious and cultural accomplishments with which our country abounds and which have had great significance throughout the ages and the generations.

Since assuming the throne, King Hassan II has sought to restore to the mosque its early role and comprehensive image as a house of prayer, instruction, and recollection and a place where religious and national affairs are pondered.

We hope that its inauguration will coincide with the convocation of the fifth conference of the Islamic countries' awqaf and religious affairs ministers. The fourth session of this conference is hosted, organized, and arranged by Morocco.

There is no doubt that when the Moroccan government issued the call to hold this conference on its soil, it sought to continue the coordination among the officials in charge of awqaf and Islamic affairs in the Islamic world, especially in this phase that the nation is going through which dictates greater consultation and solidarity.

[AL-HAWADITH] What are the dimensions of Islamic activity in Morocco?

[M'dghari] Islamic activity in Morocco is tended to by King Hassan II personally in his capacity as the emir of the faithful and chairman of the Supreme Council of Morocco's councils of ulema which are found in all parts of the kingdom and which take care of affairs concerning the call, develop imams and preachers, and provide religious legal opinions. These councils are supervised by the Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs which supports them financially. This is in addition to numerous associations which are permitted to engage in Islamic activity within the framework of public liberties. They hold frequent conferences and symposiums, and they have organized numerous international Islamic conferences, such as the Friday preachers' conference which was held in Fez recently and the international conference on sufi brotherhoods. We have an annual conference which lasts an entire month, namely the conference of Hasani lessons in Ramadan. Prominent ulema of the Islamic world are invited to attend this

conference and they give daily lectures at the royal palace throughout the month of Ramadan in the presence of King Hassan II. The conference is broadcast by the various media and the lectures are printed in the form of documentary books in [various] living languages.

Morocco has offered a complete strategy to bolster Islamic activity in the Islamic world. The mainstays of this strategy include the need to restore the Islamic call to its origins, to rectify the faith, to encourage good deeds, and to prohibit evil deeds. The Islamic call is a religious call first and foremost. If it is restored to its origins, it will serve economic, political, social, and cultural needs. But if we plunge into labyrinths with the call, then we will be steering it away from its course, its origins, and its path. There has to be a council of prominent ulema in every country to supervise the affairs of the call committees. This council must have a say in approving preachers and in selecting qualified ones to undertake this difficult task which requires special training and special qualifications. This is intended not to open the door for people to do what is in violation of the general duty of encouraging good deeds and prohibiting evil ones. Letting the door wide open has, as it is evident to everybody, led to numerous evils. The presence of this system of supervising, controlling, observing and streamlining the activity enables the Islamic call to serve the supreme interests of the country, the homeland, and the nation.

On this occasion, I urge some Islamic countries to reconsider their position toward a number of institutions which preached the call throughout a long history and which are renounced, slandered, and fought by some people in the name of fundamentalism one time and of progress another. By these institutions, I mean the sufist religious orders. These Islamic institutions are still capable of contributing to the Islamic call and are still prepared to embrace the youth and give them a religious upbringing. Let whoever wishes to see proof visit a number of African countries that would not have preserved our religion if it had not been for their religious orders and their shaykhs who have opposed atheism. There is no doubt that starting and encouraging religious orders is better than youth clubs where the sexes mingle and where one hears things which he would not wish his children and family to hear.

The mosque must also regain its reforming and scientific role.

[AL-HAWADITH] How does Morocco view the decision to limit the number of pilgrims [to Mecca]?

[M'dghari] The decision is an Islamic decision which the Islamic foreign ministers adopted unanimously in their 18th session in Jordan after they familiarized themselves with the expansions the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is making in the two holy mosques there and in the grounds surrounding them and with the appropriate housing the kingdom is building to accommodate the largest number

of pilgrims possible. On the basis of the Muslims' unanimous decision, it is neither legitimate nor pious to stray from the nation's consensus and to object to a decision adopted by the Islamic countries unanimously, especially when the decision serves the pilgrims to the holy mosque. The decision has been dictated by the development and expansion. This seeks to supply the two holy mosques and the surrounding areas with all utilities and services, out of care for the pilgrims and out of eagerness to provide them with utmost comfort so that they may perform the pilgrimage rites with utter ease, comfort and tranquillity. There are no Muslims who will deny the kingdom the credit it merits under the leadership of King Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the custodian of the two holy mosques, or the enormous and mammoth efforts the kingdom makes to serve God's guests. Perhaps the speech King Hassan II gave to his sons, the Moroccan pilgrims heading for the holy lands to perform the pilgrimage rites, reflects great awareness on his majesty's part of the status of the pure and blessed lands, the cradle of revelation and of the Islamic messages, and realization on his majesty's part of what the government of the custodian of the two holy mosques is doing to develop the services.

#### **Safi Port May Exports Approach 214,000 Tons**

45040419b Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 15 Jun 89 p 4

[Article by Muhammad al-Mustashir: "Exports Amount to 213,902 Tons; Led by Phosphates"]

[Text] The port's total exports for the month of May 1989 amounted to 213,902 tons, broken down as follows:

- Phosphoric acid: 181,842 tons
- Phosphates, of all types: 125,727 tons.
- Phosphate (3), high grade: 928 tons
- Gypsum (blend): 25,200 tons
- "Partin" [as published] (blend): 7,963 tons
- Gypsum (rock): 1,580 tons
- Manganese (canned): 2,030 tons
- "Partin" (canned): 3,007 tons
- Sardines (canned): 625 tons
- Gypsum (powder): 500 tons
- Drinking water: 13,146 tons

The total number of ships transporting the port's exports to the concerned countries was 40.

The port's imports for the same month amounted to 31,619 tons, as follows:

- Sulphur: 22,250 tons
- Ammonia: 9,191 tons

The imports were transported by 3 ships.

The amounts of processed fish (sardines in particular) fished during the same month was 2,413 tons valued at 2,613,537.89 dirhams, and 790 tons of loose fish valued at 4,947,928 dirhams.

Compared to the previous month of April 1989, 2,033 tons more sardines and 356 tons more loose fish were fished in May.

## SUDAN

### Biographical Data for 8 Ministers Published

45040452 Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH in Arabic 11 Jul 89 pp 2-3

[Article by Lt Col 'Abd-al-Ghani al-Tahir and 'Abd-al-Rahman Halawi; photographs by Yahya Shalka and Ibrahim 'Ali Ibrahim: "Biographical Data on Ministers of the National Rescue Revolution"]

[Text] The ministers of the National Rescue Revolution took their oath of office yesterday, in the Presidential Palace, in front of the chairman and members of the Revolutionary Command Council. AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH provides biographical information on the ministers below.

#### Minister of Justice and Attorney General

Name: Hasan Muhammad Isma'il al-Bili

Place and date of birth: Mansurkotti, Marawi District, 5/18/1938

#### Academic Qualifications:

- Bachelor's degree in law from Khartoum University in 1962
- Bachelor of Arts (Sociology) from Cairo University Branch in 1972.
- Diploma in public law, Cairo University Branch
- Master's degree in law from the University of Miami, in Florida, the United States of America.

#### Positions Held:

- Judge from 1962 to 1968
- Legal adviser in the military courts from 1968 to 1970
- Mandatory retirement on 11/16/1970; a retired colonel

Marital Status: Married and a father of six: two girls and four boys.

#### Minister of Culture and Information

Name: 'Ali Muhammad Shammu Place

Date of birth: al-Nuhud, 9/25/1932

#### Academic Qualifications:

- Bachelor's degree in canonical law and law, Cairo University
- Master's degree in education and psychology
- Master's degree in information
- Diploma in radio and television

#### Positions Held:

- Undersecretary of the Ministry of Culture and Information
- Minister of state for youth and sports
- Minister of culture and information twice
- Chairman of the Supreme Council for Popular Athletics
- Chairman of the National Council for Sports and Youth Care
- Adviser and undersecretary of information and culture in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates

Marital Status: Married and father of five daughters and one son.

#### Minister of Finance

Name: Dr al-Sayyid 'Ali Ahmad Zaki

Place and date of birth: Bara, 1944

#### Academic Qualifications:

- Bachelor's degree with honors, College of Agriculture, Khartoum University, 1967
- Master's degree, agricultural economics, Khartoum University, 1970
- Master's in economics, Michigan State [University], the United States of America, 1977
- Doctorate in agricultural economics, Michigan State [University], the United States of America, 1980

#### Positions Held:

- Agricultural economics expert, the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, 1967
- Director, the Agricultural Sector Department, the Ministry of Planning, 1974
- Deputy undersecretary for planning, 1980
- Undersecretary for planning and first undersecretary for planning in 1983
- Executive Director, the Islamic Bank for Development, 1988
- The board of directors of the Arab Organization for Agricultural Investment, 1988

Marital Status: Married and a father of four

#### Minister of Guidance

Name: 'Abdallah-Deng Niyyal

Place and date of birth: Burr, Upper Nile Province, 1/1/1954

#### Academic Qualifications:

- Bachelor's degree, Arabic language, al-Azhar University, 1982
- Master's degree in teaching Arabic to nonspeakers of Arabic

#### Positions Held:

- Elementary school teacher, July 1974
- Middle school teacher, September 1975

**Minister of Industry**

Name: Dr Engineer Muhammad Ahmad 'Umar 'Abdallah

Place and date of birth: al-Abyad, 1941

Academic Qualifications: A doctorate in engineering

Positions Held:

- Maintenance and production engineer and director of the Sudanese Textiles Factory
- Production manager, the particleboard factory
- Production manager, the Medical and Sanitary Products Company
- Researcher at the National Research Council
- He served as general manager of several companies in the United Arab Emirates until he was selected to serve as minister

Marital Status: Married and a father of three children

**Minister of Irrigation**

Name: Dr Ya'qub Abu-Shurah Musa

Place and date of birth: Sannar, 1946

Academic Qualifications:

- Bachelor's degree in civil engineering, Khartoum University
- Master's degree in irrigation and drainage, the Netherlands
- Master's degree in agricultural economics, Colorado State University, the United States of America
- Doctorate in planning and managing water resources, the United States of America

Positions Held:

- Engineer, Project Management Division, the Ministry of Irrigation
- First research engineer at the Hydraulic Research Station, the Ministry of Irrigation
- Chairman, Water Resources Research Unit, the Ministry of Irrigation
- Adviser, the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] mission in Khartoum

Marital Status: Married and the father of three children

**Minister of Housing, Construction and Public Facilities**

Name: Maj Gen Engineer (retired) Muhammad al-Hadi Ma'mun al-Mardi

Place and date of birth: Khartoum, 1/1/1940

Academic Qualifications:

- Diploma in technology
- Bachelor's degree in civil engineering, Britain
- Member, the British Society of Engineers
- Fellow, the College of Civil Defense

- Member, the Board of Directors of the Institute of Colleges of Technology
- Assistant lecturer at the Institute of Colleges of Technology

Positions Held:

- Corps of Engineers
- Military works
- Director of the Military Research Branch
- Adviser to the Ministry of Defense on engineering affairs (project planning and follow-up)
- Student and lecturer at the College of Defense, and subsequently director of the college

Military Qualifications:

- All mandatory courses
- Mines and explosives field engineering

Medals and Decorations

- Revolution
- Steadfastness
- Duty
- Fitness
- Sustained, distinguished service
- The Two Niles
- The Republic

**Minister of Tourism and Natural Resources**

Name: Professor Ahmad 'Ali Qanif

Place and date of birth: Barbar, 1943

Academic Qualifications:

- Bachelor's degree in agriculture, Khartoum University
- Master's degree, the University of California, the United States of America
- Doctorate in genetics, the University of California, the United States of America

Positions Held:

- Agricultural researcher, the Organization for Agricultural Research
- National coordinator for horticultural research in Sudan

Marital Status: Married and a father of five children, two girls and three boys

**Minister of Local Government and Coordinating Provincial Affairs**

Name: Natali Bankar Ambu, minister of local government and coordinating provincial affairs

Place and date of birth: Waw, 1/1/1942

Academic Qualifications:

- Sudanese certificate, the University of Birmingham



- Course for qualifying administrative officers at the Management Science Academy
- Management Science training course for development officers
- Economics and Development Studies course, the University of Birmingham
- Graduate studies and planning course

**Positions Held:**

- Assistant inspector for local governments at the Bahr al-Ghazal Provincial Office
- Local governments inspector, Bahr al-Ghazal
- Assistant executive director, East Equatoria
- Assistant governor, Kapoeta District for 4 years
- Chief officer, Raga area
- Director of the prime ministry's local governments and training office

**Marital Status:** Married and a father of five girls and five boys

**Minister of Health and Social Care**

**Name:** Professor Muhammad Shakir al-Siraj

**Place and date of birth:** Umm Durman, 7 January 1931

**Academic Qualifications:**

- Bachelor's degree in medicine and surgery, 'Ayn Shams University
- Diploma in public health, the University of London
- Diploma in world health, the Netherlands

**Positions Held:**

- Senior physician, Kurmuk Hospital
- Health inspector, south Darfur
- Assistant senior physician, the Blue Nile Health Department
- Senior physician, the Equatoria Province Health Department
- Senior physician, Khartoum Province Health Department
- Deputy undersecretary of the Ministry of Health for world health
- Undersecretary of the Ministry of Health
- Health Affairs Commissioner for the national capital
- Professor of social medicine and dean of the College of Medicine, Juba University

**Marital Status:** Married and a father of six children

**Minister of Labor and Social Security**

**Name:** Kinga George Dalking Place and date of birth: Kapoeta, 1941

**Academic Qualifications:**

- Kapoeta Elementary
- Okaru Middle School
- Secondary school in Uganda
- The University of Italy

- American University [as published]
- Foreign relations and political and religious relations worldwide

**Positions Held:** Minister of Agriculture in the Council of the South, 1986-1989

**Marital Status:** Married

**Minister of Transportation and Communications**

**Name:** 'Ali Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahim Place

**Date of birth:** Khartoum North, 7/19/1938

**Academic Qualifications:**

- Bachelor's degree in business, Cairo University
- Diploma in personnel management, the London School of Economics and Political Science
- Member, the British Institute for Personnel Affairs
- Member, the Royal Institute for Management, the United Kingdom

**Positions Held:**

- Personnel affairs officer, the Railroad Authority, 1962. He rose gradually, serving in all personnel affairs positions until he became general manager of the Training Affairs Department in 1974.
- He was appointed general manager of the Mechanical Transportation Administration in 1978.
- He was commissioned in 1980 to serve as adviser to the board of directors of the Sudanese Maritime Company, at the rank of general manager.
- He was appointed general manager of the Maritime Ports Authority in 1981.
- He was transferred to the Ministry of Transportation and Communications in January 1989.
- He is currently president of the Federation of Ports in East and South Africa.

**Minister of Trade, Cooperation and Supply**

**Name:** Dr Faruq al-Bishri 'Abd-al-Qadir, minister of trade, cooperation and supply

**Place and date of birth:** Umm Durman, January 1941

**Academic Qualifications:**

- Literature, Khartoum University, honors, part one [as published]
- Diploma in public administration, Khartoum University
- Diploma in management, the University of Birmingham
- Doctorate in urban and regional studies

**Positions Held:**

- Administrative officer in Darfur, Equatoria, and Northern Province
- Presided over Ministry of Local Government: transportation for the capital

- Lecturer at the Sudan Academy for Management Science

Marital Status: Married and the father of five children

### **Deputy President Announces New Appointments**

EA0608194789 Omdurman Domestic Service in English  
1530 GMT 6 Aug 89

[Text] The deputy president of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, Brigadier General al-Zubayr Muhammad Salih, has issued Decree Number 68 of 1989, appointing the following:

- Brigadier Muhammad al-Amin Khalifah, member of the Economic Committee
- Lieutenant Colonel Faysal Madani, member of the Information Committee.

### **Al-Nasri Claims Garang Was Offered Premiership in 1985**

45190119 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French  
26 Jul 89 p 25

[Text] John Garang could have been prime minister of Sudan after the fall of Ja'far Numayri in April 1985. This incredible disclosure came to us from Mirghani al-Nasri, a member of the former Sudanese Supreme Council. "I myself conveyed the proposal to the leader of the rebellion on 5 April 1985, but because he did not understand the meaning of our revolution, he declined the offer."

### **Three RCC Members Interviewed on Plans, Affiliations**

45040426 Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic  
19 Jun 89 pp 12-14, 56

[Report of interviews with Revolutionary Command Council members, Brigadier General Martin Arop, Brigadier General Ahmad Mahmud, and Naval Captain Salah-al-Din Muhammad, by 'Adil Rida: "What Is al-Bashir Doing To Solve the Sudan's Problems?"; Khar-toum, date not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Certainly the greatest and weightiest of the Sudan's current problems is the crisis of the living standard—the economic crisis whose weight one feels from the moment one arrives in the Sudan.

As Naval Captain Salah-al-Din Muhammad Ahmad Karrar, a member of the Revolutionary Command Council [RCC] and chairman of the council's economic committee, said, "From its first moments, the Revolution of National Salvation ascribed major importance to the economic side. It made immediate decisions that had a clear effect in providing some of the commodities people had found it difficult to obtain in the markets. The prices of essentials registered a noticeable decrease, and foreign currency exchange rates also witnessed a big decrease.

"The revolution has taken measures that will insure complete control of currency trading. We will adopt policies and resolutions that will ensure the elimination of the phenomena of monopolization, the black market, and speculation in citizens' food and necessities. We will hold deterrent trials of everyone who is proved to have been guilty of these violations against the country's economy and the citizens' food.

"In the area of provisions, the Revolution of Salvation inherited a collapsing situation. Petroleum was very scarce. There was only a 3-day reserve for the country—particularly petroleum derivatives. But thanks to God and the generous initiative of our brothers in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, quantities of petroleum have reached us. These will help us break the crisis and provide a reserve to cover the needs of production in various locations."

I said to him, "What about anticipated decisions to solve the economic problem in the Sudan?" [passage omitted]

Naval Captain Salah-al-Din Muhammad said, "The most conspicuous urgent decisions now consist of establishing sound foundations for any future plan to rest on. These foundations are embodied in discipline, which requires stopping the anarchy of dealing in foreign currency, laxity, and overcharging for food supplies. As for how we will begin in the area of economic reform, we will begin, as you mentioned, with discipline. There are studies about the problems of the Sudanese economy ready that some economists prepared after the April 1985 uprising. We will use them in laying down a plan for economic reform. I think our success in solving the economic problems requires, first of all, providing the necessities of life for the citizen, and second, solving the problem of the South, which represents a great economic burden on Sudanese society." [passage omitted]

### **John Garang's Demands**

AKHIR SA'AH met with Martin Malwal Arop, an RCC member and one of the southerners who are serving in the Sudanese Armed Forces. As I was told by Lieutenant General Bashir, he has become well known for his nationalist attitude and his lack of belief in confessional party politics and ethnic chauvinism. He participated through his thinking in preparations for the Revolution of National Salvation and then played a direct part in the revolution.

[AKHIR SA'AH] Our information says that a deep friendship links you with Dr John Garang, the leader of the rebellion in the South. From your knowledge of his thinking, I would like to ask why Garang is being stubborn about responding to efforts to bring about peace. Do you believe that the Revolution of Salvation is serious about finding a solution to this problem?

[Arop] Yes, I have a close acquaintance with Dr John Garang. He was my colleague in the army. We worked together in the 1st Infantry Division. He was the commander of the 105th Battalion, and I was working at the time in the combat training center. Then he went to the

United States to obtain a doctorate in economics, and the well-known events began. As for Garang's rigidity to which you refer, I do not believe there is any intransigence on his part. Decisions on their side are made in the movement's political bureau, after consultation and deliberation. The decision must be collective. The reason for the delay may be to study the peace initiative carefully and determine the government's seriousness in the peace effort. Also, they are waiting to meet with the RCC's delegation. After that, it will be possible to know whether they are rigid in their position or not. Before that, it is difficult to judge for or against them.

[AKHIR SA'AH] I would like to know John Garang's demands exactly and what the RCC is asking of him.

[Arop] Actually, John Garang's policy depends on freeing the Sudan intellectually and administratively, while ensuring the achievement of just development for all parts of the Sudan and guaranteeing the legitimate rights of all citizens, without discrimination because of color, ethnic group, or religion. It also involves the just distribution of power and mineral wealth between the North and the South. They would be equal before the government and before the law—in short, equality in all rights. As for the RCC's seriousness in finding a solution to the problem of the South, I can say from my acquaintance with them that they are really striving to find an acceptable, peaceful solution to this problem, while preserving the Sudan's national unity.

[AKHIR SA'AH] Why do you oppose the application of Islamic Shari'ah to the people of the Sudan, despite assurance that it will not be applied to non-Muslims, particularly in the South?

[Arop] We oppose the application of the Islamic Shari'ah laws in the North because we want us all to be citizens equal before the law. We want the law to have sovereignty over Muslim and Christian. If the Shari'ah is applied in the North, but not in the South, we shall have classified citizens. If the Shari'ah is applied in the North, that will deprive me of my right to head the government in the future, if I have the ability qualifying me to hold that position, as well as the ministries of defense, information, foreign affairs, etc. From the time of its independence in 1956, until 1983, the Sudan lived without the application of the September laws, and there was no problem.

[AKHIR SA'AH] Is it true that you have demanded cancellation of the joint defense agreement between Egypt and the Sudan?

[Arop] Our Egyptian brothers have made it clear that they do not object to cancellation of this agreement, if it stands in the way of the achievement of peace. We have not asked for cancellation. We do not want our position to be misinterpreted. The Egyptians are the friends and brothers dearest to our hearts. We are not against the establishment of the closest relations between Egypt and the Sudan.

We in the South cannot forget Egypt's many contributions to the people of the South. Universities and academic institutions in Egypt are full of students from the South. We believe in the specialness of the Egyptian-Sudanese relationship. Egypt gives us special treatment. We harbor great love, respect, and esteem for President Mubarak, the leader of our dear sister country, Egypt.

[AKHIR SA'AH] Do you think the 1972 Addis Ababa formula that gave southern Sudan regional self-government in the context of a united Sudan is a valid formula now for solving the problem, or have recent developments gone beyond this agreement?

[Arop] The Addis Ababa agreement could be a basis for solving the problem peacefully. Application of this agreement could help gain confidence, and from confidence we could move toward peace.

[AKHIR SA'AH] If the dialogue with John Garang fails, what will be the result?

[Arop] I do not believe the dialogue will fail, because there is no great disagreement between John Garang and the leaders of the Revolution of Salvation.

[AKHIR SA'AH] What tasks are required immediately of the RCC?

[Arop] Peace, because in the absence of peace, no achievement in any field will be realized. In my view, the council must focus all its efforts on peace.

A solution satisfactory to both sides must be reached, because the first choice is peace, not war.

[AKHIR SA'AH] Do you expect Ethiopia to play a positive role in mediation?

[Arop] Ethiopia is a friendly country with a deep relationship with the Sudan. It should be a mediator between the Sudan and the movement. Garang lives in Ethiopia. We cannot contact him directly without informing the Ethiopian government. We are working toward direct contact between us and the movement.

It is no secret, nor is it anything new, to state that what led the Sudanese Armed Forces to assume power was not the desire to dominate others or greed for glory and office. One need only consider the now famous note that the army sent to al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, asking him for reform. The army's demands have not been hidden—merely the implementation of reform. But when al-Mahdi turned a deaf ear to the army's demands, the Armed Forces' move took place. [passage omitted]

#### Legal Committees for Investigation

The following conversation took place in an AKHIR SA'AH interview with Brig Gen Ahmad Mahmud, legal consultant to the RCC and director of the department of legislation for the presidency of the republic. [passage omitted]

[AKHIR SA'AH] What has taken place with those who have been arrested?

[Mahmud] Legal committees headed by jurists from the public prosecutor's office have been formed. These committees are now working to investigate the charges leveled at these defendants, who are accused of corruption, excesses, disobeying the law, and trafficking in the people's food supply. These committees have begun their work. Each committee will submit its report to a higher committee in the RCC. Those who have initial reports will be looked into and given fair, just, and speedy trials. Those against whom no charges are found will be released.

[AKHIR SA'AH] When will these trials begin? Will they be public?

[Mahmud] The time for the beginning of the trials depends upon the investigation committees' finishing their work. The trials will be public. [passage omitted]

[AKHIR SA'AH] Has the investigation of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi begun?

[Mahmud] The investigation is taking place in two stages. There are preliminary investigations having to do with the security apparatus. Then there are other investigations having to do with the charges leveled at any person. Preliminary investigations have begun with al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. They have to do with the security apparatus. Afterwards, if there are any charges leveled at al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the committees will investigate them.

[AKHIR SA'AH] Do the charges leveled at al-Sadiq al-Mahdi go as far as treason or being an agent?

[Mahmud] Such talk is premature. When the investigating committees finish their preliminary investigations, it will become clear whether there are any charges that go that far.

[AKHIR SA'AH] What guarantees are you providing for the accused?

[Mahmud] First, there are clear, explicit, and stern directives to the agencies holding those who have been charged or put into protective custody. They are to be given humane, decent treatment. Two days ago, the deputy chairman of the RCC, Brigadier General al-Zubayr Muhammad Salih, visited the prisons and inspected the condition of the prisoners. He ordered that all their needs should be provided, and that doctors and medicines should be brought, if needed. He directed that they be treated decently. Each defendant will be treated decently during the stages of trial. [passage omitted]

#### Respecting and Adhering to the Law

[AKHIR SA'AH] The July 30 revolution has named itself the "Revolution of Salvation." Has it laid hold of ways to save the Sudan? [passage omitted]

[Mahmud] It was indeed a revolution of salvation. The solutions the revolution has laid out to implement this salvation are the program laid out to save the Sudan. It is a program with two axes. There is a security axis, because the Sudan has suffered an absence of security. We have now almost approached what is happening in Lebanon. All the political parties have attempted to establish their own private militias. The outrage has gone so far that they have tried to legalize these militias. This is the security axis, for which the revolution has laid down a salutary treatment—first, by solving the problem of the South peacefully and finally, so as to satisfy the Sudanese people in both North and South. The salvation program's second axis involves development. For 30 years or more, we have been living as dependents on others.

Development halted because of the war, and the war continued because of the lack of development; so we are in a vicious circle. There is neither development nor security, because development requires security and security requires development, and so forth. These two axes are the revolution's program to save the Sudan. If the revolution can bring about security first, it will then take up the first outlines for developing the Sudan with the resources it possesses.

#### 'Ali Shammu as Minister—Why?

AKHIR SA'AH's last interview in Khartoum was with 'Ali Shammu, the new information minister. The RCC's choice of 'Ali Shammu as information minister in the new civilian government came as a surprise to those who were impatiently awaiting formation of the ministry in order to learn the identity of the civilian elements who would share responsibilities for governing with the RCC. The reason for the surprise was that 'Ali Shammu was minister of information during the administration of former President Ja'far Numayri. He continued to hold that post until the uprising of 6 April 1985.

The question raised in Sudanese political circles was what this choice means. Does it mean that the elements who participated in the Numayri government will return to the light, or did the RCC's standards for choosing new ministers put ability and integrity ahead of any other consideration?

AKHIR SA'AH's interview with 'Ali Shammu was an opportunity to discuss all the rumors that accompanied and followed the outbreak of the Revolution of National Salvation in the Sudan. As is his custom, 'Ali Shammu was extremely frank in answering every question and every rumor.

[AKHIR SA'AH] What is the significance of your having been chosen as minister of information in the government of the Revolution of Salvation, even though you participated in former President Numayri's government until its end? Doesn't that choice in effect declare that Numayri's government was different from the picture that al-Sadiq al-Mahdi drew of it, and that the foundations of his regime were not all wrong?

[Shammu] First, so that matters will be clear, I would like to say that I did not disagree with former President Numayri or oppose his government. I was on his side until the May regime ended. It is unfair for us to compare Numayri's government with that of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's government did not move the Sudan even an inch ahead; rather, it led it to a collapse in various areas of life. The May period, on the other hand, witnessed many achievements. Like any experiment, it witnessed some failures. However, what happened during the period of al-Sadiq was utterly different—not a factory, not a road, not a single project!

You ask me the significance of my having been chosen to be minister of information. Honestly, I say that I myself was surprised by the choice. Perhaps they laid down conditions for the choice of ministers. Perhaps they found that these conditions applied to me. Probably, they looked at the choice from a professional point of view. I have worked in the information field for a long time. Perhaps they set the professional aspect ahead of any other consideration.

As you know, I held the ministerial post for 10 years. I believe that anyone who holds this position for such a long period has no desire to return to it again, because the post of minister in the Sudan, especially at this time, is a very difficult one. But I sensed my responsibility as a citizen whose role could not be denied and who could not lack gratitude for the great trust that the leaders of the revolution had given him. Our sacrifices must match their sacrifices when they conceived of carrying out the revolution, risking their lives to save the Sudan. Then, there is something very important, which is that I have no "fogginess" about those who are now leading the Sudan. The Sudan is a country where you can easily turn up correct information and learn people's identities. The reputation of those who are leading the Revolution of Salvation is very good. They are endowed with patriotism, impartiality, and honesty. Certainly, by all standards, their coming to govern the Sudan at this time involves a great sacrifice on their part. The responsibility of leading a country such as the Sudan in these circumstances can be borne only by elements that sacrifice their lives. For, circumstances now are very harsh and attract only those who always respond to the call of the homeland and freely give their lives for the service of this homeland.

[AKHIR SA'AH] What information that you learned about the leaders of the revolution helped you make your decision to accept the ministerial post, despite the fact that many people declined to participate in the government of salvation?

[Shammu] I learned that they are first-class patriots. They have no ideological biases toward a particular side. Thus, they are nationalists. I also learned much about their upright behavior and their strong relations with God. I learned of their history of heroism on behalf of the Sudan. All these things engendered in me a confidence in them. Afterwards, when they came and said that

they would draw only their salaries as officers in the Armed Forces, even though they were from simple families living in modest neighborhoods, my decision in their favor deepened. The proposal that the leader of the revolution, Lt Gen 'Umar al-Bashir, has made reflects his nationalist, Arab, and African attitudes.

[AKHIR SA'AH] We have learned that Lt Gen al-Bashir is religious. This is an indication of upright behavior. Are the others equally religious?

[Shammu] I know that they are all upright in behavior. This applies also to the Christian brothers who are members of the council. There are three Christians in the council, and they adhere to the noble values that the revealed religions preach.

[AKHIR SA'AH] You served in two military regimes. Both came in the wake of democratic experiments that ended in what may be termed "democratic disarray." What about working with military men? Why do the political parties always fail in the Sudan?

[Shammu] As I told you, I do not regret having worked with former President Numayri. I remained in his government until its last day. Were I to say otherwise, I would be a hypocrite. I don't say that I was 100 percent in agreement with him. I say that I was in agreement with him to a degree that made me participate in the regime until its end.

#### Al-Sadiq—Is He the Reason?

[AKHIR SA'AH] Granting that al-Sadiq al-Mahdi was a symbol of past "democratic disarray," do you believe that al-Mahdi alone was the reason for the failure of democracy, or are there other reasons that always lead to the failure of the Sudanese political parties?

[Shammu] I believe that al-Sadiq al-Mahdi was the reason for the failure. When he came to power for the last time, there had been two previous experiments. In the first of them, the practice of democracy had been better, yet it ended by handing over power to the military. Afterwards, there was the October revolution. Under it, many practices occurred that led to the May revolution, with its initial tendencies. It continued in various phases until its end. It was followed by a transition period. Then came the period of the political parties, which was the worst of periods in the Sudan. I think that the person primarily responsible for the corruption in the behavior of the political parties was al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. That is what destroyed democracy. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi had the longest parliamentary term. He held the office of prime minister. He assumed office in an atmosphere that he filled with corruption. Had he gone again to the people, he would not have received any backing, given the anarchy that he committed in the name of democracy and that led the Sudan to the abyss. [passage omitted]

### Rejection of Previous Agreements on the South

[AKHIR SA'AH] How far has the dialogue with the rebel leader in the South, Dr John Garang, gone? [passage omitted]

[Shammu] We are optimistic about the possible role of Ethiopia, which has welcomed the Revolution of Salvation, in solving this problem. We also expect our brothers in Egypt to play a large role. I am confident that with our efforts and the efforts of brothers and friends, we will sit down to reach a solution to this problem by democratic dialogue.

[AKHIR SA'AH] The complications of the situation in the South make the issue of the South the center of Sudanese policy domestically and abroad. Do you believe it was right for the Revolution of Salvation to announce its disavowal of the previous agreements that had been made with John Garang? Revolutions normally announce their continued adherence to previous agreements, so as to confirm the continuing legitimacy of previous agreements.

[Shammu] The agreements that revolutions normally confirm are those dealing with international relations or relations with international or regional organizations. They are not agreements that have to do with the country's internal problems. In other words, when any national revolution takes place, it abides by agreements with countries, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, etc. As for the issue of the South, what took place was an agreement between a political party and a movement. Then it developed into an agreement between the previous government and the movement. The revolution may have a new outlook. We have announced our readiness for democratic dialogue without preconditions. [passage omitted]

### Room To Revive the Sudanese Economy

[AKHIR SA'AH] A tendency toward economic reform appeared from the first day of the revolution, with the elimination of currency trading and the release of stored food. Are these measures enough for the desired economic reform?

[Shammu] Certainly they are not enough. These are provisional measures. The purpose of combatting currency trading is to save the Sudanese pound. The attack on the storehouses to uncover stockpiling and to eliminate commodity monopolization was a provisional matter. The problems of economic reform are large and require dealing with issues of production. If we finish the southern war that is draining our resources, provide inputs to industry and agriculture, and expand the agricultural area, the Sudanese economy will flourish.

[AKHIR SA'AH] When will the state of emergency and its most conspicuous feature, the curfew, end?

[Shammu] Very soon—as soon as the remaining wanted persons are arrested. I expect that to be very soon. There are a few persons wanted for arrest, such as Mubarak

al-Fadil al-Mahdi. As for the courts, the investigating committees and courts have been formed and will begin work very soon.

[AKHIR SA'AH] What about Iran's position toward the revolution, in view of its close relations with al-Sadiq al-Mahdi?

[Shammu] We have heard nothing to date.

[AKHIR SA'AH] The RCC has indicated some proposed forms of popular participation in decisionmaking. What about this participation?

[Shammu] There will be a reliance on local popular government. This will be the foundation for democratic practice. Popular democracy is the best model for government here in the Sudan. The council will concentrate on popular participation.

The question that remains is how the Sudan can be rescued from the shipwreck that threatens it.

Lt Gen Bashir says, "We are determined to apply the law and to impose its authority and provisions completely, no matter what the position of the person who is affected by the provisions of the law and at whom accusations are leveled. It must be clearly understood that the Sudan will be built up only by the hands of its people, their ideas, and their unity of ranks; for the revolution has come for every sincere person, without distinction or discrimination."

## TUNISIA

### Ennahda's Ghannouchi Interviewed on Domestic Issues, Party

45040442 Kuwait *AL-MUJTAMA'* in Arabic  
11 Jul 89 pp 14-17

[Interview with Rached Ghannouchi, Tunisia's Ennahda party leader, presumably in Kuwait; date not given; "Rached Ghannouchi: Awaiting Licensing of Ennahda Party"]

[Text] Rached Ghannouchi has been the topic of discussion of the western and Arab press and of the world news agencies for the past 2 months.

AL-MUJTAMA' conducted this interview with Ghannouchi after the Ennahda Party had won 25 percent the votes in the elections held recently in his country.

[AL-MUJTAMA'] Have the political, given facts in Tunisia influenced the Islamic Tendency's strategy?

[Ghannouchi] The movement's strategy has been transformed with the transformation that has occurred in the country's political conditions. This transformation moved the country from a critical situation which had nearly led it to the brink of civil war, to a situation in which the country turned into courts, executioners, clamor and terror under Bourguiba's administration. It

then led it into a situation under which hopes of national reconciliation and agreement among the various political and intellectual factions forming the Tunisian society were revived—reconciliation and agreement that make Tunisia, with its human and cultural resources, eligible to make up for what it missed during Bourguiba's sad era. Reconciliation and agreement which make Tunisia able to unite ranks and mobilize resources in order to confront development issues and tackle Bourguiba's legacy of economic, cultural, and social subservience. This is in order to entrench the Islamic Arab identity of Tunisia, to detonate the idle capacities, to distribute the wealth as fairly as possible. This is in order to bind Tunisia to its Islamic Maghreb environment in the wake of vast efforts exerted by Bourguiba's regime [al-buruqaybiyah] throughout the past period to bring about total estrangement with Tunisia's natural and historical (Arab and Islamic) dimension and to tie Tunisia finally to the overseas. The new administration, by which I mean the administration of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, has opened the spheres and hopes of reconciliation to the Tunisians even though the difficulties, obstacles, and legacy bequeathed by Bourguiba are still influential and deep-rooted, and even though major efforts need to be made in order to overcome them and to prevent a setback and a backslide. I believe that the resources to accomplish this are still available. The Islamic movement, which is a main component of Tunisian society, is a main asset for this hope of development and of binding Tunisia to its Arab, Islamic, and Maghreb environment. As it struggled in the past against westernization, dictatorship, authoritarianism and the monopolization of wealth, the movement continues its struggle, despite the difference in means, to enrich democracy, and to entrench Tunisia's Arab identity. In any case, the movement is committed in its means to the democratic political course.

### Difficulties

[AL-MUJTAMA'] What are the difficulties facing you?

[Ghannouchi] There are numerous difficulties. Many, if not the majority, of them come from us. These difficulties are not peculiar to the Tunisian Islamic movement. I believe that they characterize all the Islamic movements, rather all the movements in our Arab homeland. All of us in this nation, whether belonging to Islamic or secular tendencies, carry an enormously heavy legacy from the age of decadence—a legacy that pulls the family, the individual, and human relations generally toward the authoritarian tendency and toward the single opinion and single party. It is an intellectual legacy that clouds the vision and prevents us from dealing scientifically with our reality and the world. Emotional outbursts and reactions continue to mix with much of our thought and behavior. Therefore, we need a continuous intellectual revolution to free ourselves of the intellectual, literary, and political dimensions of the legacy of the age of decadence in order that we may deal with our reality, our age, and our religion objectively and remotely from the rigid intellectual ideology, imitation,

and partisanship. Our Arab homeland has been exhausted by the intellectual and social ideologies following either the predecessors or the foreigners. It has also been exhausted by the narrow partisanship that centers on the party's, the leader's or the government's interest at the expense of the people's, country's and nation's interest.

There are outside difficulties. But our emotional tendencies often overwhelm us and we focus our eyes and the eyes of others on the external factors, constantly depicting ourselves as the victims, whereas the Koranic approach gives the priority to the internal factors—"Say: It is from yourselves." In the face of every defeat and of every difficulty, we should look for the intellectual, political, and behavioral difficulties inside ourselves and among our ranks.

Undoubtedly, there are numerous external obstacles—obstacles from within our homeland and obstacles from abroad.

### Internal Obstacles

[AL-MUJTAMA'] What about the internal obstacles?

[Ghannouchi] Freedom in our homeland has not yet been transformed into an observed tradition, and disagreement has not yet been so codified as to exclude violence and revilement, whereas the western countries may have traditions that make it easy to settle disagreements while preserving national unity and steering a country away from division and fragmentation. Our asset of democratic and revolutionary traditions is so limited that a disagreement often turns into discord, revilement, and accusations that may reach the level of treason, may pollute the national climate, and may pave the way for feuds and court trials.

[AL-MUJTAMA'] How can this dilemma be overcome?

[Ghannouchi] We need ceaseless intellectual and political action to entrench the right to disagreement and to establish traditions and values that polish the disagreement and enable it to enrich, not shatter, our national life. Whoever follows the ongoing political debates in Tunisia notices clearly that our asset of the civilized society's values is still limited and that our ability to maintain our disagreements within the bounds of the national interest and the national values is still limited. Therefore this is a danger lurking for us and for others. It is, in fact, a danger waiting to pounce on democracy's asset in our life—this limited asset that is besieged by these dangers. The legacy of a return to the Bourguiba era—the era of authoritarianism, of westernization, of the single party and the methods of revilement and distortion—is still alive, has its supporters and has its interests which these supporters tend and with which they exchange benefits. A broad sector of our elite who grew up in the Bourguiba era believes that the battle with Islam has been settled and that Islam has finally been excluded from any participation in directing society. This elite of ours is distinguished from most of the Arab

Islamic elite groups. This elite grew up in the Bourguiba era and has viewed itself as being outside the framework of Arabism and Islam and as being tied to the west forever. This elite has severed its relations with Islam and Arabism. Our movement arose to underline the Arab character of Tunisia. This situation did not psychologically please a segment of the Tunisian elite, a segment which viewed the Islamic movement as an alien and forcefully implanted body. This elite has claimed to be democratic and secular, forgetting that the west's secularism has been tied to democracy and rationalism whereas our secularism is often tied to domination, expulsion, and efforts to strip this country away from its Arab and Islamic environment. So, this elite continues to pose an obstacle, not only to the Islamic movement but to the development of the country in the direction or within the framework of its Arab Islamic vision. This elite still hopes that Bourguiba's course will continue or will be revived and that this country will be severed from its Arab and Islamic dimension. We work to entrench a freedom, democracy, and social justice that root us in our Islamic heritage and thought.

#### External Obstacles

[AL-MUJTAMA'] What are the external difficulties and obstacles?

[Ghannouchi] There are difficulties and obstacles from outside our country and they are embodied in the perceived image of modern Islam or of the modern Islamic movement as a synonym to reaction and to despotism, the ally of the elite groups and not of the broad sectors. And what elite groups are these? They are the oppressive elite groups. This image which depicts the Islamic movement as being opposed to democracy, justice, and human rights and as being a danger to openness, science, modernness, and contemporariness reflects on us negatively. Regrettably, a large part of the media has devoted its efforts to entrenching this reflection as the image of the entire Islamic movement, putting all in the same bag without any examination or any distinction between what accusations may be true and what accusations may be totally contrived. The truth is that the political struggle in our Arab homeland has not yet risen to a level that makes it an element of national and pan-Arab reconciliation. It is not yet a factor in leading thought in the right way and in highlighting the elements of continuance and agreement between all the intellectual tendencies in our Arab and Islamic homeland, so that we may confront the enemy jointly, confront the international scheming against us, and confront the Israeli age, as some modern thinkers have called it. So the obstacles facing the Islamic movement are not few.

#### Political Reforms

[AL-MUJTAMA'] What is the people's attitude toward the government reforms?

[Ghannouchi] I believe that despite the setbacks that have occurred and the false steps that have been taken, the people are still giving the head of state a grace period, are still inclined to think well of him and are still making a distinction between him and the party he represents. To a large degree, the people are done with the hope of reviving Bourguiba's party. The people also continue to attach hope to the head of state to free Tunisia's decisionmaking from the domination of Bourguiba's party. The people hope that this decisionmaking will not reflect the will of this party, which has been renounced, but the will of the country's living forces. There is no doubt that these hopes will be sentenced to either die or be realized, depending on the promised political behavior. We hope for the best.

[AL-MUJTAMA'] What are the steps that you will take now that Ennahda Party has been denied licensing?

[Ghannouchi] We are not a movement that derives its existence from a license issued by a government. The position of the parties that were born with a license will be very critical if this card is withdrawn from them. Our movement's birth certificate is its entire struggle throughout 2 decades to restore Tunisia's Arab Islamic identity, to develop the country, to distribute its wealth fairly, and to bind the country to its Arab and Islamic environment. It is a struggle which, God be thanked, has borne ripe fruit among Tunisia's youth. Moreover, there is no intellectual or political tendency that receives from the youth the response the Islamic movement receives. This movement is the more influential movement on the level of labor, the unions, and the dispossessed sectors. This was proven by the movement's appeal in the latest elections.

#### Licensing

[AL-MUJTAMA'] Why have you been eager to apply for government licensing?

[Ghannouchi] Our eagerness to include our activity within the legal framework does not emanate from fear for our existence but from fear for the democratic plan in Tunisia. This experiment is faced with a real threat if a mass-oriented movement like our movement is not recognized. We are eager for the political and cultural presence of the Islamic movement to grow and to be streamlined within a reasonable framework of public liberties so that this presence may be a positive and fruitful factor in Tunisian society. On the other hand, denying the existence of something that already exists is undoubtedly an arbitrary act that creates the threat of growth within this broad and strong Islamic tendency of aspirations that may not be compatible with democracy, that may represent obstacles to real development, and that may raise difficulties in the face of the movement's leadership. So what can we do? Here, we must emphasize that our position will be, whether we want it or not, influenced by the government's position. We still find it more likely that rational tendencies in government, led by the head of state, will overcome the reactionary and



regressive tendencies in the party and among the elite. If the refusal to license the movement has been justified with the specious legal argument that the applicants for licensing the Ennahda Party do not themselves have civil rights, then it is a scandal for the law and for political decisionmaking to provoke these groups that have fought against dictatorship and westernization, regardless of whether they belong to an Islamic, liberal, pan-Arab, or leftist tendency. These incriminated groups are waiting for the law to absolve them of criminality. Such a fact is a scandal for the culture and the law. In any case, now that this specious argument on which the refusal was founded has been eliminated with the issuance of constitutional amnesty or general legislative amnesty, there remains no justification for refusing to recognize the Ennahda Party.

### Islamic Press

[AL-MUJTAMA'] What is Tunisia's position vis-a-vis the foreign Islamic press?

[Ghannouchi] The fact is that most of these magazines were banned at the end of Bourguiba's era—the phase of Bourguiban madness and the vilest part of the Bourguiba age when the man acted madly and tyrannically. He imagined that he could uproot the Islamic movement by pulling out its roots and sources, believing rightfully that these roots and sources are embodied in the Islamic and Arab cultural asset in Tunisia. So let him uproot, let him make everything French, let him ban Arabization. Let him protect the educational curricula from the impact of the Arab and Islamic culture, let him confiscate the Islamic magazines, and ban the importation of Arab and Islamic books and magazines, [thinking that] he will thus destroy the Islamic movement. But God be thanked, "the plotting of evil will hem in only the authors thereof." The tyrant has faced the same fate as other tyrants like him and Tunisia's Arab and Islamic tendency has continued strongly. Most of these magazines were banned under the previous administration, and the ban has continued under the current administration. These magazines include Kuwait's AL-WA'Y AL-ISLAMI, the UAE's AL-MANAR AL-ISLAMI, AL-ISLAH AL-IJTIMA'I, AL-MUSLIMUN newspaper and AL-AZHAR magazine. Nobody has challenged the moderation of these magazines or the fact that they are not magazines that serve a certain political party but serve the minimal limit of the Islamic culture. There is no doubt that the continued ban on these publications, compared to the openness of the western cultures, represents an old injustice perpetrated in the modern age. We hope that this injustice will be lifted rather than intensified with further bans on and harassment of the Arab Islamic tendency, especially since a law has been issued in the country banning the formation of parties on the basis of religion and language, meaning the Arabic language.

### Relationships With Other Tendencies

[AL-MUJTAMA'] During the period of harassment by Bourguiba's regime, the movement gained the sympathy of the Tunisian political tendencies with their various inclinations. What is the nature of the current relationship between the Islamic movement and the other Tunisian political and ideological tendencies?

[Ghannouchi] The second phase of the Bourguiba era, extending from the 1970's until Bourguiba was toppled, was characterized by the growth of familiarization and cooperation between the different Tunisian political tendencies with their various ideological sources, be they Islamic, secular, or communist. This cooperation was based on confronting Bourguiban oppression and struggling for establishment of public liberties. This was the most important objective on which the various factions agreed. Bourguiba fell, and the new administration's proclamation of a number of principles and slogans which respond to the appeals made by the political movement under the previous administration has created some sort of laxity or tepidity in the relations between these various parties. There is no longer an external pressure factor that motivates them to meet and confront a common enemy. The common enemy has fallen and the motive for continuance and meeting between the various parties has disappeared. Even though our relationship with colleagues in other parties has been afflicted with some sort of tension or misunderstanding, most often created by others, we can say that this relationship generally has continued to hold the possibilities of renewal and of meeting even though the justifications for meeting under the new administration have diminished, as I have already said. But should new conditions similar to the old conditions develop, it will at least be possible to meet with the majority of these parties. So our relations with most of the country's political tendencies are normal.

### Cable of Thanks to President Ben 'Ali

[AL-MUJTAMA'] Upon your arrival in Kuwait for this visit you cabled President Ben 'Ali. What were the cable's contents?

[Ghannouchi] I actually cabled President Ben 'Ali to thank and congratulate him on his fulfillment of the pledge he had undertaken to issue a constitutional amnesty or a general legislative amnesty. This is a demand on which Tunisia's political movement has been in agreement for more than 1 and ½ decades. This is a demand that is dear to the hearts of Tunisia's freemen, not because it rehabilitates a generation of strugglers who fought against oppression. The people have never viewed these groups as criminal in order that they may need a law or a legislative amnesty to rehabilitate them or to eliminate the blot from their character because their character is clear. Rather, this demand is dear to their hearts because our country's law has developed and because it now reflects the reality. Reality attests that for a long time, the law pursued these groups, brought them

to trial, and incriminated them, whereas the people viewed them as strugglers. We are delighted that the law has developed and acknowledged reality, and has risen to the level of reality. This is why we have thanked the head of state for the daring step he took by presenting his general legislative amnesty bill to parliament. The law was issued a few days ago. We have reservations about this law, which falls short of the aspirations of Tunisia's struggling political movement because it does not provide for the strugglers' right to be reinstated in their jobs and be compensated for the financial and psychological damage to which they have been subjected. But in any case, this is a significant step toward national reconciliation in Tunisia.

#### Is Movement's Historical Leadership a Problem?

[AL-MUJTAMA'] Some Arab observers in the Tunisian capital have attributed the refusal to license the Ennahda Party to the presence of the historical leaders at its top. The government does not want these historical leaders. With your absence from Tunisia these days, some observers have said that you are perhaps meeting the government's wish for the historical leaders to disappear from the party's forefront so that the party may be licensed. What is your comment?

[Ghannouchi] This means that I am plotting with the government (he said with a laugh). I have read this report in the press and I believe that it is a misreading of the government decision and of the relationship between us and the government. It is a misreading because the Islamic tendency's leadership has been produced by a historical struggle, not by inheritance. We have not inherited authority in the Islamic tendency. These leaders have not risen by way of inheritance or by way of violent military action. They have been imposed by the popular movement and by the struggle. All are aware of this. Moreover, the government has stated repeatedly that it wants to deal with true representatives of the people. Bourguiba tried to impose commanders and leaders on the parties and the unions, but to no avail. Tunisia's political leadership has stated repeatedly that it wants to deal with true representatives. I don't think that this approach of interfering in the political movements and popular organizations and of working to impose on them leaders tailored according to its wish will contribute to establishing the country's security and to developing ideal solidarity among its factions. To my knowledge, the Islamic tendency has no leader who has ever aspired or competed for a position in our movement. In all our congresses, one finds that most of the natural candidates who are expected to be nominated often decline to accept the responsibility in advance until a decision is issued at the outset prohibiting the withdrawal so that there may be free election and so that the responsibility may be held by whomever is chosen. People know and every observer of the Islamic Tendency Movement realizes that the decision does not come from above but from institutions. It is futile for another force to try to remove those produced by the Islamic movement's institutions. Even the movement's leaders, not to

mention others, do not have this power. I may excuse whoever has written this because he is not familiar with our movement's internal conditions.

#### Licensing, Again

[AL-MUJTAMA'] Now that the general legislative amnesty has been issued, do you plan to apply anew for government licensing of the Ennahda Party?

[Ghannouchi] This is the normal course. With the elimination of the imposed obstacle, the outcome is supposed to change. The conditions dictate this [application]. The regime has justified its rejection of the application on the grounds that the applicants do not enjoy civil rights. Now that their civil rights have been restored, the government has no argument, unless the refusal is a justification for something else. This would be dangerous. We want to deal with the government as seriously as it deals with us.

[AL-MUJTAMA'] Does not the presence of an Islamic movement in Tunisia affect the Arab Maghreb countries politically? What is the nature of your relationship with the existing Maghreb regimes?

[Ghannouchi] (Wondering:) Will recognition of the Ennahda Movement affect the Maghreb conditions? Yes it will, but positively. Recognition of the Ennahda Movement will make Tunisia and its regime a pioneer in centrism among the Arab regimes. One of the most significant dilemmas of the modern Arab regimes is embodied in their inability in many cases to deal with the Islamic movement in a manner that leads to development and that spurs unity among the national ranks. Recognition of the Ennahda Movement by the Tunisian regime will be a positive factor in the entire region and a pioneer act by the Tunisian regime within the Maghreb and Arab framework. We want our regime to gain this pioneership. As for the neighbors' position, we have not been told to date that any Maghreb government has a negative position toward the Islamic movement. Rather, we have been told of positive, not just neutral, positions. Legally, the Tunisian regime is independent and sovereign.

[AL-MUJTAMA'] We thank Mr Rached for kindly answering our questions. We implore God to lead us all to what is beneficial to our countries. God's peace, mercy and blessings be upon you.

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

#### 1988 Agricultural Import/Export Figures Reported 44040448 Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 22 May 89 p 2

[Text] The state's volume of agricultural crop imports dropped during the past year to 1.059133 million tons, as compared to 1.383430 million tons in 1987—a difference of 324.297 thousand tons and a drop of about 23 percent.

That was shown in the annual report that shows the quantities of agricultural products that are imported to the state and exported from it during the year.

The volume of agricultural exports during the past year was 132,422 tons, in addition to 18,785 transplants of various kinds, compared to 134,858 tons exported in 1987, in addition to 11,000 transplants of various kinds.

Also during the past year, the agricultural quarantine department refused entry to 1476.200 tons of various types of agricultural produce, as well as 10,844 fruit transplants, because they were unfit for consumption or because they were infected with agricultural diseases.

Regarding imports, around 757,980 tons of vegetables were imported in 1988, with a monthly average of 29,812 tons [as published], while 260,026 tons of fruit were imported, with a monthly average of 21,669 tons. The volume of imported dates was 76,833 tons with a monthly average of 6,403 tons; of field crops 240,621 tons, with a monthly average of 20,052 tons; of animal feed 92,315 tons, with a monthly average of 7,693 tons; and of other produce 31,358 tons, with a monthly average of 2,613 tons.

The volume of flowers and plants that were imported during the past year was 635 tons, with a monthly average of 53 tons.

As for items needed for plant production that were imported during the past year, there were 280,677 fruit transplants, with a monthly average of 23,390; 411,950

ornamental transplants with a monthly average of 34,329; 1,395,366 tons of seed, with a monthly average of 116,281; 110,336 tons of organic fertilizer, with a monthly average of 9,100 tons; 396.3 tons of chemical pesticides, with a monthly average of 33.030 tons.

As for the state's agricultural exports during the past year, both of local and re-exported produce, 47,428 tons of vegetables were exported, with a monthly average of 3,952 tons; 66,539 tons of fruit with a monthly average of 544 tons [as published]; 18,453 tons of other kinds with a monthly average of 1,537 tons; and 1,565 transplants were exported.

The state's most important agricultural exports are considered to be garlic, onions, ginger, dates, apples, pistachios, rice, lentils, and perfumes.

The volume of agricultural produce that agricultural quarantine refused to allow into the country last year was around 1476.200 tons of vegetables, 121 tons of fruit, and 1,182 tons of miscellaneous types, in addition to 904 fruit and ornamental transplants, because they were infested with untreatable pests and diseases, or were spoiled and untreated; or because the radiation in them was over the permissible safety limits.

During the past year the agricultural quarantine department examined and treated 280,677 fruit transplants, including transplants of mango, citrus, fig, Christ's-thorn, grape, pomegranate, and guava, as well as date palm suckers.

## PAKISTAN

### Economic Planners Said To Follow U.S. Orders

46560047 Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 30 May 89 p 1

[Column 'siasat namah' by Abdul Karim Abid: "Following U.S. Orders Will Not Help the Country"]

[Text] Pakistan's budget has always been written according to the orders of our U.S. bosses. However, our economic experts have not always followed U.S. orders, as there were some strong leaders in the country. There always was some opposition to U.S. pressure. It was the first time that no one had any power to oppose the U.S. pressure. Mr Ishaq Khan did not only succeed in making the United States happy, but also used to ignore its demands. His strategy was successful as he always had the support of a strong leader. No one had the nerve to raise a voice against the U.S. bosses this time. Thus, all we have to do is to add some color to the economic sketch that the U.S. experts have already drawn for us.

The U.S. bosses took pity on Benazir Bhutto, seeing the precarious political situation she is in. They have given her permission not to take all the difficult actions at the same time. After demanding the first part of these difficult tasks the remaining tasks have been postponed until the next year. Despite this delay, there will be a sharp rise in the price of electricity, telegraph and postal services, telephone, and railway transportation. Various subsidies and exemptions will be eliminated. Many important development projects will be abandoned in order to reduce the deficit. The fact is that the previous governments did not do anything to get out of the U.S. economic imperialism, and the present government is unable to do anything about it. With the passage of time, we are sinking further in this economic quicksand. We cannot get out of this mire until we stop formulating our economic plans according to our U.S. bosses' desires. The U.S. economic policy wants us to stay liberal and keep our markets open for consumption of products exported by western investors. The U.S. is bleeding our people in the name of raising our living standards and developing our economy, and giving this blood to these foreign investors. We have spent almost a half century acting upon this capitalist imperialism. The economic situation of the people will not improve if we spend another half century following this advice. We have to produce our own national mind and heart in our country's corridors of power. The first step towards economic reform requires sacrifices and hard work by the people and the government. They have to stop being engrossed in fun and being drunk on the wine of debts. We cannot have a healthy economy until we get rid of all the luxury goods in the markets on which our national welath is being wasted. While we cry about scarcity of electricity and bear the pains of load shedding, electric appliances and gadgets abound in our homes and in the markets. A recent government order asks for turning off airconditioners in government offices for a few hours daily. Why only a few hours? Why not turn them off permanently?

The officers can also work under fans just like the clerks and other government workers. What is the purpose of all those neon signs? Cannot we turn them off and restrict their use during the months of electric shortage? The people are also wasting electricity recklessly. Electric lights during weddings daze our eyes. This habit is making the national economic future very dark. We need a government that can introduce new thinking and feelings to make people change their habits.

One good sign from an economic point of view is that the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) is tired of its program or socialism. Even though the PPP leadership has repeated its adherence to a socialist economy in the Chitral meeting in order to give importance to its left wing that has become active again, we believe that Benazir Bhutto has many expectations from the private sector. However, she focuses her expectations on foreign investors and industrialists who because of expensive labor, lack of trained personnel, and other problems, want to move from their conventional production places. Pakistan is just one of those places they are looking at. The country must have stability before these foreign investors will settle here. Political stability cannot be established while all kinds of campaigns are going on. Second, these foreign investors are mainly interested in sucking the remaining blood from the people. We should encourage establishment of industries that help increase our exports to foreign markets. We need foreign capital for extracting energy minerals and in the area of engineering. We do not need help in the areas of toothpastes, hair creams, and other cosmetics for beauty and makeup. These only corrupt our people even more. They will use more of these beauty aids and the money earned from the blood and sweat of our people will go to other countries.

Even when foreign governments and investors move in to start industries here as expected, we must make sure that these industries are not fully controlled by foreigners. Arrangments must be made to encourage participation by local industrialists and investors. Restrictions on foreign investors should force them to work with the local investors. The foreign investors should work with our government on the larger projects that are beyond the scope of our private sector.

The PPP government can say that it did not have much time, and that it has to face this budget situation a few days after forming the government. It can also blame the political unrest for not being able to do anything for the people. It can tell us that it will do things in the future. The PPP may not be ready to implement any economic plans, but it is not ready mentally either to even plan for new economic horizons. Perhaps, the PPP has not even discussed any ideas in the area of economy. The party is so stuck with scuffles within its ranks that it is looking up to the United States for help to maintain its power and dignity. In exchange it will do anything that the U.S. president will require. This mentality will be obvious during Benazir's visit to the United States. She has obviously got more U.S. approval because of her policies

about Afghanistan. She has formed this policy as desired by the United States. The United States needs Benazir in this area; however, this need is not permanent. What will happen when the Afghan situation changes? Benazir has neither the time nor does she consider it necessary to think about it.

### **Private-Sector Involvement in Defense Production Supported**

46560053a Karachi JANG in Urdu 4 Jul 89 p 3

[Editorial entitled, "Defense Production and the Private Sector"]

[Text] The federal minister of defense has once again offered to include the private sector in defense production. Speaking to businessmen and industrialists in the office of the Federation of Commerce and Industry, the minister said that if the private sector is included in defense production, it will be on the basis of complete freedom of action; that they will not be subject to the supervision of the intelligence personnel at any level of activity nor will there be any attempt to subject them to government control through any other means. According to newspaper reports, the minister went so far as to say that the government will not be concerned with the source of the technology utilized or the elements working in conjunction with the private sector. Such conditions of work are encouraging for the private sector in a developing country like Pakistan and that was why the minister's proposal received a very positive reaction in the gathering from Tariq Saeed, the president of the Federation of Commerce and Industry and Ahmad Daoud, the country's prominent industrialist. Ahmad Daoud said, "Show us what we need to do to promote the defense industry and we will accomplish the task." Tariq Saeed also gave full assurances of the private industry's cooperation in defense production. It is very encouraging to witness the understanding and harmony expressed in the statements by the minister of defense and the representatives of the private sector. Nowadays, cooperation and understanding between the government and the private sector are the most important factors in a country's development and progress; lack of confidence and understanding between these two sectors can seriously affect a country's progress. A clear example of this was witnessed by the country in the decade of the seventies; the decision to nationalize large industries and financial institutions shook the private sector's confidence in the government. Industrial activity and production fell into stagnation throughout the country and investment in production ceased altogether. The government's guarantee of freedom of activity in the private sector is a laudable decision in every way and the government's assurance not to nationalize any private industry in the future is the result of realistic thinking which is naturally welcomed by the private sector. The resulting situation is in every way a fortunate one for the country. The participation of the private sector in such sectors of basic importance as defense and energy helps assure the country's strength both economically and in

defense. In defense, the private sector's participation will lessen Pakistan's dependence on other countries. If a wise course is adopted, defense products manufactured in the country can be exported to earn foreign exchange. The statements of the minister of defense show that most of the details of the plan to seek the cooperation of the private sector in defense production have been worked out and diligent work is in progress on the remaining details. The minister expressed the hope that two or three such industries will start regular production in the defense sector by April. We hope fervently that this will come about and that with the full cooperation of the private sector, the defense industry will expand and progress on a nationwide basis. In view of the large scale military preparations and dangerous experiments being carried out by India, it will not be easy for us to fulfill our defense needs from outside sources. The government should act without delay to put into effect its plan to include the private sector in the defense industry so that the benefits and objectives of the measure can be seen by the people as soon as possible.

### **Science, Technology Criticized as Weak Sectors**

46560053b Karachi JANG in Urdu 4 Jul 89 p 3

[Article by Ahmad Nadim Qasimi under byeline, "Hastening Along" and subtitled, "Science and Technology Are the Weakest Sectors of Our Society"]

[Text] Someone put his finger on the truth when he said that countries who no longer use their brains and even consider it a sin to give thought to certain problems fall into stagnation. They reach a crossroads in life and just stay there immobile. Human history shows that nations which habitually give serious thought to their problems outstrip other nations and those nations which lose the habit of reflection fall far behind. We Muslims pride ourselves on having taught Europe to think; but we overlook the fact that we ourselves gave up thinking, thus allowing Europe, our student, to overtake us and leave us, the teachers, behind. We Muslims became the "backward" people. We say that we sought out the writings of the Greek philosophers and translated them into Arabic and it was through these translations that European Orientalists were able to become acquainted with the great thinkers of their own continent. But we again overlook the fact that, after entrusting Greek wisdom to Europe, we fell victim to a kind of negative relaxation and, today, are counted among the backward people of the world.

As far as talk goes, we continually hear from prominent individuals that the times have changed and consequently we should master science and technology and set out on the road of human advancement as the progressive countries of the West have done. But all this talk is not followed by action. The amount allotted to the development of science and technology is shamefully inadequate compared to the importance of these branches of knowledge. This shows clearly that at no time did our authorities acknowledge by their actions the

importance of science and technology. We are in fact content to import Western "inventions" in science and technology; we think that since we can obtain ready made articles from Europe and America, there is no need to become involved in starting our own technology. Hence we have no facilities for learning, using and popularizing the branches of science and technology. We cannot benefit from the knowledge of our best scientific minds whose talents have to be utilized in foreign countries.

We have no shortage of good scientists and technology experts some of whom enjoy world fame; but these men are forced to go to foreign countries because in their own country, there is neither the environment nor the inclination to utilize their capabilities. Take, for example, Dr Abdul Salam, a Nobel prize winner with an enviable world reputation. He is an Ahmadi but how could his faith have any bearing on his knowledge of physics or on the laws governing atoms and planets? Whether a scientist is a Sunni, a Shia, from Devband or Bereili, Ahmadi, Parsee, Buddhist or Hindu, whatever a scientist's religion or convictions, he is first and last a scientist and we should value him as a praiseworthy son of our country and benefit to the fullest extent from his scientific knowledge. Another example is Dr Saeed Dorani who teaches physics in Birmingham University and has a vast knowledge of the possible uses of atoms. Why should he be teaching in Birmingham and not in Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar or Quetta? There are many such Pakistani men of knowledge and wisdom who are forced to live in foreign countries. Not only have we failed to provide any facilities of work for them, we have failed even to create a scientific environment; seventy-five percent of our people laugh themselves silly at the idea that men landed on the moon.

All we have been doing is practicing martial law; the first 8 or 9 years we spent in fighting among ourselves and expended all our energies in changing central governments. When finally a bureaucratic prime minister somehow put together a constitution, and election processions were held, Ayub Khan descended on the country with his martial law and for the next decade involved the country in that game. When Ayub relinquished power, another period of martial law started and this martial law threw away half our country. A duly elected government took office which enacted a unanimously approved constitution; but the head of this government was hanged and another martial law was imposed which publicly flogged and hanged people. It finally was shamed into holding elections, but these were on a non-party basis and abrogated politics. Now at last democratic elections have brought elected governments into office in the center and the provinces; one wishes that instead of fighting amongst themselves they would pay attention to the country's development; that they would ignore their personal and political differences and agree on a program to educate the new generation in scientific research and technical know-how; that we would rise above differences in ideology and beliefs and

bring our scientists home so that we would obtain from the benefits which other countries are enjoying at our expense.

### Provinces Urged To Check Spread of Illegal Weapons

46560049b Karachi AMN in Urdu 15 Jun 89 p 3

[Editorial: "Campaign To Recover Illegal Weapons!"]

[Text] The federal government has admitted the fact that the racial riots in Sindh have ended because of the cooperation of the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement].

A spokesman for the Ministry of Interior made this remark while announcing the initiation of a countrywide campaign to retrieve illegal weapons and gunpowder. He appealed to all the citizens to identify the people who possess illegal weapons which they constantly use. In order to make this campaign successful, an appeal has been made to the provincial governments to cooperate with the federal agencies.

There was an urgent need for such a campaign in order to bring back an age of peace and tranquillity. However, under the current circumstances, it cannot be said how far this campaign will be successful in the entire country. Because, with regard to the weapons, the attitude of some provincial governments, to some extent, is dubious.

There are many distribution sources for illegal weapons in the country. Some weapons come from Barhun located in the North-West Frontier Province. Others come from the tribal regions, where there are secret markets for the weapons used in the Afghan civil war. Similar markets exist in Balochistan, where the Afghan refugee camps are located.

Whether these weapons belong to the Kabul regime's military or are dispatched for the Afghan Mujahedin, they somehow reach these secret markets. They are then brought to Pakistan and sold here. From time to time, this worsens the state of law and order in this country. This chain has continued in the same way since the age of dictatorship. During the past 6 months, a huge number of trucks loaded with weapons and drugs have also been seized. Keep in mind that the trucks loaded with weapons and drugs reach their destination after passing through the entire Punjab, where, in the past, the law enforcement agencies never even looked up at them. Currently, during the democratic era, still no special attention is paid toward illegal weapons and drugs.

Due to the spread of and use of illegal weapons, the law and order in Sindh has been disrupted the most. The use of illegal weapons has resulted in major incidents in the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan. After the November 1988 general elections, when the country's politics changed, the political use of weapons also began. People made use of illegal weapons for this purpose; however, licensed weapons were also used.

Regarding this matter, the chief minister of Sindh, Syed Qaim Ali Shah, in a meeting in Islamabad disclosed that after a specific action in Sindh, a gang of six veiled men were captured. They were found to be terrorizing the people with weapons, creating disorder and engaging in plundering. The licenses that they handed over for the weapons that they carried were issued in Punjab.

The question that arises here is why did the Punjab government issue those elements licenses for such dangerous sophisticated weapons? Wasn't it aware of the fact that the weapons would be used to create terror and disruption in Sindh? Viewing through the perspective of the political conditions, one is left with a strong doubt about the members in authority in Punjab, that these disruptionists were sent to Sindh to create subversion for the purpose of the political gains.

A friend of General Ziaul Haq, Retired General Fazal Haq, was appointed chief minister of the North-West Frontier Province. During his tenure, Shia leader, Alaama Arif Hussain Al Hussaini, was assassinated. During his same period, riots erupted in the northern regions, in which there were also incidents of the massacre of thousands of persons. One person has been arrested in connection with the assassination of Alaama Al Hussaini. He has disclosed the involvement of Gen Fazal Haq and his brother-in-law, Senator Hashim Khan, in this incident. Although the investigation still continues, and it has been announced that without solid proof the said general would not be arrested, there are reports that 1,000 armed men are guarding Gen Fazal Haq's residence, and that stinger missiles have been installed there.

The question is whether those guarding the general possess licenses for their weapons. If they do, who granted them the licenses for the missiles? Doesn't this indicate that if proof against him becomes available and it is time for his arrest, he will resist it and will create an obstruction in the path of law?

Under such circumstances, the campaign of illegal weapons could face numerous problems. Along with the retrieval of weapons, the administration will have to take measures that will keep the number of weapons licenses to a minimum. If someone is granted permission for armed guards, the number should not exceed one. The privilege of large-scale security measures should be granted to the president and the prime minister only, and not to everyone. The main objective of any action taken should be to exclude weapons from the national life and politics.

### **Government's Case Against Former NWFP Governor**

46560054 Lahore CHATAN in Urdu 17 Jun 89 pp 9-11

[Article by Ibne Ahmad: "What Is Going To Happen to Gen Fazle Haq? Is Nawaz Sharif being Surrounded?"]

[Excerpts] General Fazle Haq, the former governor of the Northwest Frontier Province and a member of the

national assembly, is nowadays living under the protection of the Punjab government. He not only spends most of his time in the company of the chief minister of Punjab, but the government of Punjab has with great kindness appointed a contingent of the Punjab police to guard him. In view of the present unfavorable situation, General Fazle Haq might have left the country but the federal government has forbidden him from travelling outside the country. Hence, Punjab has now become his abode and he lives within the four walls of the chief minister's residence. The federal government has alerted all related agencies and airports that General Fazle Haq is wanted for the assassination of Alaama Ariful Hussain Hussaini, the leader of Tahrike Nefaze Fiqhe Jaafariya [Movement for the Promulgation of the Jaafariya Doctrine]; that he should not be allowed to flee the country and that he should be kept under strict surveillance. This is the situation which has forced General Fazle Haq to seek sanctuary with the government of Punjab. The erstwhile governor, acting chief minister, and the friend of the late Ziaul Haq is forced to go into hiding even though he is now a member of the national assembly. Such are the twists and turns of events and the consequences of past actions which are very difficult and even impossible to escape. The question is, why did General Fazle Haq need a sanctuary? Why is he, a former governor, a capitalist and a political leader, in hiding? The simple answer is that he is implicated in the murder of Arif Hussaini. No matter how exalted the rank of a murderer, once the law decides to catch him, he cannot elude its powerful grasp.

If a former prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto could be charged with murder and hanged, why should a former governor be allowed to escape the law? Perhaps political factors are involved in this campaign against General Fazle Haq. But the situation as has been presented shows him to be the accomplice of murderers. In this trial, he is standing on the same stage occupied by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: the difference is that Bhutto was the chairman of the People's Party and at that time a military dictator was in power. Today, the accused person is connected with IJI [Islamic Democratic Alliance] and the People's Party is in office. The situation suggests political vengeance. But the question is, under the present democratic system, can the legal experts who called Bhutto's hanging illegal, prove that General Fazle Haq was the real instigator of the crime?

One wonders what will happen to General Fazle Haq in the future. Will Nawaz Sharif also be apprehended for harboring a criminal? Is this part of a plan to inflict a mortal wound on the IJI? Nothing can be said for certain at the present time; what does seem certain is that Fazle Haq will not be able to elude the special police for long. It has become a tradition with us that every time a new government comes into office, it squares accounts with the former administration and starts a process of vengeance in order to prove the incompetence of the former government and its own capability. It was said about the late Zia that he was afraid of the power of Bhutto and the

People's Party; therefore, the destruction of the People's Party seemed to him to be the only way to save his own power. That was the reason why he started this "innovation." The present government of the People's Party, which had announced its renunciation of the policy of revenge, has now started on a course of vengeance and wants to punish General Fazle Haq for assisting Zia. Should this be the fact, then such a procedure would be undemocratic, illegal and unethical. It ill becomes a democratic government to bring its political opponents to trial for murder and then condemn them to death. This is a reprehensible tradition. However, if an individual is in fact implicated in a heinous crime like murder, he should be punished irrespective of whether he is rich or poor.

The report is circulating in some political circles that General Fazle Haq will soon be charged with smuggling narcotics; that the government has proof of his involvement in these smuggling activities but that it does not want to bring suit against him at present since it wants to have him arrested for the assassination of Arif Hussaini and then have him charged with smuggling heroin. According to these circles, the chief minister of Punjab will also be included in the lawsuit. Since the federal government does not possess any list of crimes committed against the law by Nawaz Sharif and all the effort of the special police in this connection have failed, the special police will now accuse Punjab's chief minister of harboring General Fazle Haq and may issue an FIR against them. In that case, the task of the Punjab police will be only to guard General Fazle Haq and Nawaz Sharif.

The matter at issue is that of the assassination of Alama Hussaini. But other political murders as well were committed during the Zia regime the most notable among which are the assassinations of Chaudhry Zuhur Ala, Zuhurul Hassan Bhopali and Alama Ehsan Elahi Zahir, all of whom were politicians. Will the People's Party search for their assassins as well? Political circles are of the view that the "vestiges" of martial law will be implicated in the murders of these three political leaders as well. The People's Party will thus benefit in two ways: first, it will gain good repute for finding the assassins and second, it will make its enemies see stars in the daylight and strike fear and trepidation in their hearts. Another view holds to the contrary; it thinks that the plan has the backing of the third force in the country. This force has always remained in power and now wishes to promote democracy. It wants to block any possible recourse to martial law and to bring to account those who were responsible for imposing martial law for eleven years.

It remains to be seen what effect this campaign against Fazle Haq will have on the country's politics. One can deduce from the present situation that the People's Party has started its campaign with Fazle Haq. This is the first rung of the ladder and several others remain to be scaled. Alama Hussaini was assassinated in the Frontier Province; but it should be remembered that Chaudhry Zuhur

Elahi and Alama Zahir were killed in Punjab and Zuhurul Hassan Bhopali in Sind. None of the assassins have as yet been arrested.

We would certainly say to the federal government, do not bring political differences into court proceedings. You are in office today but you may not be tomorrow; the prime minister should keep crime separate from politics. If she promotes the politics of vengeance, she may find herself its future victim. As an "enlightened leader," she should not mix revenge and politics. If a rich man is a criminal, he should not receive any special treatment. The federal government's campaign against narcotics is a welcome action on condition that politics does not enter into it. Any political color given to the matter could spur the government of Punjab to take retaliatory action. The Punjab police might then issue charges against the leaders of the People's Party and the special police might accuse members of the IJI of criminal activities. Should these things occur, the politics of vengeance will take on hideous proportions and the future of democracy will become dark.

#### **Commentary Supports Repealing Barbaric Laws**

*46560049a Karachi AMN in Urdu 12 Jun 89 p 3*

[Editorial: "Mullah-Pleasing Barbaric Laws"]

[Text] Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, in an interview with a French journalist, Mary Claire, said that she would review the barbaric laws of the martial law era.

Everyone is aware of the extreme cruelties that are being inflicted both in the name of, and under the pretense of Islam and Shariat on the people of Pakistan, especially the women. Additionally, the laws which were used as a tool for barbarism have a place of their own. However, the most prominent one from among them is the Hudud [Islamic Penal] Ordinance, which cannot be even recognized as a law, since it was not ratified by any legislative body.

The Hudud Ordinance is one of those laws which cannot be recognized as Islamic either. There are two reasons for that. One, if only one Islamic law is enforced in a non-Islamic system, not only would such a law itself be non-Islamic, rather it would be unable to make the society Islamic. The second point is can those who act upon this law and impose punishments under it claim that they have fulfilled the Will of God? We feel that they can not. The martial law era was purely non-Islamic, and it was a period of barbarism. Its signs and impacts have not ended even after the introduction of democracy in the country. Regrettably, this situation still continues.

We feel that under such circumstances, it is not enough just to say that the laws of the martial law era would be reviewed. These laws, especially the ones enforced to please the Mullahs, will have to be buried forever, since acting upon them not only prevents justice, but also does away with justice. Furthermore, such laws are used as a tool to tyrannize the people. What kind of Penal Code is



it under which a landlord father and son who raped a helpless and weak blind girl are acquitted, while the blind girl, who gave birth to their illegitimate child, is penalized after being accused of adultery? What type of Penal Ordinance is this, that is applicable to a helpless blind girl, but is ineffective and useless against those who lead processions of naked women in three regions of Punjab and under the force of guns, make them dance openly?

Benazir is well aware of the fact that the message of Islam is dignity and equality, and not barbarism and oppression. She said that Pakistan was founded to establish such a Muslim social order whereby both men and women enjoy equal rights and opportunities. But, one could talk of the rights and opportunities only when democracy was granted a chance to do its job in the country. Unfortunately, right from the start, the fundamentalists maintained the achievement of power in the name of Islam as their goal. Furthermore, by having a filthy alliance with a dictator who deceived under the name of Islam, they left no stone unturned to demolish the country. The savage and oppressive laws that prolonged the reign of a power-loving general, gained abundance in the country, which disgraced both Pakistan and Islam in the entire world.

If the Shariat [Islamic judicial system] is to be enforced in the country, then, by making every law including the penal law Islamic, the entire system will have to be enforced at one time. To engage in business without interest in one place and to restore the interest system in another and then, like Ziaul Haq, to claim that the banking and financial system has become Islamic will not work. If Islam needs to be enforced, then total Islam will have to be adopted instantly. Islam cannot be enforced in installments. If an Islamic system is enforced, the common Muslims will accept it easily. It will inconvenience only the rich, the landlords, and the people of the industrial sector, who, during Zia's dictatorship always remained or were protected from the Penal Ordinance and other oppressive laws. Living in an Islamic system will be difficult for many so-called

scholars and their dependents, because this very sector, considering itself to be the monopolist of religion, violates Islam the most. True Islam will prove fatal to those personalities who were always happy to regard a ludicrous system as being according to Islam.

One should also be prepared for the fact that in an Islamic system, the elements that create disturbances in the name of religion will have to be accountable for their anti-Islam activities, and for this purpose, a limit could also be set against them. Additionally, they will have to pay for the bloodshed of the human lives they have taken during their struggle to achieve power, no matter how old these incidents may be. One has to account for his actions. Besides, even the four Orthodox Caliphs were not safe from the Islamic reckoning.

The fundamental thing is that during this age, when even the death penalty has been abolished in most countries of the world, penalties of throwing people in trenches dug in the ground and then stoning them to death, would not enhance our reputation much. Therefore, it is better to revoke them and to introduce such penalties according to the Islamic judicial system, which could fulfill the Will of God. Justice is possible only when the judge himself is fully knowledgeable of Islam and comprehends the Will of God. Penalties of stoning people to death can cause a sensation, but it cannot be claimed that everyone has been treated with fairness; since dozens of flaws already exist in the past incidents.

This entire situation is being created because we insist on enforcing certain portions of Islam without reinstating true Islam. If anyone criticizes those portions, the fundamentalists start condemning him as an infidel; whereas, without making the society fully Islamic, such verdicts also are meaningless. Anyhow, the wrongdoing that continues under the pretense of Islam should be terminated. Particularly, acting upon the Hudud Ordinance should be stopped until a total Islamic judicial system has been implemented in the society. At that time, dealing with every person with justice alone should be made the axis of the Hudud Ordinance.

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